







A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 





Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 































Submitted to the University of Warwick





List of Tables iv




Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Dealer information and macro fundamentals - New evi-
dence on hybrid exchange rate models 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.1 Cross-currency Interdependence In The FX Market . . . . . . 34
2.5.2 Out-of-sample Forecasting Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
i
Chapter 3 Performance, Persistence, and Pay: A New Perspective
on CTAs 42
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.1 Biases In Commercial Hedge Fund Databases . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.2 CTA Trading Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2.3 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 CTA Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.1 Characteristics Of CTA Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Managerial Skill In The CTA Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.1 Crisis Alpha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5 Managerial Skill and Performance Persistence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Chapter 4 FX Spot and Swap Liquidity and the Effects of Window
Dressing 82
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2 Data and Variable Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2.1 Price Measures Of Market Liquidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.2 Price Measures Of Funding Liquidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.2.3 Quantity Measures Of FX Liquidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.4 Large Versus Small Dealers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 Liquidity Measures In The Long-Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4 Intraday FX liquidity Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.4.1 Short- and Long-run Liquidity Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.4.2 Adverse Liquidity Effects Of Small Dealer Competition . . . 117
4.4.3 Three-tier Dealer Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.4.4 Contagion Versus Interdependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
ii
4.4.5 Small Dealer Market-making: Case Study Of December 2016 130
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A Additional Tables & Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
iii
List of Tables
2.1 Summary Statistics: Market And Limit Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 Correlation Coefficients: Market And Net Limit Orders . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Regression Results: Hybrid Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Regression Results: Hybrid Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Comparison: Market And Net Limit Order Coefficients . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Goodness Of Fit: Hybrid Model And Its Nested Components . . . . 27
2.6 F-Tests: Hybrid Model And Its Nested Components . . . . . . . . . 28
2.7 In-Sample Predictions: Hybrid Model And Its Nested Components . 29
2.8 Alternative Order Flow Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.8 Alternative Order Flow Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.9 SUR Model: Cross-Equation Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.10 SUR Model: System-wide Explanatory Power . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.11 Out-Of-Sample Forecast: SUR Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.12 Out-Of-Sample Forecast: Panel Fixed-Effect Estimation . . . . . . . 39
3.1 Data Cleaning Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 Trading Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4 CTA Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Benchmark Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.6 CTA Performance: Bull and Bear Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
iv
3.7 CTA Performance: Bull and Bear Markets (By Trading Strategies) 59
3.8 CTA and Benchmark Returns: A Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.9 CTA Manager Skill and Gross Alpha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.10 CTA Manager Skill and Gross Alpha: Systematic Traders . . . . . . 65
3.11 CTA Manager Skill and Gross Alpha: Discretionary Traders . . . . 66
3.12 Crisis Alpha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.13 Manager Skill and Added Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.14 Manager Skill and Performance Persistence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.15 Compensation Scheme and Performance Persistence . . . . . . . . . 79
4.1 Example: Two-second window for JPY/USD spot rate . . . . . . . 88
4.2 Benchmark hourly and daily measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3 G-SIB classification vs Euromoney FX Survey rankings . . . . . . . 93
4.4 Summary Statistics: Liquidity dynamics (price-based) at quarter end 102
4.4 Summary Statistics: Liquidity dynamics (price-based) at quarter end 103
4.5 Intraday conditional co-movement of liquidity measures . . . . . . . 111
4.6 Intraday conditional co-movement of liquidity measures . . . . . . . 113
4.7 Long-run liquidity dynamics in JPY/USD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.8 Long-run liquidity dynamics in EUR/USD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.9 Forward rate bid-ask spreads and forward discounts quoted by large
vs small dealers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.10 Forward quote dispersion of small and large dealers . . . . . . . . . 120
4.11 Intraday conditional co-movement of liquidity measures . . . . . . . 122
4.12 Long-run liquidity dynamics in JPY/USD (By Bank Tiers) . . . . . 123
4.13 Long-run liquidity dynamics in EUR/USD (By Bank Tiers) . . . . . 124
4.14 Forward quote dispersion (By Bank Tiers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.15 Contagion from FX funding to market liquidity in JPY/USD . . . . 128
4.16 Contagion from FX funding to market liquidity in EUR/USD . . . 129
v
A1 Intraday correlation coefficient of liquidity measures by trading hour 138
A2 Intraday correlation coefficient of liquidity measure, by trading hour
incl. CIP deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A3 First principal component of liquidity measures by trading hour . . 140
A4 First principal component of liquidity measures, by trading hour incl.
CIP deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A5 Long-run dynamics in JPY/USD incl. CIP Deviation . . . . . . . . 142
A6 Long-run dynamics in EUR/USD incl. CIP Deviation . . . . . . . . 143
A7 Long-run dynamics in JPY/USD incl. CIP Deviation by Bank Tiers 144
A8 Long-run dynamics in EUR/USD incl. CIP Deviation . . . . . . . . 145
A9 Contagion from FX funding to market liquidity in JPY/USD, incl.
CIP Deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
A10 Contagion from FX funding to market liquidity in EUR/USD, incl.
CIP Deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
vi
List of Figures
3.1 Fund-level Skewness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2 Development Of Real Assets Under Management in the CTA Industry 73
3.3 Predictability of Fund Performance: Manager Skills Ratio . . . . . . 76
3.4 Predictability of Fund Performance: Manager Compensation . . . . 78
4.1 Large and small dealer characteristics in JPY/USD . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2 Large and small dealer characteristics in EUR/USD . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3 G-SIB surcharge and bucket cut-off points (2016/2017) . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 Activity of small and large dealers by market segment in JPY/USD 98
4.5 Activity of small and large dealers by market segment in EUR/USD 99
4.6 Bid-ask spreads in spot and forward rate, forward discount, and CIP
deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.7 Measures of dealer competition in spot and swap markets . . . . . . 105
4.8 Small dealer quoting intensity in the swap markets . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.9 Intraday liquidity dynamics: JPY/USD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.10 Intraday liquidity dynamics: EUR/USD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.11 Median quote in JPY/USD spot (December 2016) . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.12 Median quote in JPY/USD forward points (December 2016) . . . . . 133
4.13 Median quote in EUR/USD spot (December 2016) . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.14 Median quote in EUR/USD forward points (December 2016) . . . . 135
vii
Acknowledgments
I am indebted to my supervisors Philippe Mueller and Paul Whelan, and Michael
J. Moore for their guidance and mentorship during my PhD journey. I am grateful
for the numerous meetings and discussions, and the opportunities to collaborate on
interesting projects.
Also, I would like to thank my co-authors Alexander Mende, Vikas Raman,
and Vladyslav Sushko for sharing their wisdom and for being always available to
me as point of contact, for questions, and for discussions. I truly learnt a lot from
every meeting and I am thankful for these collaborations.
I am extremely grateful to my family. The continuous and unlimited support
of my parents, Sabine and Ingomar, and my sister, Niniane, during all of my studies
has been invaluable. I could not have done this journey without them. Further,
I cannot be thankful enough to my partner Wai Yee who stood by my side at all
times. She has been supporting me in every possible way.
Lastly, I would like to mention my friends and PhD colleagues in Warwick,
and abroad, and thank them for casual conversations about possible research ideas,
countless joyful discussions, many critical debates, and their support. A very incom-
plete list includes: Andrew, Danilo, Iram, Johannes, Julius, Kolja, Miranda, Oscar,
and Pedro.
Finally, I greatly acknowledge financial support from the Economic and So-
cial Research Council and Doctoral Training Centre in Warwick [grant no. 1500668].
viii
Declarations
This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. I confirm that I have not submitted the thesis
for a degree at another university.
Chapter 2 is circulated as a working paper with the title ”Dealer information
and macro fundamentals - new evidence on hybrid exchange rate models” and co-
authored by Michael J. Moore. A version of this chapter is accepted for publication
at the Journal for International Money and Finance.
Chapter 3 is circulated as a working paper with the title ”Performance,
Persistence, and Pay: A New Perspective on CTAs”, and co-authored by Alexander
Mende, Michael J. Moore, and Vikas Raman.
Chapter 4 is circulated as a working paper with the title ”FX Spot and






This thesis consists of three chapters, in which I examine recent developments
in the area of international finance. In Chapter 2, I introduce a new class of hybrid
exchange rate models that combine macroeconomic variables with information from
a foreign exchange interdealer trading platform. Building upon the work by Chinn
and Moore (2011), I examine the power of hybrid models to explain and forecast
exchange rate dynamics. I provide compelling evidence that hybrid models produce
more accurate in-sample predictions than a conventional macroeconomic Taylor rule
and well-established market microstructure models.
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of recent developments in the commodity
trading advisor (CTA) industry, a growing alternative investment class, in which
fund managers primarily take long and short positions in derivative markets. Based
on the largest and cleanest cross-sectional CTA dataset employed in the literature
to date, I assess the highly debated performance of CTAs (Bhardwaj et al. (2014),
Gregoriou et al. (2010)) and discuss different characteristics of their return dynam-
ics. Furthermore, I provide empirical evidence for a robust link between manager
skill, manager compensation, and future fund performance. The results are consis-
tent with a rational market where investors compete to invest with successful CTA
managers who set their fee structure to signal their skills to investors.
In Chapter 4, I examine liquidity dynamics of FX spot and swap instruments.
While trading volume of FX derivatives has been growing in the post-financial crisis
period (BIS (2016)), knowledge about these instruments’ liquidity dynamics is still
limited. In this essay, I show that market and funding liquidity are inherently linked.
In particular, I find that changes of dealers’ quoting activity in the FX spot market
has a significant impact on liquidity conditions in FX derivative markets. Further,
FX dealers’ quoting activity exhibits distinct seasonal up- and down-swings around
quarter-end months. In these periods, small-volume and less-informed dealers ap-
pear to substitute large dealers as market makers. This change in the composition
of the dealer ecosystem leads to a decline in market liquidity and to an increase in
funding costs of FX derivative instruments. In line with Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009), the increased funding costs seem to induce liquidity spirals at the end of the
year, whereby a worsening of funding conditions is associated with lower levels of




In this thesis, I discuss three different topics in the area of international finance.
Two chapters focus explicitly on developments in the foreign exchange market, the
deepest asset class with trading volume exceeding US$ 5 trillion a day (BIS (2016)).
In the other chapter, I analyse recent dynamics in the commodity trading advi-
sor (CTA) industry. Managers of these alternative investment vehicles do not only
actively trade currency options and futures but take long and short positions in
various derivatives and across most major asset classes. As indicated by the in-
dustry’s growing assets under management over the last twenty years or so, CTAs
have established themselves as a popular alternative investment class and they have
become an inherent component of today’s financial market infrastructure.
While all three chapters are directly or indirectly related to international
currency markets, an additional common characteristic is their distinct empirical
component and the extensive data analysis which was conducted for each essay.
In two chapters I employ high-frequency based data that was originally obtained
in raw format at the tick-by-tick frequency from FX trading platforms. In the
first essay, the data source is Thomson Reuters Dealing 3000 interdealer platform,
which provides information on quotes at the top of the order book and on executed
trades in the FX spot market. In the third essay, I use information about bid and
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ask prices of spot and derivative instruments, and about the name and location of
active dealers obtained from Thomson Reuters Tick History Database. Both rich
and very detailed datasets offer various angles to study recent dynamics in the foreign
exchange market. The analysis in the second chapter which concerns dynamics in
the CTA industry is primarily based on conventionally employed monthly return
information for a large cross-section of funds. I use data from Barclay’s Hedge Fund
database and from proprietary datasets, which are all provided by the managed
account specialist Risk and Portfolio Management SB. With the aim to contribute
to the international finance literature, the structure of the thesis can be summarized
as follows.
In Chapter 2, I introduce a new class of hybrid exchange rate models that
combine macroeconomic variables and information from interdealer trading plat-
forms. Building upon the work by Chinn and Moore (2011), I assess the power
of hybrid models to explain and predict exchange rate dynamics. In contrast to
earlier studies, I employ information from one of the largest foreign exchange in-
terdealer datasets, which covers nineteen U.S. dollar and euro currency pairs for
a period of more than ten years. In addition, I examine the impact of different
measures of trading and quoting activity - namely market order flow (Evans and
Lyons (2002)) and net limit order flow (Kozhan et al. (2015)) - on the dynamics
of currency prices at the monthly frequency and as a component of a hybrid ex-
change rate model. The comprehensive analysis points towards largely unexplored
benefits that emerge from combining information from conventional macroeconomic
and market microstructure models. The results from the in-sample analysis show
that the hybrid model produces almost always more accurate predictions than its
individual model components. In contrast, a simple out-of-sample forecasting exer-
cise produces mixed evidence across the currency cross-section. Depending on the
currency pair, the hybrid model is outperformed by a conventional Taylor rule or
simple market microstructure models.
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Chapter 3 provides an extensive empirical analysis of recent developments in
the commodity trading advisor industry (CTA), using the largest and cleanest cross-
sectional dataset on fund characteristics, trading strategies, and return information
analyzed so far. Contrary to recent studies (Bhardwaj et al. (2014), Gregoriou et al.
(2010)), I show that CTA managers generate positive significant net-excess returns
for investors. These net returns are highly positively skewed and move counter-
cyclically to equity markets, offering investors an alternative investment opportunity
with unique risk-return dynamics. In addition, I find that CTA managers produce
significant annualized gross abnormal excess returns of more than 5% that cannot be
explained by conventional factor models. Lastly, I document that the performance
of managers is persistent. Following Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), I show that
manager skill and manager compensation predict future fund performance for up
to 36 months. These findings are consistent with a rational market where investors
compete to invest with successful CTA managers who use fees to signal their skills
to investors.
In Chapter 4, I return to the analysis of international currency markets and
I examine liquidity dynamics of FX spot and swap instruments. While trading
volume of FX derivatives has been growing in the post-financial crisis period (BIS
(2016)), knowledge about these instruments’ liquidity dynamics, and the link with
FX spot market activity is still limited. Previous research examining FX liquidity
so far (e.g. Mancini et al. (2013), Karnaukh et al. (2015)), has focused purely on
spot market liquidity characteristics and largely ignored other currency instruments.
In this essay, in contrast, I consider spot and swap markets at the same time,
show that market and funding liquidity are closely related, and document that
liquidity dynamics across these FX instruments are inherently linked. In particular,
I find that quoting activity of dealers in the spot market has an impact on liquidity
conditions in the swap market. Further, dealers’ quoting activity exhibits seasonal
up- and down-swings around quarter-end periods, during which small-volume and
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less informed dealers appear to substitute large dealers as market makers. This
leads to a decline in liquidity and increase in funding costs of FX derivative trading.
In line with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) the increased funding costs, seem to
induce liquidity spirals at year-ends, whereby a worsening of funding conditions is
associated with lower levels of market liquidity in currency spot and swap markets.
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Chapter 2
Dealer information and macro
fundamentals - New evidence on
hybrid exchange rate models
2.1 Introduction
This paper introduces a new class of hybrid exchange rate models that combine for-
eign exchange (FX) market microstructure-based order flow measures and macroe-
conomic fundamentals in one and the same model. The analysis is motivated by
recent findings in Chinn and Moore (2011), which provide empirical evidence that
models accounting for FX dealer information and macroeconomic measures improve
the performance of economic models. This paper builds upon this novel result.
Specifically, I exploit the link between a conventional Taylor rule and changes in
currency prices to construct hybrid exchange rate models. I argue that a bridge
between a conventional macroeconomic approach and FX trading dynamics can be
built by proxying dealers’ risk premia by the aggregated trading and quoting activity
in the FX interdealer market. I evaluate the in-sample performance of such hybrid
models using various criteria and conduct a stylized one-month ahead out-of-sample
5
forecasting exercise to show the robustness of this finding and, subsequently, discuss
the advantages and shortcomings of hybrid exchange rate models. Examining the
benefits of combining models from the recent FX market microstructure literature
(Evans and Lyons (2002)) with conventional Taylor rule fundamentals (Engel and
West (2005), Engel et al. (2008)), this paper addresses various research questions:
Do hybrid models fit exchange rate data more accurately than their individual nested
model components? Is net limit order flow a significant driver of currency dynamics
in a hybrid exchange rate model framework and at the comparably low monthly
frequency? What is the impact of cross-currency interdependencies on the analysis?
How does a hybrid model perform in a stylized out-of-sample forecasting exercise
compared to conventional macroeconomic and market microstructure models?
Equipped with a new class of hybrid models, I discuss these questions and aim
to contribute to the literature in various ways. First, this paper provides evidence
that hybrid models have a more accurate model fit than its individual components
separately. I use various model selection criteria and short-term in-sample predic-
tions to illustrate the advantages of employing hybrid exchange rate models. The
performance of hybrid models is superior to conventional models for U.S. dollar ex-
change rates and for the most frequently traded euro pairs, such as the EUR/USD
and EUR/JPY. For some currency pairs, the increase in the hybrid model’s good-
ness of fit measure is even larger than the aggregated R̄2 measure of the individual
nested models. In particular these cases highlight the possible gains of using hybrid
models to analyse exchange rate dynamics. The findings are robust to different
specifications of order flow that account for the time-varying trading and quoting
activity in the FX interdealer market.
Second, I build upon recent results by Kozhan et al. (2015) and show that net
limit order flow is a significant driver of exchange rates at the monthly frequency.
While the level of significance varies largely across currencies, net limit order flows’
impact on prices is almost always smaller than the impact of market orders. These
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findings are in line with Bloomfield et al. (2005) who argue that informed traders
use market orders and act as liquidity takers at the beginning of the trading period,
before changing their quoting activity, increasingly quote limit orders and provide
liquidity. In this study, this behaviour is empirically captured by the negative corre-
lation coefficient between market and net limit orders and by the smaller coefficients
associated with net limit orders that I obtain in the regression analysis. While the
impact of net limit orders has been examined at the intraday and daily level, to the
best of my knowledge this study is the first to document their significant impact on
returns as part of a macroeconomic model and at the monthly frequency.
Third, I use the comprehensive cross-section of the underlying FX order flow
dataset and conduct seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) analysis to highlight the
importance of cross-currency interdependencies for the analysis of exchange rate.
Accounting for the significant correlation across euro and U.S. dollar pairs, I employ
an adapted measure for the system-wide model fit that explicitly penalizes the larger
number of estimates in the system. This measure confirms that the hybrid approach
produces a better system-wide goodness of fit than its individual model components.
Further, I use the SUR model as well as panel fixed effects estimations to conduct
a stylized one-month ahead out-of-sample forecasting exercise. In both regression
approaches, I find that hybrid models outperform a conventional macroeconomic
Taylor rule for several U.S. dollar pairs, but often produce higher mean square
errors than market microstructure models. For euro pairs, market microstructure
models produce the most accurate out-of-sample forecasts. While the focus of this
paper is the in-sample analysis, these findings suggest that hybrid models can be
potentially useful to forecast exchange rates out-of-sample.
Finally, all empirical evidence presented in this study is based on one of the
largest foreign exchange interdealer order flow datasets analysed so far. I examine
10 U.S. dollar and nine euro currency pairs between January 2004 and February
2014. To the best of my knowledge this is the broadest cross-sectional coverage of
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foreign exchange order flow data, covering information not only about trades but
also about limit order submissions and cancellations at the top of the order book.
Accounting for these two measures of dealer activity, for different base currencies,
and for a period of more than 10 years, the dataset provides new insights into the
link between currency prices and order flows in the foreign exchange market.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review recent developments
in the foreign exchange rate literature. The research methodology is described in
section 3, and I introduce the data in section 4. The main findings are presented in
section 5. Section 6 concludes the discussion.
2.2 Literature Review
The apparent disconnect between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rates
is well documented in the literature (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)) and has
received increasing attention since the seminal paper by Meese and Rogoff (1983).
Despite numerous empirical assessments, however, researchers’ success in explaining
exchange rate movements remains limited if solely macroeconomic variables are used
as explanatory factors.
An alternative angle to understand exchange rate patterns is provided by
market microstructure models, which established themselves as a new stream in
the exchange rate literature within the last 15 years or so. Instead of focusing
on macroeconomic fundamentals, the portfolio shift model by Evans and Lyons
(2002) determines exchange rate changes by investors’ demand for a currency. Evans
and Lyons show that accounting for data from FX trading platforms, measured
by market order flow, increases the explanatory power of exchange rate models
significantly. Several studies subsequently confirm this finding (e.g. Killeen et al.
(2006)) and show that information incorporated in market microstructure variables
is a crucial driver of exchange rate.
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Surprisingly, macroeconomic and market microstructure models have evolved
largely separately from each other, although both literature streams attempt to ex-
plain the same phenomenon: the dynamics of exchange rates. Possible benefits
from combining different modelling approaches have not been systematically ex-
ploited yet, even though a synergy of models could help to improve academics’
understanding of the development of currency prices.
One exception is Chinn and Moore (2011), who examine an ad-hoc hybrid
version of the traditional money-income model that includes market order flow as
an additional regressor. Estimating an error correction model for dollar/euro and
dollar/yen currency pairs, the authors illustrate that a hybrid exchange rate model
has a superior model fit compared to the individual nested model components. The
improvement in explanatory power is driven by the fact that market order flow ag-
gregates otherwise disperse private information and make it public to a larger group
of FX dealers. Consequently, market participants benefit from a more comprehen-
sive set of information on which they can base their decisions.
This paper builds upon these findings, but I extend the modelling approach
by Chinn and Moore (2011) in several dimensions. First, I derive the hybrid macroe-
conomic model from the link between a Taylor rule and changes in currency prices.
This step is motivated by the recently documented success of Taylor rule models to
explain exchange rate patterns (Engel et al. (2008), Molodtsova and Papell (2009)).
Generally, Taylor rules provide a link between short-term interest rates-the cen-
tral banks’ main direct policy tool—and dynamics of macroeconomic fundamentals.
These are inherently influencing asset prices such that the bridge to exchange rate
changes can be built using the uncovered interest rate parity condition.
Second, the class of hybrid models in this study encompass up to two mea-
sures from the FX interdealer markets that capture different dimensions of dealer
activity. I use information about exchange rates that are incorporated in market
order flow following Evans and Lyons (2002) portfolio shift model. The measure
9
is defined as the sum of net buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades and captures
demand-shifts for a particular currency. Moreover, I use a recently introduced trans-
action flow measure, namely net limit order flow, as additional explanatory variable.
As outlined in detail in the data description, net limit order flow is defined as the
difference between executed and cancelled limit orders that lead to price changes at
the top of the order book. In line with the original work by Kozhan et al. (2015), I
postulate that dealers’ submitted and cancelled limit orders have an impact on the
price discovery process of exchange rates.
By incorporating this additional measure, the analysis not only considers a
subset of dealers’ activity in the form of market orders but accounts for a larger set
of trading dynamics that take place in the FX interdealer market. The importance
of this additional dimension of quoting activity at the intra-day and daily frequency
has been recently documented by Kozhan et al. (2015). This paper is the first to
assess the impact of net limit order flow within the framework of a macroeconomic
model and at the monthly frequency. Finally, while most of the existing FX market
microstructure literature focuses on the most liquid U.S. dollar pairs, the scope
of the employed dataset allows for a more comprehensive empirical assessment.
I look at a considerably larger cross-section of pairs that includes euro and U.S.
dollar denominated exchange rates, fewer liquid pairs, currencies from emerging and
developed economies, and from different exchange rate regimes that have received
less attention so far.
2.3 Methodology
The starting point to construct the hybrid exchange rate models is a conventional
Taylor rule that establishes a link between short-term interest rates and macroe-
conomic fundamentals. The relationship between the central bank policy tool and
macroeconomic developments is derived following the approach by Molodtsova and
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Papell (2009), who define a central bank’s policy function as
i∗t = πt + φ(πt − π) + γyt + r∗ + κqt (2.1)
where i∗t is the central bank’s target for the interest rate, π∗ is the target level
of inflation, πt refers to the inflation rate, yt is the output gap, measured as the
difference between potential and current output in period t, r∗ is the equilibrium
level of the real interest rate, and qt refers to the real exchange rate. The last
factor is included following the work of Clarida et al. (1998), who argue that central
banks take into account the stability of currency prices when setting the interest
rate. Next, combining the central bank’s target for inflation and interest rate in one
parameter (µ = r∗ − φπ∗) and ϕ = (1 + φ), Equation (2.1) can be rewritten as
i∗t = µ+ ϕπt + γyt + κqt (2.2)
The intercept term (µ) measures deviations from the short-term interest rate and
the target rate of inflation. Further, I allow the Taylor rule specification to account
for the impact of interest rate inertia, defined as
it = (1− ρ)i∗t + ρit−1 + vt (2.3)
where it denotes the short-term interest rate and ρ ∈ [0, 1] is a smoothing parameter
that captures the gradual adjustment of interest rates to the target level. Substi-
tuting (2.2) in (2.3), I derive the following policy response function
ît = (1− ρ)(µ+ ϕp̂it + γŷt + κq̂t) + ρ̂it−1 + v̂t (2.4)
where ”ˆ” denotes variables of the foreign country. The home country’s policy
response function has the same set-up, but the parameter of the real exchange rate
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is set to zero (κ = 0). It implies that the interest rate is determined only by its own
lagged term, inflation, and output gap:
ıt = (1− ρ)(µ+ ϕπt + γyt + κqt) + ρit−1 + vt (2.5)
Assuming both countries set their interest rates according to Equations (2.4) and
(2.5), the interest rate differential can be written as
it − ît = α+ β1(πt − π̂t) + β2(yt − ŷt) + β3(it−1 − ît−1) + β4qt + vt − v̂t (2.6)
where the parameters of the policy response functions are summarized as α = (1−
ρ)µ, β1 = (1− ρ)ϕ, β2 = (1− ρ)γ, β3 = ρ, and β4 = (1− ρ)κ.
As the relationship between interest rate differential and macroeconomic fun-
damentals is established, I turn next to the link between currency prices, interest
rates, and order flow dynamics. A crucial starting point is the uncovered interest
parity (UIP) condition given by
st − st−1 = it−1 − ît−1 + εt (2.7)
where the change in currency prices between period t and t − 1 determined by the
lagged interest rate differential between home and foreign country (it−1 − ît−1) and
a residual term εt. If UIP holds, the link between currency prices and fundamentals
can be built by substituting the interest rate spread from Equation (2.6) into the
UIP condition. For the analysis in this paper, I depart from this assumption and
account for the fact that UIP does not necessarily hold. I follow Breedon et al. (2016)
and argue that fluctuations of currencies’ prices are not only driven by the interest
rate spread between two countries but also by an additional risk premium term,
which I denote as δt. As the future path of exchange rates is unknown to market
participants, currencies are risky assets, so that depending on their expectations
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about the future dynamics of the exchange rate and the likelihood of sudden shocks
to currency prices, dealers require additional compensation for holding currencies
as part of their portfolio. This additional risk component ultimately has an impact
on the exchange rates, as it affects dealers’ quoting activity.
To allow for the additional risk premium, I follow Breedon et al. (2016) and
decompose the residual term ε in a risk premium term (δt) and an error term (ut),
so that Equation (2.7) can be re-written as
st − st−1 = it−1 − ît−1 + δt + ut (2.8)
While it is notoriously difficult to measure risk premia precisely, I assume
dealers’ trading decisions and quoting activity in the FX market can serve as a
reasonable proxy for dealers’ decisions to hold and trade a currency pair. Hence,
holding a larger fraction of a currency as part of the portfolio, dealers increase their
exposure to shocks affecting the underlying asset and, therefore, the risk premium
for holding the asset must be larger. These shifts in demand for certain currencies in
turn are captured by aggregated market and net limit order flow in the interdealer
market and, therefore, can be considered as a reasonable proxy for the risk premium
in Equation (2.8). Under this assumption, the hybrid model can be formulated as
a combination of Equations (2.6) and (2.8), so that
st − st−1 = α+ β1π̃t−1 + β2ỹt−1 + β3it−2 + βqt−1 + γ1mot + γ2lot + ut (2.9)
where π̃t−1 = πt−1− π̂t−1, ỹt−1 = yt−1− yt−1, it−2 = it−2− it−2, denote the country
differentials for inflation, output gap and lagged interest rates, respectively.
The hybrid model in Equation (2.9) captures the benefits of combining
macroeconomic fundamentals and FX dealer information in one single approach.
First, the hybrid model nests the link between a conventional macroeconomic Tay-
lor rule and changes in currency prices if UIP holds (γ1 = γ2 = 0). In such a model,
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I expect estimates β1, β2, β3, β4 to be positive. An increase in the home country’s
inflation is associated with a contractionary monetary policy response. For example,
as a response to an increase in price levels, central banks pursue a tighter monetary
policy and increase the country’s short-term interest rate. Such a policy decision
translates into an appreciation of the exchange rate (β1 > 0). As Molodtsova and
Papell (2009) point out, an increase in the level of inflation leads not only to a
contemporaneous rise in the home interest rate but also affects market participants’
expectations about the long-lasting impact of the policy intervention. The revision
of expectations can result in a further appreciation, which accelerates the initial
impact of the change in currency prices.
Further, β2 captures the impact of output gap differences between two coun-
tries. A positive spread implies an increase in economic activity that exceeds the
potential output level. This divergence is likely to occur during economic booms and
business cycle upswings and, in combination with inflationary pressure, may lead
to an adjustment of the central bank’s interest rate path. Following the same line
of argument as before, the increase in prices is associated with a rise in the interest
rate and the appreciation of the base currency compared to the foreign currency
(β2 > 0).
The impact of interest rate inertia is captured by β3 and is expected to be
positive as an increase in interest rate in the home country is associated with an
appreciation of the domestic currency. Since interest rates enter the Taylor rule
specification with a lag, I account for the fact that changes in monetary policy may
not be immediately incorporated in asset prices (β3 > 0).
Lastly, the impact of an increase in the real exchange rate is associated
with increasing returns. Since real exchange rates are determined by the sum of log
nominal exchange rate and the log price differential, an increase in the real exchange
rate, ceteris paribus, is driven by lower price levels in the home country or higher
price levels in the foreign country. The higher the domestic price level relative to
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the foreign price level, the more distinct the impact on exchange rate returns will
be (β4 > 0).
Second, Equation (2.9) nests the portfolio shift model (β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 =
γ2 = 0), in which contemporaneous market order flow has a significant and positive
impact on the price discovery process of currencies (Evans and Lyons (2002)). In
line with the original model, I expect the estimate of γ1 to be positive (γ1 > 0)
because an increase in order flow is associated with a higher net demand for the
home currency. The shift in demand leads to an increase in the exchange rate.
Third, the hybrid model accounts for the portfolio shift model, which also
includes net limit orders (β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0). In this setup, I expect estimates
of both order flow components to be positive, as the buying pressure from net limit
order flow works in the same direction as that of market orders. Larger demand
for the base currency leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate. Therefore, γ2
is expected to be positive. The dealer’s decision to submit either market orders or
limit orders, however, depends on the signal and strength of private information.
Following Kozhan et al. (2015) and Bloomfield et al. (2005) I suspect that dealers
primarily employ market orders to exploit gains from private information and so
price signals from limit orders should be smaller than signals from market orders.
Therefore, I expect that the magnitude of γ1 is larger than that of γ2.
2.4 Data
The empirical analysis is conducted at the monthly frequency, since most macroeco-
nomic data are not available at a higher level. I use exchange rate information for 19
currency pairs, which are obtained from the interdealer platform Reuters Dealing.
The sample period starts in January 2004 and ends in February 2014 (122 obser-
vations) and covers more than 10 years of data. I split the data into two separate
panels, where the euro (EUR) and the U.S. dollar (USD) are the base currencies,
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respectively. The euro serves as numeraire currency for the following nine cur-
rency pairs: Swiss franc (EUR/CHF), Czech koruna (EUR/CZK), British pound
(EUR/GBP), Hungarian forint (EUR/HUF), Japanese yen (EUR/JPY), Norwe-
gian krone (EUR/NOK), Polish zloty (EUR/PLN), Swedish krona (EUR/SEK)
and U.S. dollar (EUR/USD). For currency pairs denominated in U.S. dollars, I
consider the Canadian dollar (USD/CAD), Swiss franc (USD/CHF), British pound
(USD/GBP), Israeli shekel (USD/ILS), Indian rupee (USD/INR), Japanese yen
(USD/JPY), Mexican Peso (USD/MXN), Polish Zloty (USD/PLN), Singapore dol-
lar (USD/SGD) and South African rand (USD/ZAR). For each pair, I construct
a time-series of currency returns (∆st), which is defined as the difference of the
end-of-month log spot exchange rate between month t and t− 1.
The order flow data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Dealing 3000, which
is one of the largest electronic trading platforms in the FX market. While the orig-
inal dataset contains order flow information for 80 exchange rates, I only choose
currency pairs that are available for the entire sample period and that are denomi-
nated by either the euro or U.S. dollar. The currency pairs included in the analysis
account for approximately 73% of foreign exchange market global turnover in April
2013 (BIS (2013b)). In contrast to earlier empirical assessments, the sample covers
two base currencies, and includes developing and emerging markets currencies as
well as different exchange rate regimes. While most of the advanced economies are
classified as free-floating currency regimes that follow inflation-targeting monetary
policy frameworks, some of the smaller economies employ more restrictive exchange
rate arrangements. These include Singapore, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Israel, South Africa, and India (IMF (2014)).
While the original transaction data from Thomson Reuters is obtained at
the intraday frequency, I transform order flow measures to the monthly level by
aggregating order flow data within each month. Following previous studies (e.g.
Love and Payne (2008)), I measure market order flow as the number of buyer-
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initiated minus seller-initiated trades. Since I only have information on the number
of trades but not on traded volume, the implicit assumption of the market order
flow measure is that all trades are of equal size. As shown by previous research,
this is not a concerning shortcoming and the significant impact of transaction flow
data on exchange rate returns exists, even if order flow is measured by the number
of trades instead of trading volume (Rime et al. (2010)). I denote the measure of
market order flow in month t as (mot)
In addition to market order flow, I employ a new microstructure-based mea-
sure called net limit order flow. Following Kozhan et al. (2015), net limit order flow
is based on submitted and cancelled limit orders that change the price at the top
of the order book. The measure is constructed in the following way. I construct
a time series of net order submissions, which accounts for the difference between
the number of bid and offer submissions, and a second time series of net cancella-
tions, which includes the difference between the number of cancellations of bid and
offer orders. Equipped with these two series I define net limit order flow as the
difference between net limit orders and net cancellations. The measure considers
that private information is transmitted through limit order quoting activity and it
therefore differs fundamentally from the conventional market order flow measure.
Further, net limit order flow explicitly accounts for submitted and cancelled limit
orders because we postulate that both dealer decisions can affect the price path of
currencies. Since it accounts for two dimensions of dealer activity—limit order sub-
missions and cancellations—the measure differs from limit order imbalances, which
have been examined in earlier studies (e.g. Cheung and Rime (2014)). In line with
market orders, I aggregate the net limit order flow measure to a monthly frequency
and denote the variable in period t as (lot)
To illustrate the crucial role of net limit order flow in the interdealer market,
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the monthly average trading and quoting activity.
As shown, the average number of trades and the number of submitted and
17
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Market And Limit Orders
This table reports the average number of trades executed through market orders (mo) and
the number of net limit orders, defined as the sum of submitted and cancelled orders, (lo)
for nine euro and ten U.S. dollar pairs.
Euro U.S. dollar
mo lo mo lo
USD 29,829 359,106 CAD 145,386 171,365
CHF 426 50,440 CHF 338 130,375
CZK 6,860 22,242 USD 189,749 322,253
GBP 92,423 356,597 ILS 4,435 18,474
HUF 11,516 34,150 INR 31,810 47,412
JPY 265 200,627 JPY 3,231 180,895
NOK 26,952 101,711 MXN 68,469 201,141
PLN 19,288 65,861 PLN 926 124,702
SEK 29,735 100,374 SGD 30,459 52,775
ZAR 32,028 127,122
Notes: The sample period is January 2004 to February 2014, comprising 122 monthly
observations for each currency pair. The data source is Thomson Reuters Dealing 3000
trading platform.
cancelled limit orders varies significantly across currency pairs. For example, the
pair EUR/USD shows one of the highest number of trades and orders across euro
currencies, reflecting that it is the most frequently traded currency pair in the foreign
exchange market (BIS (2013b)). When the quoting currency is associated with an
emerging market or small economy, dealer quoting activity is substantially lower.
The variation in market order flow and net limit orders across pairs illustrated
in Table 2.1 can be explained by the fact that Reuters Dealing 3000 is not the only
electronic trading platform in the foreign exchange market. For example, it is the
main trading venue for commonwealth and many emerging market currencies, as
reflected in the comparatively large number of trades and order submissions for
EUR/GBP (356,597) and GBP/USD (322,253). In contrast, the average number
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of market orders involving the Japanese yen in the sample is comparatively low
(EUR/JPY 265; USD/JPY 3,231), although the Japanese yen is one of the most
frequently traded currencies. Yet, even though dealer activity for certain currency
pairs is higher on alternative market venues, transaction dynamics between the
main trading platforms are closely linked and highly correlated with each other at
low frequencies (Breedon and Vitale (2010)). This should ensure that the results
are representative of the overall dynamics in the FX market.
Lastly, even though the average monthly number of market orders is low for
some currency pairs (for example when Japanese yen or Swiss franc is the respective
quote currency), the dataset has the advantage that it covers submitted and can-
celled limit orders so that an additional dimension of dealer activity is measured.
The high quoting activity at the top of the order book (lo) may be indicative of the
important role played by net limit orders in the foreign exchange market.
An indication of the significant impact of both transaction measures for the
dynamics of currency prices is illustrated in Table 2.2. The table shows the corre-
lation coefficients between market order and net limit order flow and the log spot
exchange rate for all 19 currency pairs. In 17 out of 19 cases the correlation coef-
ficient between market orders (mot) and the change in prices (∆st) is positive and
statistically significant at least at the 10% level. Only for USD/MXN the coeffi-
cient is negative, but the magnitude of the contemporaneous relationship is much
lower than for other pairs. This positive correlation is in line with the predictions of
the portfolio shift model (Evans and Lyons (2002)). Positive co-movement between
currency prices and order flow can be interpreted as net demand for the base cur-
rency, which leads to an appreciation of the euro or U.S. dollar, respectively. The
correlation is not significant, although positive, when the Swiss franc is the quote
currency. A possible explanation for the missing significant linear relation might be
the low number of market order submissions on this trading platform, as indicated
by Table 2.1.
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While the role of market order flow is clear, the impact of net limit order
flow (lot) on exchange rate changes is more ambiguous at the monthly frequency.
Table 2.2: Correlation Coefficients: Market And Net Limit Orders
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the change in the log spot exchange
rate (∆st), market order flow (mot) and net limit order flow (lot), for nine euro and ten
U.S. dollar pairs. Correlation coefficients marked in bold are different from zero at least at
the 10% level of significance.
Panel A: Euro pairs
USD CHF CZK GBP HUF
∆st mot ∆st mot ∆st mot ∆st mot ∆st mot
mot 0.47 0.05 0.36 0.37 0.32
lot 0.24 0.03 0.00 -0.32 0.25 -0.05 -0.06 -0.45 -0.02 -0.21
JPY NOK PLN SEK
∆st mot ∆st mot ∆st mot ∆st mot
mot 0.10 0.42 0.37 0.28
lot 0.20 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.28 -0.06 -0.02
Panel B: U.S. dollar pairs
CAD CHF GBP ISL INR
∆st mot ∆st mot ∆st mot ∆st mot ∆st mot
mot 0.31 0.10 0.42 0.37 0.28
lot -0.02 -0.21 0.20 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.28 -0.06 -0.02
JPY MXN PLN SGD ZAR
∆st mot ∆st mot ∆st mot ∆st mot ∆st mot
mot 0.25 -0.17 0.29 0.33 0.41
lot 0.30 -0.24 0.13 -0.33 0.04 -0.05 0.31 -0.50 0.09 -0.12
Notes: The sample period is January 2004 to February 2014, comprising 122 monthly
observations for each currency pair.
The correlation coefficient is positive for 11 currency pairs, but its magnitude
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is almost always lower than that of market orders. Yet, the positive correlations can
be interpreted as a first indication that limit orders convey information about the
exchange rate path. The statistical significance, however, is lower than that for
market order flow. As shown, the correlation coefficient between net limit order
flow and the exchange rate is only significantly different from zero for six currency
pairs. This contrasts with Kozhan et al. (2015), who examine this relationship at
the daily frequency. Two explanations come to mind. First, the diverging results
based on different data frequencies indicate that information transmitted through
limit orders is lower than that transmitted through market orders. Second, as the
correlation coefficients are largely not significantly different from zero, information
transmitted via net limit order flow is transitory and short-lived. The impact of
net limit order flow on the exchange rate vanishes for most currency pairs when the
data is aggregated to the monthly frequency.
Yet, net limit order quoting activity is an important determinant for the
analysis, as pointed out by the relationship between both order flow variables. It
is negative for 18 currency pairs, indicating the changing trading behaviour of in-
formed traders to generate gains from trades based on their private information. As
Bloomfield et al. (2005) argue, informed traders use both market and limit orders
but their trading behaviour varies over the course of the trading period. While in-
formed traders primarily quote market orders and take liquidity to profit from their
private information at the beginning of the trading period, they switch to limit order
submissions once the value of information is exploited and currency prices have ad-
justed. By submitting limit orders during later periods of the trading day, informed
traders then provide liquidity to other investors who use market orders to reduce
inventory risk. This change in dealer activity is reflected by the negative correlation
coefficient between the two contemporaneous flow variables. Further, the negative
correlation represents the general trade-off faced by dealers to submit a either limit
or a market order. While limit orders are cheaper than market orders, their execu-
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tion is price contingent and not necessarily immediate. In contrast, market orders
are executed at the prevalent market price. The significant correlation coefficients
indicate that it is important to include limit order flow in the model even if the
analysis is conducted at the monthly level.
In addition to the foreign exchange microstructure data, I construct a dataset
of macroeconomic variables. The main source is the IMF’s International Finan-
cial Statistics database accessed via Datastream. Price levels are measured by the
monthly consumer price index (CPI) and inflation is constructed by calculating the
monthly difference of CPI (IFS code: 64 − ZF ). Since gross domestic product is
available only quarterly, I use the industrial production index (IFS code: 66− ZF )
as proxy for output for most of the countries. The output gap is calculated using a
one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter. As a proxy for the short-term interest rate, I use
money market rates (IFS code: 60−B–ZF ).
2.5 Results
I begin the empirical analysis and estimate the hybrid model with both order flow
measures for the euro and U.S. dollar-based exchange rates. Results are displayed
in Table 2.3.
As illustrated, the performance of the hybrid model varies fundamentally
across currency pairs. For the most frequently traded exchange rates, the adjusted
goodness of fit measure is in the double-digit region. For euro currency pairs the
maximum value is 0.32 (EUR/USD) and it increases up to 0.42 for U.S. dollar
pairs (USD/CAD). In contrast, much less variation of returns is explained when the
Swiss franc (USD/CHF, EUR/CHF) or most emerging markets serve as the quoting
currency. For example, for the Mexican peso and the Indian rupee the adjusted R2
is only 0.02 and 0.05, respectively. For these four currency pairs order flow data
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Table 2.3: Regression Results: Hybrid Model
This table reports regression results of the hybrid model st−st−1 = α+β1π̃t−1 +β2ỹt−1 +β3it−2 +
βqt−1 +γ1mot +γ2lot +ut, where π̃t−1 = πt−1− π̂t−1, ỹt−1 = yt−1− ŷt−1, it−2 = it−2− ît−2, denote
the differences of inflation, output gap and lagged interest rates between home and foreign country,
respectively. Changes in prices are measured in basis points. The estimates of the intercept are
omitted to save space. Numbers in parentheses refer to Newey-West adjusted standard errors. The
sample period is January 2004 to February 2014, comprising 122 monthly observations for each
currency pair. *,**,*** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
Panel A: Euro pairs
β1 β2 β3 β4 γ1 γ2 R̄
2
USD 100.86*** -677.95 -30.85 169.69*** 66.64*** 0.32
(35.85) (1,406.35) (34.88) (30.31) (20.16)
CHF 10.52 -66.05 13.03 -328.45 226.74 12.13 0.00
(23.40) (167.60) (29.69) (303.65) (462.84) (29.15)
CZK 10.10* -343.42 -6.74 -171.49 275.94*** 84.74*** 0.28
(21.94) (203.24) (21.46) (265.13) (60.33) (26.24)
GBP -5.71 -100.78 18.06 -461.34 69.76*** 27.95*** 0.12
(51.47) (483.25) (41.68) (435.71) (9.90) (13.45)
HUF 14.75 404.75 0.17 30.64 173.59*** 22.54 0.07
(14.49) (427.21) (17.10) (470.63) (50.31) (39.75)
JPY -65.00** 822.14 -12 -1015.09* 2704.53*** 112.06** 0.23
(32.98) (526.52) (24.47) (609.30) (554.51) (55.51)
NOK -16.48 121.07 5.58 -442.26 155.97*** 3.3 0.16
(14.96) (220.04) (44.60) (306.14) (34.06) (4.88)
PLN -22 601.22 38.7 -333.48 150.88*** 16.19 0.13
(31.26) (410.42) (30.60) (627.11) (46.20) (23.19)
SEK -35.94 192.33 5.54 -20.69 118.09*** -3.36 0.07
(40.24) (123.11) (21.82) (437.25) (36.32) (5.34)
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Table 2.3: Regression Results: Hybrid Model
This table reports regression results of the hybrid model st−st−1 = α+β1π̃t−1 +β2ỹt−1 +β3it−2 +
βqt−1 +γ1mot +γ2lot +ut, where π̃t−1 = πt−1− π̂t−1, ỹt−1 = yt−1− ŷt−1, it−2 = it−2− ît−2, denote
the differences of inflation, output gap and lagged interest rates between home and foreign country,
respectively. Changes in prices are measured in basis points. The estimates of the intercept are
omitted to save space. Numbers in parentheses refer to Newey-West adjusted standard errors. The
sample period is January 2004 to February 2014, comprising 122 monthly observations for each
currency pair. *,**,*** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
Panel B: U.S. dollar pairs
β1 β2 β3 β4 γ1 γ2 R̄
2
CAD 24.72 59.17 -75.94** (453.55) 103.57*** 58.17 0.42
(30.36) (745.08) (32.08) (310.20) (7.94) (58.28)
CHF 87.71*** (406.00) (43.48) 291.00 224.10 44.01 0.04
(27.31) (366.03) (23.19) (310.71) (200.52) (97.67)
GBP 3.33 39.96 -92.59** 356.16 61.47*** 50.61*** 0.22
(21.05) (572.82) (45.67) (311.53) (13.80) (19.06)
ILS 11.19 (80.37) -46.61*** (97.81) 428.31*** 24.74 0.11
(12.84) (396.90) (16.40) (255.53) (139.95) (36.15)
INR 9.09 469.59 -18.74* (339.45) 32.79 56.48 0,05
(6.39) (649.14) (11.41) (246.43) (48.59) (89.90)
JPY 22.32 965.86* (17.09) (20.36) 300.67*** 238.70*** 0.22
(15.89) (472.72) (15.50) (209.16) (80.84) (43.92)
MXN 23.27 -3103.32** (5.50) (154.66) -45.54* 10.96 0.06
(14.35) (1,346.32) (25.01) (242.85) (26.94) (16.20)
PLN 44.41** 734.94 (43.53) (643.24) 1317.23*** 21.49 0.10
(19.22) (817.81) (30.92) (428.61) (435.76) (67.68)
SGD (2.41) (375.52) (7.53) 56.35 161.14*** 217.82*** 0.38
(6.66) (276.42) (10.80) (153.69) (25.20) (42.03)
ZAR 18.18 (781.91) 34.87 396.56 283.95*** 24.84* 0,19
(17.70) (2,242.08) (25.16) (602.67) (69.56) (13.84)
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do not add any or only very little explanatory power. As the adjusted R2 reaches
double-digit values for 14 out of 19 currency pairs, I conclude that interdealer order flow
information plays a relevant role for exchange rate dynamics at the monthly frequency.
Looking at the coefficients of macroeconomic fundamentals, only 10 out of 75 as-
sociated coefficients are significant at the 10% level or higher. For euro pairs, the inflation
differential is the main macroeconomic driver (e.g. EUR/USD and EUR/JPY), while coef-
ficients of the output gap are not significant at all.
Yet, even if coefficients associated with macroeconomic variables are significant,
the signs of the estimated coefficients often contradict prior expectations. For example,
while I expected the output gap differential to be positively related to changes in currency
prices, all significant coefficients are negative for U.S. dollar exchange rates. These results
are indicative of the disconnect between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rates
(Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)).
In contrast to macroeconomic fundamentals, net limit orders and market order flow
significantly determine the price path of currencies. The coefficient of market order flow is
significant at the 10% level for almost all euro currency pairs and is significant for seven out
of 10 U.S. dollar pairs. These results are in line with previous studies that find market order
flow is a significant driver of exchange rates even at the monthly frequency. Inferences about
limit order flow are more ambiguous. While I find that 18 out 19 coefficients corresponding
to net limit order flow (γ2) are positive, for only half of these cases the coefficients are
significantly different from zero. The positive coefficients of both order flow measures confirm
that a higher demand for the base currency leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate.
Furthermore, I document that in 16 out of 19 pairs the magnitude of market order
flow coefficients is larger than that of limit orders (γ1 > γ2). I formally test in Table 2.5 if
the difference between the obtained coefficients is significantly different from zero and report
the p-value of the t-test associated with the null hypothesis: H0 : γ1 − γ2 > 0.
Table 2.5 shows that the null hypothesis is rejected at least at the 10% level for
almost all euro currency pairs and for roughly half of the U.S. dollar pairs. The impact of
net limit orders on the exchange rate is significantly smaller than that of market orders,
confirming the results of Kozhan et al. (2015). The findings are also in line with Bloomfield
et al. (2005), suggesting that market participants first employ market orders to exploit
profits from their private information and subsequently increase limit order quoting activity
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Table 2.4: Comparison: Market And Net Limit Order Coefficients
This table reports the p-value of an one-sided t-test with the null-hypothesis H0 : γ1−γ2 > 0
against the alternative hypothesis HA : γ1 − γ2 ≤ 0, to assess if the coefficient associated
with market order flow is significantly larger than the estimated coefficient of net limit
orders. The parameters γ1 and γ2 refer to the estimates of market and net limit order flow
in a hybrid exchange rate model.
Panel A: Euro pairs
USD CHF CZK GBP HUF
p-value 0.01** 0.24 0.00*** 0.04** 0.01**
JPY NOK PLN SEK
p-value 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Panel B: U.S. dollar pairs
CAD CHF GBP ISL INR
p-value 0.08* 0.32 0.28 0.00*** 0.73
JPY MXN PLN SGD ZAR
p-value 0.22 0.98 0.00*** 0.97 0.00***
Notes: The sample period is January 2004 to February 2014, comprising 122 monthly
observations for each currency pair.
once prices adjust and information advantages become smaller.
In a next step, I examine the extent to which the hybrid model outperforms its
nested components. Table 5 displays the adjusted R2 measure for the original market
microstructure portfolio shift (R21 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = γ2 = 0), its extension by
Kozhan et al. (2015), which includes net limit order flow (R22 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0), a
conventional Taylor rule (R23 : γ1 = γ2 = 0), a hybrid model only augmented with market
order flow (R24 : γ2 = 0), and the hybrid model with both order flow components (R
2
5 : No
restrictions imposed). The highest adjusted R2 for each currency pair is marked in bold.
In addition, I employ a series of F-tests as model selection criteria to establish whether a
hybrid model can be considered the preferred modelling choice over its nested conventional
models. Table 6 reports p-values for the respective F-tests.
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Table 2.5: Goodness Of Fit: Hybrid Model And Its Nested Components
This table reports the adjusted goodness of fit of the hybrid model and of its nested models.
The hybrid model is specified as form st− st−1 = α+β1π̃t−1 +β2 + ỹt−1 +β3ĩt−2 +βqt−1 +
γ1mot+γ2lot+ut. The following restrictions are imposed to estimate the nested components
of the hybrid model: R21 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = γ2 = 0, R
2
2 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0,
R23 : γ1 = γ2 = 0, R
2
4 : γ2 = 0, R
2
5 : No restrictions.




















USD 0.22 0.27 0.11 0.29 0.32 CAD 0.34 0.37 0.09 0.41 0.42
CHF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 CHF 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.04
CZK 0.12 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.18 GBP 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.20 0.22
GBP 0.13 0.14 0.00 0.12 0.12 ILS 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.11
HUF 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.07 INR 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05
JPY 0.15 0.19 0.05 0.19 0.23 JPY 0.05 0.19 0.01 0.07 0.22
NOK 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.17 0.16 MXN 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06
PLN 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.13 PLN 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.10
SEK 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.07 SGD 0.01 0.39 0.00 0.11 0.38
ZAR 0.16 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.19
Notes: The sample period is January 2004 to February 2014, comprising 122 monthly
observations for each currency pair.
Beginning with the results in Table 5, I note that hybrid models produce the highest
adjusted R2 for four euro-denominated exchange rates (EUR/USD, EUR/JPY, EUR/PLN,
EUR/SEK), while individual market microstructure models produce higher values for the
remaining currencies. In these cases, macroeconomic fundamentals do not add explanatory
power to the hybrid model. For U.S. dollar pairs, hybrid models produce the highest R2 for
all exchange rate pairs but the Swiss franc. Interestingly, including net limit order flow in
the hybrid model regressions increases adjusted R2 substantially in some cases. For example,
for the Singapore dollar net limit order flow adds a significant proportion to the explanatory
power of the hybrid model (R2 = 0.38). For USD/JPY, explanatory power increases from
0.7 to 0.22 when net limit order flow is included in the hybrid model.
Next, I use a series of F-tests as model selection criteria and test for the joint
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Table 2.6: F-Tests: Hybrid Model And Its Nested Components
This table reports the p-values for a series of F-tests, for which we impose restrictions on
the coefficients of the hybrid model. The hybrid model is specified as form st − st−1 = α+
β1π̃t−1 +β2 + ỹt−1 +β3ĩt−2 +βqt−1 +γ1mot+γ2lot+ut. We conduct four different F-tests for
each currency pair, testing the following null hypotheses: H21 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = γ2 = 0,
H22 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0, H
2
3 : γ1 = γ2 = 0, H
2
4 : γ2 = 0.
















USD 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.01** CAD 0.00*** 0.01** 0.00*** 0.09*
CHF 0.87 0.77 0.76 0.82 CHF 0.08* 0.06* 0.68 0.52
CZK 0.03** 0.54 0.00*** 0.00*** GBP 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.05*
GBP 0.58 0.75 0.00*** 0.24 ILS 0.24 0.2 0.00*** 0.56
HUF 0.73 0.68 0.01** 0.58 INR 0.12 0.07* 0.43 0.32
JPY 0.01** 0.05* 0.00*** 0.02** JPY 0.00*** 0.08* 0.00*** 0.00***
NOK 0.56 0.42 0.00*** 0.7 MXN 0.09* 0.07* 0.12 0.53
PLN 0.47 0.39 0.00*** 0.51 PLN 0.16 0.11 0.02** 0.74
SEK 0.45 0.36 0.00*** 0.61 SGD 0.00*** 0.81 0.00*** 0.00***
ZAR 0.07* 0.12 0.00*** 0.12
Notes: The sample period is January 2004 to February 2014, comprising 122 monthly
observations for each currency pair.*,**,*** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance,
respectively.
significance of coefficients from four different nested models. Focusing on column H30 in
Table 2.6, the low p-value indicates that coefficients on transaction flow variables are jointly
non-zero and that the hybrid models are the preferred choice over the conventional Taylor
rule for almost all currency pairs in the sample. In 15 out of 19 cases I reject the null
hypothesis H30 . Further, in seven out of those 15 currency pairs the hybrid model augmented
with market and net limit orders should be selected to account for all significant regressors
(H40 ).
While adjusted R2 values and F-tests already indicate the superior performance of
hybrid models over their nested components, I also conduct a one-step ahead in-sample
forecasting exercise as an additional model selection criterion. First, I estimate the hybrid
models and their nested components and calculate the mean square error (MSE) for each of
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these models. Second, I use the conventional macroeconomic model as a base line comparison
and calculate relative measures for all four models (MSERel1 to MSE
Rel
4 ). Results are
displayed in Table 2.7; a smaller value than 1 indicates a superior predictive power of the
tested model compared to the macroeconomic Taylor rule. The closer the value to zero, the
more accurate the model’s prediction is. For ease of reading, I marked the lowest relative
MSE for each currency in bold.
Table 2.7: In-Sample Predictions: Hybrid Model And Its Nested Components
This table reports the relative mean square errors (MSERel) of a one-month ahead in-
sample forecasting exercise of the hybrid model st+1−st = α+β1π̃t−1 +β2 + ỹt−1 +β3ĩt−2 +
βqt−1 + γ1mot + γ2lot + ut. We estimate the model in different specifications and impose
the following restrictions for different model: MSERel1 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = γ2 = 0,
MSERel2 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0, MSE
Rel
3 : γ2 = 0, MSE
Rel
4 : No restrictions. Mean
square errors are expressed relative to the conventional Taylor rule mode. Values smaller
than one indicate more accurate in-sample performance of the tested model, compared to
the conventional Taylor rule. Values in bold mark the smallest relative mean square error
for each currency pair.
















USD 1.099 1.071 0.996 0.977 CAD 1.128 1.127 0.987 0.986
CHF 1.023 1.021 0.980 0.979 CHF 1.020 1.018 0.996 0.996
CZK 0.998 0.997 0.996 0.995 GBP 1.190 1.184 0.998 0.998
GBP 1.010 0.994 0.997 0.987 ILS 1.046 1.031 1.000 0.979
HUF 1.013 1.007 0.998 0.993 INR 1.045 1.045 0.993 0.988
JPY 1.070 1.068 0.982 0.978 JPY 1.008 0.974 0.998 0.962
NOK 1.014 1.012 1.000 0.999 MXN 1.033 1.025 1.000 0.996
PLN 0.999 0.955 0.993 0.949 PLN 1.057 1.052 1.000 0.996
SEK 1.010 1.009 0.997 0.996 SGD 1.053 1.050 0.999 0.999
ZAR 1.061 1.054 0.984 0.974
Notes: The sample period is January 2004 to February 2014, comprising 122 monthly
observations for each currency pair.
As illustrated in Table 2.7, the hybrid model shows a better predictive performance
than the conventional macroeconomic model. While differences are small for several U.S.
dollar pairs, for EUR/PLN or EUR/USD the predictive performance of the hybrid models
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is notably better. The hybrid models also outperform conventional market microstructure
approaches, indicating that the improved performance is not only driven by order flow
variables but by the combination with macroeconomic fundamentals.
Lastly, I show that these results are robust to different economic factors, such as
the degree of trading and quoting activity. In Table 8 I employ the same series of F-tests as
described earlier but instead of employing standard order flow measures, I use alternative
specifications that are scaled by the market thickness and dealer activity in the market of
each respective currency.
In the panel on the left of Table 2.8, I use normalized order flow measures (moNt ,lo
N
t )
whereby I scale monthly market order flow by the number of trades and net limit order flow
by the total number of submitted and cancelled orders. This alternative measure considers
the time-varying degree of trading activity in each month in the interdealer market. In
the middle panel, I construct trade- and order-weighted order flow measures as a second
alternative measure of dealer activity (moWt ,lo
W
t ). To this end, I scale daily order flow by
the number of trades on each day relative to the total number of trades during each month.
Similarly, order-weighted net limit order flow is constructed by multiplying net limit orders
on each day by the number of submitted and cancelled orders during the day relative to the
number of total limit order book activity over the entire month. Both measures are then
aggregated to the monthly level. In contrast to normalized order flow measures, weighted
transaction data allocate relatively more emphasis to order flow that is associated with
higher dealer activity.
In the panel to the right of Table 8, I report results from a two-stage least square
approach, to alleviate concerns about the contemporaneous relationship between order
flow regressors and exchange rate changes. In these regressions, I use lagged order flows
(mot−1,lot−1) as instruments for the contemporaneous terms (mot,lot) that are originally
included in the hybrid model in Equation (2.9). To be more concrete, in a first step I
regress lagged transaction flow data on contemporaneous values and construct instruments
from the first-stage residuals. These are then included in the second-stage estimation of the
hybrid model. As lagged flow data are uncorrelated with the error term of the hybrid model
but highly correlated with contemporaneous order flow, the approach fulfils the two most
important criteria for the choice of an appropriate instrument.
As presented in Table 8, I find that results are qualitatively similar to the original
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model, that is, they are weakest for the normalized order flow, and almost identical for
the weighted order flow and IV estimation. For all three specifications, I reject the null
hypotheses of the conventional macroeconomic Taylor rule (H30 ) in favour of a hybrid model
with market order flow for at least seven out of nine euro pairs, and for five out of 10
U.S. dollar exchange rates. For EUR/USD, EUR/CZK, EUR/JPY, and EUR/NOK, and
USD/CHF, USD/JPY, USD/SGD, USD/GBP, and USD/CAD, net limit order flow has a
significant impact (H40 ) and improves the explanatory power of the hybrid model. Lastly,
both market microstructure models (H10 and H
2
0 ), are rejected for various currency pairs,
pointing toward a higher variation of exchange rate patterns that is jointly explained by
macroeconomic variables and transaction flow measures.
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Table 2.8: Alternative Order Flow Specifications
This table reports the p-values for a series of F-tests, for which I impose restrictions on the coefficients of the full hybrid model that employs alternative
order flow specifications (m̃oAlt,l̃o
Alt
): st−st−1 = α+β1π̃t−1+β2ỹt−1+β3 ĩt−2+βqt−1+γ1moAltt +γ2loAltt +ut, where Alt = N,W, IV refer to normalized
(N), weighted order flow (W ), and the IV-approach (IV ), respectively. Normalized order flow refers to monthly order flow scaled by the total number of
trades; weighted order flow is the sum of daily order flow weighted by the number of trades and quotes within each month. For the instrumental variable
approach, I use lagged order flow as an instrument in a first-step regression and include the obtained residuals as a proxy of contemporaneous order flow
dynamics in the second-stage regression. For each alternative order flow measure, I conduct four different F-tests, testing each of the following four null
hypotheses: H21 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = γ2 = 0, H
2
2 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0, H
2
3 : γ1 = γ2 = 0, H
2
4 : γ2 = 0. The sample period is January 2004 to
February 2014. *,**,*** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
Panel A: Euro pairs
Normalized order flow (m̃oN ,l̃o
N
) Weighted order flow (m̃oW ,l̃o
W


























USD 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02** 0.45 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.23 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01**
CHF 0.51 0.65 0.15 0.18 0.88 0.78 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.77 0.76 0.82
CZK 0.28 0.62 0.01** 0.04** 0.11 0.83 0.00*** 0.01 ** 0.03** 0.54 0.00*** 0.00***
GBP 0.95 0.91 0.45 0.86 0.7 0.75 0.00*** 0.41 0.59 0.76 0.00*** 0.24
HUF 0.21 0.32 0.10* 0.08* 0.7 0.66 0.00*** 0.49 0.62 0.62 0.00*** 0.36
JPY 0.10* 0.06** 0.03** 0.35 0.02** 0.04** 0.00*** 0.03 ** 0.01*** 0.06 0.00*** 0.02**
NOK 0.13 0.59 0.06* 0.02** 0.63 0.5 0.00*** 0.69 0.48 0.35 0.00*** 0.69
PLN 0.72 0.63 0.02** 0.56 0.64 0.5 0.00*** 0.96 0.48 0.38 0.00*** 0.59
SEK 0.35 0.59 0.16 0.08* 0.37 0.32 0.00*** 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.00*** 0.47
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Table 2.8: Alternative Order Flow Specifications
This table reports the p-values for a series of F-tests, for which I impose restrictions on the coefficients of the full hybrid model that employs alternative
order flow specifications (m̃oAlt,l̃o
Alt
): st−st−1 = α+β1π̃t−1+β2ỹt−1+β3 ĩt−2+βqt−1+γ1moAltt +γ2loAltt +ut, where Alt = N,W, IV refer to normalized
(N), weighted order flow (W ), and the IV-approach (IV ), respectively. Normalized order flow refers to monthly order flow scaled by the total number of
trades; weighted order flow is the sum of daily order flow weighted by the number of trades and quotes within each month. For the instrumental variable
approach, I use lagged order flow as an instrument in a first-step regression and include the obtained residuals as a proxy of contemporaneous order flow
dynamics in the second-stage regression. For each alternative order flow measure, I conduct four different F-tests, testing each of the following four null
hypotheses: H21 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = γ2 = 0, H
2
2 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0, H
2
3 : γ1 = γ2 = 0, H
2
4 : γ2 = 0. The sample period is January 2004 to
February 2014. *,**,*** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
Panel B: U.S. dollar pairs
Normalized order flow (m̃oN ,l̃o
N
) Weighted order flow (m̃oW ,l̃o
W


























CAD 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.27 0.86 0.00*** 0.02** 0.00*** 0.15 0.00*** 0.01** 0.00*** 0.09*
CHF 0.01** 0.06* 0.06* 0.04** 0.08* 0.06* 0.65 0.55 0.08* 0.06* 0.7 0.54
GBP 0.00*** 0.0*** 0.7 0.59 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.11 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.05*
ILS 0.19 0.41 0.00*** 0.18 0.33 0.25 0.00*** 0.8 0.23 0.19 0.00*** 0.57
INR 0.1 0.06* 0.33 0.87 0.12 0.07* 0.25 0.33 0.12 0.07* 0.46 0.35
JPY 0.37 0.26 0.02** 0.94 0.00*** 0.13 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.08* 0.00*** 0.00***
MXN 0.03** 0.06* 0.07* 0.12 0.12 0.07* 0.13 0.95 0.1 0.08* 0.11 0.49
PLN 0.37 0.31 0.00*** 0.43 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.78 0.14 0.10* 0.03** 0.75
SGD 0.52 0.63 0.31 0.26 0.00*** 0.84 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.81 0.00*** 0.00***
ZAR 0.18 0.13 0.32 0.49 0.09* 0.15 0.00*** 0.13 0.08* 0.13 0.00*** 0.12
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2.5.1 Cross-currency Interdependence In The FX Market
The large cross-sectional dimension of the interdealer order flow dataset provides the addi-
tional opportunity to account for the cross-currency interdependencies of exchange rates and
to assess their impact on the exchange rate analysis. Building upon results from individual
time series regressions, I conduct seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) analysis in two sets
of equations with EUR and USD as base currency, respectively (Zellner (1962)).
There are various justifications for estimating exchange rates in a system of equations
as opposed to individual time series regressions. For example, changes in one exchange rate
are likely to affect the value of other pairs that share the same base currency. Further, the
dynamics of frequently traded currencies are closely related to each other. If exchange rates
are analysed individually, interdependencies across currencies are not considered, affecting
the efficiency of obtained coefficient estimates.
For example, EUR/GBP and EUR/JPY show large correlation coefficients of 0.51
and 0.47 with EUR/USD, respectively. Correlations between U.S. dollar-based currency
pairs are even higher, with coefficients as high as 0.60. To account for the significant relation
between currency prices, I set up systems of seemingly unrelated regressions for each base
currency that take the form
St = BXt + Ut (2.10)
where St is a k × 1 vector containing the dependent variable spot exchange rate (∆sjt ) as
dependent variable. For example, for euro currency pairs, let j = USD, CHF, CZK, GBP,




t ), B is a matrix of coeffi-
cients and Xt contains the explanatory variables for the hybrid models and their individual
components. I take the following approach. First, I estimate the hybrid model in a SUR
framework and extract the variance-covariance matrices of the two systems of equations.
Second, I formally assess the co-movement of the exchange rate pairs in each panel by test-
ing if the off-diagonal entries of these matrices are zero. In this case particular case the SUR
estimation would lead to identical results as ordinary least square regressions. I test for the
diagonality condition by calculating the Breusch and Pagan (1980) test statistic. Under
the null hypothesis of diagonality, the test statistic follows a χ2(M(M−1)/2) distribution, with
MEUR = 9 and MUSD = 9 denoting the number of equations in each system. The 5%
critical value is χ236 = 50.998.
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Table 2.9: SUR Model: Cross-Equation Correlations









where M refers to the number of equations in the seemingly unrelated regression framework
(SUR) and r2ij are the sample correlation coefficients, which are calculated based on the
sample standard covariances, such that r2ij =
sij√
siisjj
. I estimate a hybrid model of the
form st − st−1 = α + β1π̃t−1 + β2ỹt−1 + β3ît−2 + βqt−1 + γ1mot + γ2lot + ut in a SUR
framework for euro and U.S. dollar currencies separately and I assess the hybrid model’s
nested components by imposing the following restrictions: λ1LM : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = γ2 =
0, λ2LM : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0, λ
3
LM : γ1 = γ2 = 0, λ
4
LM : γ2 = 0, λ
5










Euro pairs 344.41 345.98 417.55 359.98 360.48
U.S. dollar pairs 1077.55 1037.84 1184.62 1081.6 1037.49
Notes: The sample period is January 2004 to February 2014, comprising 122 monthly ob-
servations for each currency pair. The SUR system for euro currencies includes EUR/USD,
EUR/CHF, EUR.CZK, EUR/GBP, EUR/HUF, EUR/JPY, EUR/NOK, EUR/PLN, and
EUR/SEK. For the U.S. dollar-based SUR estimation, the USD/CAD, USD/CHF,
USD/ILS, USD/INR, USD/JPY, USD/MXN, USD/PLN, USD/SGD, and USD/ZAR are
included.
As shown in Table 2.9, the obtained statistics range between 344.41 (λ1LM ) and
417.55 (λ3LM ) for euro and between 1037.49 (λ
5
LM ) and 1184.62 (λ
3
LM ) for U.S. dollar pairs.
This large values suggest that the null hypothesis should be rejected for all five models at the
1% level. The simple test procedure highlights the significant cross-currency correlations
and points toward the importance to conduct the exchange rate analysis in a system of
equations.
To test if the hybrid model outperforms its nested components after considering the
cross-currency correlation, I use McElroy (1977) system-wide goodness of fit measure as an
evaluation criterion. I also modify the original measure to account for the total number of
parameters estimated in each system. The results for all five models and both systems of
equations are displayed in Table 2.10.
For euro pairs, adjusted system-wide R2SUR exhibit the highest value for the hybrid
model (R2,5SUR = 0.093) that incorporate both order flow variables and macroeconomic fun-
damentals. The model comprising solely macroeconomic regressors, produces an adjusted
system-wide R2SUR of only 0.005 (R
2,3
SUR = 0.093). Similarly, I find that the best fit for U.S.
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Table 2.10: SUR Model: System-wide Explanatory Power
This table reports McElroy’s system-wide measure of fit of a seemingly unrelated regression
framework (SUR) R2SUR = 1 − MtrΣ−1Syy , where M denotes the number of equation in
the system, Σ is the residual cross product and Syy is the mean deviation cross product
matrix. The adjusted R̄2SUR is calculated as R̄
2
SUR = 1 −
(1−R2SUR)(N−1)
N−p−1 and explicitly
accounts for the total number of observations. We estimate a hybrid model of the form
st− st−1 = α+ β1π̃t−1 + β2ỹt−1 + β3it−2 + βqt−1 + γ1mot + γ2lot + ut in a SUR framework
for euro and U.S. dollar currencies separately and we estimate models based on its nested
components by imposing the following restrictions: R2,1SUR : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = γ2 = 0,
R2,2SUR : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0, R
2,3
SUR : γ1 = γ2 = 0, R
2,4
SUR : γ2 = 0, R
2,5










Euro pairs 0.089 0.11 0.047 0.129 0.146










Euro pairs 0.073 0.087 0.005 0.084 0.093
U.S. dollar pairs 0.035 0.077 0.006 0.06 0.102
Notes: The sample period is January 2004 to February 2014, comprising 122 monthly ob-
servations for each currency pair. The SUR system for euro currencies includes EUR/USD,
EUR/CHF, EUR.CZK, EUR/GBP, EUR/HUF, EUR/JPY, EUR/NOK, EUR/PLN, and
EUR/SEK. For the U.S. dollar-based SUR estimation, the USD/CAD, USD/CHF,
USD/ILS, USD/INR, USD/JPY, USD/MXN, USD/PLN, USD/SGD, and USD/ZAR are
included.
dollar exchange rates is obtained with the hybrid model, which accounts for both order flow
variables. R2SUR rises to 0.101 (R
2,5
SUR), clearly outperforming all other models.
Overall, the SUR analysis supports the approach to combine variables from the
microstructure and macroeconomic literature results in one and the same model. Moreover,
the analysis highlights the significant impact of cross-currency correlations across exchange
rates in the FX market, which should be taken into account in an out-of-sample forecasting
exercise.
2.5.2 Out-of-sample Forecasting Performance
While the assessment so far points toward the superior explanatory performance of hybrid
models over their nested components, in a last step I assess whether hybrid models can be
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potential tools to forecast exchange rates out-of-sample. To this end, I take the following
approach. First, as I provided evidence for significant co-movement across exchange rates, I
use the SUR regression framework to conduct a one-step ahead forecast for each individual
exchange rate. Second, as the length of the time series is limited by the available order flow
data, I also use a fixed effect panel framework to construct a one-step ahead out-of-sample
forecast. This approach is motivated by recent studies (e.g. Engel et al. (2008)) that show
that the forecasting performance of exchange rate models can be improved by reducing
the number of coefficients across currency pairs. For both estimation techniques I use the
conventional Taylor rule model as a benchmark and calculate Campbell and Thompson









where s̄t+1|t refers to the conditional one-step ahead forecast from the hybrid model and
s̃t+1|t is the conditional forecast from the conventional Taylor rule. Positive values indicate a
smaller mean square error of the hybrid model. The one-step ahead forecasts based on SUR
regressions are constructed using a rolling window of 80 months and the OOS-R2 statistic
for all five models is displayed in Table 2.11.
The OOS-R2 statistics indicate that the hybrid model that includes only market
order flow as an additional regressor produces more accurate forecasts than the macroeco-
nomic model for EUR/CZK, USD/CHF, USD/ILS, USD/JPY, and USD/ZAR. In contrast,
net limit order flow does not seem to add much forecasting power. This confirms earlier
results that the impact of net limit order flow on the exchange rate path is transitory and
appears to vanish completely in an out-of-sample assessment.
Further, Table 2.12 summarizes the OOS-R2 statistics for the fixed effects panel
forecasts. In this estimation setting, I set the size of the rolling window to 40 months to
increase the number of one-step ahead forecasts for each currency pair.
As illustrated by the statistics marked in bold, market microstructure models pro-
duce smaller mean square errors than the Taylor rule and the hybrid model. For euro pairs,
the hybrid model generally performs worse than the macroeconomic Taylor rule, as indicated
by the negative R2,3OOS,FE and R
2,4
OOS,FE For U.S. dollar currency pairs, the performance of
the hybrid model is better and R2,3OOS,FE is positive for CHF, ILS, JPY, and PLN. For these
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Table 2.11: Out-Of-Sample Forecast: SUR Estimation








where s̄t+1|t refers to the conditional one-step ahead forecast from the hybrid model and
s̃t+1|t is the conditional forecast from the conventional Taylor rule. The hybrid model for
the out-of-sample exercise is specified as st+1|t = α + β1π̃t−1 + β2ỹt−1 + β3ĩt−2 + βqt−1 +
γ1mot + γ2lot + ut. s̃t+1|t is obtained from the same regression with γ1 = γ2 = 0. I
impose the following restrictions to estimate the nested components of the hybrid model:
R̄2,1OOS,SUR : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = γ2 = 0, R̄
2,2
OOS,SUR : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0,
R̄2,3OOS,SUR : γ2 = 0, R̄
2,4
OOS,SUR : No restricions.
















USD -0.33 -0.34 -0.46 -0.5 CAD -0.22 -0.34 -0.31 -0.35
CHF -0.49 -1.5 -0.27 -0.84 CHF 0.11 0.04 0.04 -0.07
CZK -0.01 -0.14 0.04 -0.10 ILS 0.46 0.46 0.03 -0.01
GBP -1.27 -1.34 -1.36 -1.40 INR -0.08 -0.04 -0.12 -0.17
HUF -0.34 -0.48 -0.38 -0.61 JPY 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.08
JPY -0.17 -0.33 -0.29 -0.51 MXN 0.09 0.08 -0.12 -0.15
NOK -0.31 -0.31 -0.37 -0.33 PLN -0.1 -0.05 -0.18 -0.13
PLN 0.08 -0.01 -0.21 -0.23 SGD 0.00 -0.71 -0.08 -0.89
SEK -0.13 -0.22 -0.29 -0.41 ZAR 0.08 0.04 0.03 -0.02
Notes: The sample period is January 2004 to February 2014. The SUR system for euro in-
cludes EUR/USD, EUR/CHF, EUR.CZK, EUR/GBP, EUR/HUF, EUR/JPY, EUR/NOK,
EUR/PLN, and EUR/SEK. For the U.S. dollar-based SUR estimation, the USD/CAD,
USD/CHF, USD/ILS, USD/INR, USD/JPY, USD/MXN, USD/PLN, USD/SGD, and
USD/ZAR are included.
pairs the combination of macroeconomic fundamentals and order flow data leads to superior
out-of-sample forecasts than using only macroeconomic fundamentals. Compared to the
in-sample evaluation, the hybrid model’s success over the conventional Taylor rule in an
out-of-sample forecasting exercise is limited to a few currency pairs. Yet, these cases point
toward the possible benefits of combining macroeconomic and transaction flow information
in one and the same model. Furthermore, as I do not use real-time data on macroeco-
nomic fundamentals, the information used in this stylized forecasting exercise differs from
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Table 2.12: Out-Of-Sample Forecast: Panel Fixed-Effect Estimation








where s̄t+1|t refers to the conditional one-step ahead forecast from the hybrid model and
s̃t+1|t is the conditional forecast from the conventional Taylor rule. The hybrid model for
the out-of-sample exercise is specified as st+1|t = α + β1π̃t−1 + β2ỹt−1 + β3ĩt−2 + βqt−1 +
γ1mot+γ2lot+ut. s̃t+1|t is obtained from the same regression with γ1 = γ2 = 0. I impose the
following restrictions to estimate the nested components of the hybrid model: R̄2,1OOS,FE :
β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = γ2 = 0, R̄
2,2
OOS,FE : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0, R̄
2,3
OOS,FE : γ2 = 0,
R̄2,4OOS,FE : No restrictions.
















CHF 0.152 0.146 -0.249 -0.28 CAD -0.737 -0.987 -0.681 -0.935
CZK 0.41 0.378 -0.18 -0.158 CHF -0.005 0.004 0.002 0.003
GBP -0.062 -0.221 -0.384 -0.436 ILS 0.039 -0.037 0.002 -0.007
HUF 0.061 0.063 -0.192 -0.149 INR -0.189 -0.151 -0.141 -0.096
JPY 0.082 0.058 -0.13 -0.175 JPY -0.056 -0.017 0.001 0.048
NOK 0.049 -0.154 -0.451 -0.674 MXN -0.134 -0.28 -0.137 -0.4
PLN -0.149 -0.276 -0.15 -0.295 PLN 0.017 0.041 0.001 0.014
SEK 0.11 0.015 -0.026 -0.216 SGD -0.323 -0.346 -0.215 -0.265
ZAR -0.125 -0.539 -0.129 -0.556
Notes: The sample period is January 2004 to February 2014. The SUR system for euro in-
cludes EUR/USD, EUR/CHF, EUR.CZK, EUR/GBP, EUR/HUF, EUR/JPY, EUR/NOK,
EUR/PLN, and EUR/SEK. For the U.S. dollar-based SUR estimation, the USD/CAD,
USD/CHF, USD/ILS, USD/INR, USD/JPY, USD/MXN, USD/PLN, USD/SGD, and
USD/ZAR are included.
the information available to market participants. This difference may not only affect the
performance of the conventional Taylor rule, but also the forecast precision of hybrid models
that explicitly account for the interactions between transaction flow measures and macroe-
conomic fundamentals. Another caveat of this approach is the small number of available
observations in the forecasting exercise. The length of the time series is determined by the
data availability of order flow variables. Once longer time series of transaction flow data be-
come available, the forecasting performance of the hybrid models can be assessed in greater
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detail and over longer forecasting horizons. I leave this exercise to future research.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper introduces a new class of hybrid exchange rate models that combines foreign ex-
change dealer information with macroeconomic fundamentals embedded in a conventional
Taylor rule. I argue that the link between macroeconomic models and interdealer trading
dynamics can be established by interpreting transaction flow variables as a proxy for deal-
ers’ risk premiums and assuming that the uncovered interest rate parity condition does not
hold. Equipped with a new class of hybrid models, I conduct an extensive empirical assess-
ment and compare their performance with conventional market microstructure models and
a macroeconomic Taylor rule. The findings can be summarized as follows.
First, I document a higher goodness-of-fit measure and superior in-sample predic-
tive power of hybrid models compared to conventional market microstructure and macroe-
conomic models. I show that the adjusted goodness of fit measure increases up to 0.32 for
euro and 0.42 for U.S. dollar exchange rates. For currencies traded against the U.S. dollar,
the hybrid model generally shows a strong performance, while for currencies traded against
the euro the hybrid model performs best for the most frequently traded currencies, such as
EUR/USD and EUR/JPY. For more than half of the sample, the hybrid model is the pre-
ferred modelling choice over nested market microstructure models, as indicated by various
F-tests and other model selection criteria. These findings are robust to different order flow
specifications that explicitly consider the degree of dealer activity in the foreign exchange
market.
Second, I show that a new microstructure measure, based purely on submitted
and cancelled limit orders at the top of the order book, is a significant driver of monthly
exchange rates. This measure has a large and significant impact for the most liquid currency
pairs (EUR/USD, EUR/JPY, GBP/USD, USD/JPY) but also for a few emerging market
currencies (e.g. USD/SGD). The estimated magnitude of this new measure, called net limit
order flow, is lower than that of market orders and appears to be more transitory.
Lastly, I highlight the importance of cross-currency interdependencies and analyse
a large cross-section of exchange rates in a seemingly unrelated regression framework. I use
an augmented system-wide measure to account for the number of parameters and compare
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the hybrid model with its nested individual model components. For both base currencies,
euro and U.S. dollar, the hybrid model explains the largest proportion of the system-wide
variation. Further, I conduct a stylized one-month ahead out-of-sample forecasting exercise
in a seemingly unrelated regression and panel fixed effects regression set-up. For U.S. dollar
pairs, forecasts from both models outperform the conventional Taylor rule in several cases,
while the most accurate forecasts for euro pairs are produced by market microstructure
models.
Overall, the empirical evidence I present points toward the advantages of combining
market microstructure approaches to analyse exchange rate dynamics. As more transaction
flow data become available, future research can build upon these findings and focus further




Pay: A New Perspective on
CTAs
3.1 Introduction
A growing academic literature examines why investors continue to allocate their capital to
seemingly unsuccessful active managers. While numerous studies focus on the performance
of actively managed mutual funds (e.g. Gruber (1996); Cremers and Petajisto (2009);
Berk and Green (2004)) and hedge funds (e.g. Ackermann et al. (1999); Agarwal et al.
(2015a); Stulz (2007)), performance of commodity trading advisors (CTAs) has received less
attention.1 That said, the broad consensus emerging from extant studies is that the average
CTA does not create value for its investors (e.g. Elton et al. (1987), Elton et al. (1989),
Elton et al. (1990), Bhardwaj et al. (2014)). Yet, as indicated by their rapidly growing
assets under management (AUM) from USD 24.9 billion to USD 339.7 billion between
1994 and 2016,2 CTAs have become a popular investment vehicle for practitioners and a
1They are often excluded from hedge fund studies, such as Bollen (2013), Agarwal et al. (2009)
or Titman and Tiu (2011).
2Information on the industry’s AUM refers to Barclay’s yearly estimates of the industry’s overall
assets under management. Accessed via https://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/cta/
mum/CTA_Fund_Industry.html and https://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/ghs/mum/
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fundamental component of today’s financial markets.3 I offer a new perspective on this
puzzle. More specifically, I employ one of the largest and cleanest CTA datasets explored
so far to analyse the performance of CTAs, discuss the cross-sectional variations within
the category, assess CTA manager skill and performance persistence, and examine whether
managerial compensation is justified by managerial performance.
Apart from their ever-growing presence, CTAs are also unique in that even while
they are one of the more populous categories of alternative investments, their investment
strategies are relatively undiversified and identifiable, making it is easier to benchmark and
evaluate their performance (Fung and Hsieh (2001)). Such a unique advantage in modelling
returns not only results in an accurate estimation of CTA performance but also enables me
to circumvent the opaqueness of hedge fund investments and gain valuable insights into the
operational efficiency of the alternative investments universe.
I find that CTA managers generate economic and statistically significant positive
net excess returns. Further, I document that pre-fees alphas are positive and significant,
indicating that CTA managers beat passive benchmark strategies. Following the rationale of
Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), I also provide evidence that CTA managers add significant
value to their customers and that CTA performances are persistent for a horizon of up to
three years. Finally, I show that CTAs’ compensation scheme predicts future performance,
providing managers with an avenue to signal their skill to investors. While previous pa-
pers have invoked investor irrationality or severe information asymmetry to reconcile their
findings with the continued growth of CTAs, the results of this study are indicative of a well-
functioning, competitive marketplace with rational investors and fund managers. In fact,
the results are perfectly in accordance with the main predictions of the Berk and Green
(2004) model. One, there is significant and persistent cross-sectional variation in manager
skill. Two, investors compete to invest with successful managers. Finally, managerial com-
HF_Money_Under_Management.html. In terms of AUM, CTAs became the third-largest hedge fund
category in 2016, after Fixed Income (USD 556.2 billion) and Multi-Strategy (USD 360 billion)
hedge funds.
3The growing popularity in the CTA industry, its increasing AUM, and associated risk fac-
tors are also evident in the recently increasing number of financial newspaper articles, for ex-
ample, “Trend is your friend, say investors flocking to futures”, (https://www.ft.com/content/
e367ca58-e72d-11e4-a01c-00144feab7de) “Computer-driven trend hedge funds thrive despite
falling markets,” (https://www.ft.com/content/dc33992c-beca-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf) or
“Risk in new form of “portfolio insurance” sparks fear.” (https://www.ft.com/content/
3eba3f56-08c6-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b)
43
pensation, functioning as a balancing mechanism, is set so that the ex-ante net alpha is
zero.
The analysis is based on data derived from Barclay’s Hedge Fund Database (Bar-
clayHedge). The database covers on average 70% of the industry, in terms of AUM. Risk
and Portfolio Management AB (RPM), a managed account industry specialist based in
Stockholm, Sweden, provides me with the data. Since RPM has been downloading the
entire BarclayHedge database daily since 2002, data entries are not rewritten and no re-
turn histories are deleted (Patton et al. (2015)). The dataset is therefore largely free of
graveyard-bias and captures the wide cross-sectional dynamics of alive as well as defunct
funds that stopped reporting during the sample period. First, equipped with this rich
dataset, I construct equally and value-weighted portfolios of CTAs and show that funds
generate on average 4.1% and 4.5% annualized net excess returns. These returns are net of
all fees and are delivered to investors. Furthermore, I make use of an additional, small but
representative proprietary dataset, provided by RPM, which contains solely realized returns
and validates my findings. I show that portfolios constructed from BarclayHedge and from
the proprietary dataset have the same distributional characteristics, highlighting the accu-
racy of the findings and verifying the economic and statistically significant performance of
CTAs.
Second, to identify cross-sectional variations among CTAs, I use a novel trading
strategy classification obtained from RPM. The classification is based on RPM’s private
information about a fund and on the fund’s own trading strategy description, which it
reports to BarclayHedge. All funds that start to report to BarclayHedge are categorized
according to one of the four strategy groups: systematic and discretionary trend followers
and their non-trend following counterpoints. In contrast to classifications that are available
from commercial hedge fund databases, the fund categorization in this study allows me
to distinguish between funds that use trend-following trading strategies (trend follower)
and those that use a different trading approach (non-trend follower), for example, short-
term or fundamental traders. The analysis shows that the differentiation between these
groups is crucial and that return dynamics across these trading strategies are fundamentally
different from each other. For example, systematic and discretionary trend followers generate
6.0% and 7.4% average annualized returns, compared to only 3.5% and 1.8% by non-trend
following CTAS.
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Third, I discuss additional attractive characteristics of CTA returns, such as their
positive skewness and correlation with other assets classes. Approximately 64% of the
funds have positively skewed returns, indicating that CTAs might be attractive to investors
with preferences for skewed returns (Polkovnichenko (2005), Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009),Mitton and Vorkink (2007)). Furthermore, I show that CTA returns move strongly
counter cyclically to equity markets. In times of equity market turmoil (SP500 average:
−10.1%), CTAs average monthly excess return is at least 1.7%; and when equity markets
flourish (SP500 average: 8.4%), CTAs average excess return is −0.8%. Further, in extreme
events, CTAs’ return generating process is almost entirely uncorrelated with those of hedge
funds—during months with the highest and lowest returns of the hedge fund research index,
trend-following CTAs constantly produce returns between 2.4% and 3.5%. Even though
CTAs are often classified as a subcategory of hedge funds, similar to Liang (2004), the
analysis emphasizes substantial differences between these two asset classes and the possi-
ble diversification benefits from including CTAs in an investor’s portfolio that cannot be
obtained by investing in other active investment vehicles, such as hedge funds.
Fourth, I find that CTAs generate abnormal gross returns over and above benchmark
trading strategies such as time series momentum (Moskowitz et al. (2012)) and option
straddle factors (Fung and Hsieh (2001)). For the equally weighted and value-weighted CTA
portfolios, the gross alpha is 8.4% and 6.4% on an annual basis, respectively. Furthermore, I
document that CTAs, especially systematic trend followers, exploit price movements during
periods of market turmoil. During these times, they produce an annual gross alpha of 27.4%,
indicating that they successfully exploit price trends during crisis periods.
Next, I employ a recent approach by Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) to analyse the
value added by CTA managers. In line with Berk and Green (2004) and Berk (2005), the
authors argue that the amount of capital funds attract from investors is a better measure of
managerial skill than the pre-fees regression alpha. Since the profitability of a fund depends
on the return as well as the amount of capital managed by a CTA, the authors construct
a proxy for a fund’s added value that takes both dimensions into account. I find large
cross-sectional variation in managerial skill. Specifically, I document that 41% of CTAs in
the sample generate negative value, compared to standard time series momentum strategies.
Moreover, I find that the average added value of a CTA is USD 0.49 million per month.
Finally, using the valued added measure I provide evidence that CTA performance
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is persistent for up to three years. Sorting funds into quintile portfolios, the top 20% of
CTAs significantly outperforms the bottom 20% over various forecasting horizons. In line
with the argument that funds with greater investment skills demand higher compensations,
I also find that the costliest investments in CTAs outperform funds that demand less com-
pensation. This analysis shows that funds with higher accruing fees are more successful and
that managers can use their compensation as credible signal of their skill. These findings
are indicative of an efficient CTA market.
The paper is most closely related to the existing literature examining the return
dynamics of CTAs, most notably to Bhardwaj et al. (2014). In contrast to their results,
my findings suggest that CTAs generate significant excess net returns to investors, that
these net returns are positively skewed, and that CTAs generate significant pre-fees alpha,
especially during periods of equity market stress. A likely explanation for the difference in
results is that the analysis is based on a substantially larger set of CTAs, allowing for a
wider representation of market dynamics. It covers on average 70% of the industry in terms
of AUM, which is more than three times larger than the 21% industry coverage in Bhardwaj
et al. (2014).
In addition, this study is the first to provide insight into the heterogeneity of CTA
trading strategies, to show that there is significant and persistent cross-sectional variation
in the skills of CTA managers, and that CTA manager pay is commensurate with manager
performance. In this respect, this paper is also closely related to Berk and van Binsbergen
(2015), who similarly examine managerial skill in the mutual fund universe. While I focus
solely on CTAs, the results also contribute to the larger debate on the rationality of investors
who place money with fund managers. For example, Griffin and Xu (2009), find no evidence
for constant significant positive hedge fund alphas. In contrast, Agarwal and Naik (2000),
Agarwal et al. (2009), and Ibbotson and Chen (2006) argue in favour of the hypothesis that
hedge fund managers are skilled and generate abnormal returns beyond standard beta-risk
factors. This paper’s findings are consistent with this view that fund managers exhibit
significant and persistent skill, and that “being able to pick good hedge funds can therefore
be highly rewarding” (Stulz (2007)).
Finally, while Brown and Goetzmann (2003), Kazemi and Li (2009), and Gregoriou
et al. (2010) use fund classifications available in commercial databases to identify perfor-
mance differences among CTAs and hedge funds, I use a novel classification system to
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explicitly distinguish between trend- and non-trend-following CTAs. As I highlight in vari-
ous exercises, their trading strategies and performances are substantially different from each
other. In contrast to Arnold et al. (2013), who also distinguishes trend-followers and other
CTA trading strategies, I do not analyse factors that determine the survival of funds but
rather examine performance differences between these trading strategies. Earlier papers
that have used the same fund classification (Elaut and Erdös (2016)) focus on only one
trading strategy, but do not compare performance differences among CTAs.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I introduce the
datasets I use for the analysis and describe in detail the steps of data cleaning taken to
alleviate the impact of possible biases. In section 3, I discuss CTA performance as well as
dynamics of net-of-fee returns. Section 4 assesses the managerial skill of CTA managers and
the persistence of CTA returns. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Data
The main underlying database for the analysis is Barclay’s Hedge Fund Database (Barclay-
Hedge). Risk and Portfolio Management AB (RPM), a managed account industry specialist
based in Stockholm, Sweden, provided me with the data. BarclayHedge is the single most
comprehensive database for CTAs. Compared to other commercially available hedge fund
databases, it has a low proportion of missing information and large coverage of defunct
funds, which have stopped reporting to the data provider (Joenväärä et al. (2016)). For the
analysis, I focus on funds’ flagship programs, which refer to a fund’s longest track record
and highest assets under management. This leaves me with 3,017 individual CTAs and
208,959 fund-time observations for the period 1985 to December 2015. In order to allow for
a comparison between these results and the previous literature, I follow the same cleaning
procedure outlined in Bhardwaj et al. (2014). Table 3.1 summarizes each step and its impact
on the dataset.
Since most commercial hedge fund databases begin to keep a track record of de-
funct funds in 1994, I restrict the analysis to the post-January 1994 period and drop returns
associated with earlier reporting dates. This should reduce the impact of a potential sur-
vivorship bias in the database (Elaut et al. (2016)). Further, I only consider funds that
report information denominated in U.S. dollars and exclude the records of 174 CTAs that
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Table 3.1: Data Cleaning Steps
This table summarizes data cleaning steps of Barclay’s Hedge Fund Database as of
15/03/2016. The number of funds for an equally weighted (EW) portfolio (no minimum
reporting time) is 2,620. The value-weighted (VW) portfolio consists of 1,924 individual
CTA flagship programs. AUM refers to assets under management
Data screening steps # Funds removed # Funds remaining
Starting Sample 3017
Stopped reporting before 1994 164 2853
Not reporting in USD 174 2679
Missing date of entry to database 9 2670
Not reporting “net all fees” 36 2634
Unrealistic return 1 2633
Funds created in 2016 13 2620
Funds with missing AUM 696 1924
use a different base currency. I also delete nine funds, for which I cannot identify an exact
reporting start date, 36 entries that do not report returns “net all fees” and one entire fund
history that reports unrealistic returns, such as −99.99%. Also, to allow for more than
two months’ reporting delay, I do not include funds added to BarclayHedge after December
2015.4. Lastly, to be able to construct a value-weighted index, I delete CTAs that do not
report assets under management (AUM) for the first or last observation. For missing AUM
observations within a fund’s record, I proximate the AUM by linear interpolation between
the first and last available non-zero entry.5
After applying these filters, I am left with a sample of 2,620 funds and 195,682
cross-sectional observations to construct an equally weighted (EW) portfolio CTA index.
The value-weighted (VW) index is based on a cross-section of 1924 CTAs and 131,485. In
terms of size, the underlying data for the analysis consists of approximately three times
as many CTA flagship programs as previous studies on CTA performance. In terms of
AUM, I cover on average 70% of the CTA industry over the entire sample period, which is
4I obtained the database from RPM in March 2016
5This approach closely follows Bhardwaj et al. (2014) even though the authors only delete funds
with missing information about AUM for the first reported observation.
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significantly larger than the industry coverage of 21% in Bhardwaj et al. (2014).6
3.2.1 Biases In Commercial Hedge Fund Databases
It is well documented in the academic literature (for a recent survey see e.g. Agarwal et al.
(2015b)) that commercial hedge fund databases are subject to various biases. Concerning
CTAs in particular, Fung and Hsieh (1997) find that the average annual return of surviving
funds is 3.4% higher than the average annual return of their total sample of 901 CTAs in the
period 1986–1996. Bhardwaj et al. (2014) show that EW and VW indices that include solely
surviving funds generate 4.15% and 2.21% higher average annualized returns than portfolios
of both alive and defunct funds. Including defunct funds in the analysis, therefore, takes
into account the fact that worse performing funds may stop reporting and drop out of the
database. In the sample of this study, the performance of EW and VW indices would be
artificially inflated by 2.5% and 1.2%, respectively, if I considered only the 507 funds still
alive at the end of the sample period and omit those that dropped out over time.
In addition to survivorship bias, I account for funds’ tendency to report returns
retrospectively after they have entered the database. This practice is termed “backfill bias”
(Gregoriou et al. (2010)). Since CTAs use commercial databases to market their performance
to investors, backfilled returns can lead to an artificial upward bias of the return structure. A
common approach in the literature has been to exclude the first 12–24 months of the analysis
to account for possibly retrospective reported return structures. However, as Bhardwaj et al.
(2014) point out, a generic screen of the first “x-month” of reported returns does not clean
the data sufficiently. They find that funds backfill on average 31 months in their sample.
Instead of discarding a fixed number of first few months of each fund, the authors recommend
using the fund’s reporting start date as indicator and to exclude all reported returns prior
to this date from the analysis.
In my version of BarclayHedge, I can follow the authors’ suggested practice for most
of the sample period and delete a fund’s entire history prior to its entry in the database. I
can infer the start of a fund’s report history in BarclayHedge since RPM has downloaded
the entire databases daily since February 2002 and flags the first entry of a fund to the
6I use BarclayHedge’s estimate of the CTA industry size as benchmark. The annual data of the
estimated industry size are accessible via: https://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/
cta/mum/CTA_Fund_Industry.html.
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database. I use this flag to minimize a potential upward bias in my analysis, caused by
backfilled returns. For the first eight years, January 1994–January 2002, for which the
reporting start date cannot be pinned down, I take a conservative approach and delete the
first 36 reported months of a fund’s track record.
Further, funds may revise their reports ex-post or even ask database vendors to
delete the entire performance records after a fund stops reporting to the database (Patton
et al. (2015)). If a fund has performed poorly in the past, it might have a greater incentive
to delete its history, leading to an upward bias among defunct CTAs. Since the data for this
study has been downloaded and stored daily by RPM, this BarclayHedge version is largely
free of this “graveyard” bias.
3.2.2 CTA Trading Strategies
To understand and assess performance differences among CTAs, I supplement information on
return dynamics from BarclayHedge with a trading strategy classification, which is obtained
from RPM and allows me to distinguish between trend- and non-trend-following CTAs.
Funds that enter BarclayHedge are categorized on a weekly basis into one of the categories
shown in 3.2. The classification is based on comparing funds’ past return dynamics with
trend-following benchmarks, on the fund’s own strategy description, on conversations with
CTA managers and, if known, on observing funds’ portfolio re-balancing and investment
behaviour across different asset classes. Usually a fund is classified to one of the four
categories only once when a fund starts to report its performance to BarclayHedge.7
Table 3.2 shows three different levels of classification. As shown in column (1) funds
can be identified as discretionary or systematic trading CTAs. Systematic traders are char-
acterized by their use of algorithmic trading models and an extensive quantitative analysis
of financial data that forms the basis for funds’ investment decisions. In contrast, for discre-
tionary strategies managers’ ability to exploit chart patterns or divine global supply/demand
imbalances from fundamental data plays a much more fundamental role. Column (2) distin-
guishes between trend-following funds and non-trend followers. Trend-following funds take
directional long and short positions in various asset classes and generate returns by exploit-
ing persistent price trends (Kaminsky (2011)). In contrast, I consider non-trend followers as
7Based on anecdotal evidence, we assume that the strategy of funds do not change drastically
over the course of their reporting time.
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Table 3.2: Trading Classification
This tables shows the different strategy classifications provided by RPM. The different
dimensions are divided into columns (1) and (2). For example, funds can be classified as
either systematic or discretionary. Further, these classes can be differentiated between trend









fundamental, short-term, commodity and FX traders. This classification is a novel feature
of this study, since I can distinguish between the following strategy classifications, which are
not available in any commercially available hedge fund database: systematic trend follower,
systematic non-trend follower, discretionary trend follower, and discretionary non-trend fol-
lower.8 However, as my analysis shows, it is crucial to account for the heterogeneity among
systematic and discretionary funds, since their return dynamics are fundamentally differ-
ent from each other. Using RPM’s strategy classification, I aim to reduce any “strategic
self-misclassification” (Brown and Goetzmann (2015), p. 103) that may result from purely
self-reported strategies.
3.2.3 Summary Statistics
For the analysis, I focus on CTAs with 24 months’ reported information, which is a suf-
ficiently long return history that is indicative of real return dynamics (Bhardwaj et al.
(2014)). Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the dataset.
As shown in Table 3.3, the EW and VW indices consist of 1,274 and 936 CTAs
that report at least 24 months of returns. Two-thirds of these funds are systematic traders,
while only 317 funds are categorized as discretionary. Less than 10% belong to the category
8While Elaut and Erdös (2016) use the same classification to analyze systematic trend followers,
the aim of this paper is to provide an understanding of the overall industry dynamics and to show
differences across all trading strategies.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics of the composition of funds with at least twenty four
months of reported return history. Average size is measured in million USD. Average age
is measured in months. Funds are considered as “alive” if they report their information to
BarclayHedge at the end of the sample period (December 2015). Information on individual
trading strategies refers to funds that are considered for the strategies’ EW index. Numbers
in brackets refer to the proportion of funds in the overall sample.
Systematic Discretionary
EW Index VW Index Trend Non-Trend Trend Non-Trend Others
# of Funds 1274 926 487 (38%) 355 (28%) 29 (2%) 288 (23%) 115 (9%)
Avg. Size 234 USD 259 280 380 45 68 55
Avg. Age 70.8 69.2 81.2 64 62.7 65.4 63.6
Alive Funds 323 296 136 96 4 59 28
“Others.” The average size of a CTA accounts for USD 234 million, measured by AUM of
the last reported observation. However, there is a large variation in fund size across trading
strategies. Systematic funds with an average size of USD 280 or USD 380 million assets under
management for trend and non-trend followers are substantially larger than discretionary
funds. Further, the long-lived CTAs with an average reporting time of 81.2 months tend to
be systematic trend followers. The remaining sample average is approximately 64 months.
Lastly, as indicated by the final row, most funds at the end of the sample are systematic
funds.
3.3 CTA Performance
To evaluate the performance of CTAs, I start by examining the characteristics of funds’
net excess returns—net returns in excess of the 3-Month Treasury Bill. To begin with,
panel A of Table 3.4 shows the annualized average net excess return and volatility for
the EW and VW indices for the period January 1994—December 2015. Over the entire
sample period, the average annualized return accounts for 4.1% and 4.5% for the EW and
VW index, respectively. Strikingly, both portfolios generate returns that are significantly
different from zero at the 1% level, as indicated by the high t-statistics. The results are
52
fundamentally different from earlier studies arguing that CTAs do not produce positive
returns to investors. For example, Bhardwaj et al. (2014) find net excess returns are used
up entirely by funds’ high fee structure. Using a substantially larger cross-section of funds,
representing on average 70% of the total CTA industry in terms of AUM, I show that CTAs’
net-of-fee returns are economic and statistically significant. CTAs’ profitability might be
one simple explanation for the growing assets under management in the industry.
Table 3.4: CTA Performance
This table shows the performance analysis for EW and VW portfolios of funds with at least
24 reported return observations. Panels B and C display the results for the individual trading
strategy, when funds are weighted on an equal or value basis, respectively. The column ”T-
Test” refers to the t-statistics of the null hypothesis that the average return equals zero.
***, **, * denote level of significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Jan 1994 - Dec 2015
Avg. Ann. Return Avg. Ann. Volatility T-Test
Panel A: All CTAs
EW Index 4.1% 7.2% 2.65***
VW Index 4.5% 7.6% 2.81***
Panel B: By Trading Strategy (EW)
Systematic Trend 5.1% 11.7% 2.03**
Systematic Non-Trend 3.1% 4.3% 3.37***
Discretionary Trend 4.7% 15.0% 1.46
Discretionary Non-Trend 2.8% 4.3% 3.10***
Panel C: By Trading Strategy (VW)
Systematic Trend 6.0% 11.7% 2.41**
Systematic Non-Trend 3.5% 5.8% 2.84***
Discretionary Trend 7.4% 15.7% 2.21***
Discretionary Non-Trend 1.8% 6.5% 1.28
I also find CTAs’ positive performance is largely driven by systematic traders, who
generate significant positive returns of 5.1% and 3.1% for trend and non-trend followers, re-
spectively. In contrast, the performance of discretionary funds is not necessarily significantly
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different from zero. Also, even though trend-following funds appear to generate higher re-
turns, these benefits are associated with higher levels of risk. While the annualized average
volatility of VW systematic and discretionary non-trend-following portfolios is 5.8% and
6.5%, respectively, it increases to 11.7% and 15.7% for trend-following counterparts. Even
though various existing biases in all commercial databases have been identified by academic
research, an issue for all studies so far has been that no source of validation is available to
verify the process of data cleaning and analysis results. In this study, I am able to alleviate
this major shortcoming by using a proprietary dataset of realized CTA returns as a valida-
tion mechanism. The data are provided by RPM and are based on realized returns from a
set of 51 representative managers that report directly to RPM. While the cross-section of
this dataset is smaller than the BarclayHedge coverage, it is worth highlighting that the re-
turns from this database are realized rather than reported returns. Importantly, this implies
that these data do not suffer from backfill or graveyard bias, or any form of retrospective
window-dressing. Furthermore, since the set of CTAs has been actively managed by RPM,
funds have been added to and dropped from the database. Therefore, the set of funds also
consists of alive and defunct funds, circumventing concerns about survivorship bias. Even
though the number of funds is small, the return dynamics are a representative sample of
the overall CTA industry. For example, the correlation between a value-weighted index of
the benchmark returns and BarclayHedge’s CTA index is 0.83.
To alleviate concerns about remaining or undetected biases in the dataset, I compare
the return dynamics of the EW and VW CTA portfolios from BarclayHedge with EW
and VW indices based on realized returns from RPM’s proprietary dataset. I conduct a
t-test to assess if the indices based on reported return and realized return data are on
average significantly different from each other. I postulate that if the results were driven
by data biases or inadequate data cleaning, I would reject the null hypothesis that the
reported return and realized return data have the same return dynamics. Also, I conduct
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to check if the distribution of returns between the indices
is significantly different. Failing to reject the null hypothesis, however, implies that the
dataset of realized returns is representative of the overall industry, strengthening my line of
argument. The results of these assessments are shown in Table 3.5.
To start with, Table 3.5 shows the average annual return of BarclayHedge and the
set of funds that I use for validating my results. While the difference between indices is
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Table 3.5: Benchmark Comparison
This table compares CTA returns from an equally- (EW) and value- (VW) weighted port-
folio reported to BarclayHedge with EW and VW portfolios based on realized return data,
provided by RPM. The reported t-statistic (”T-test”) refers to the test if the difference
between the indices is, on average, different from zero. The column “KS-Test” refers to the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, testing if both samples of funds are drawn from the same
distribution. Note: EW index only covers the period April 2002–December 2015.
Avg. Ann. Return
BarclayHedge Realized Returns Correlation T-Test KS-Test
EW Index 4.10% 2.70% 0.80 0.50 0.11
VW Index 4.50% 3.80% 0.82 0.30 0.09
slightly larger for the EW portfolios, it only accounts for 0.7% on an annual basis. Despite
the performance differences, both indices largely follow the same dynamics. The correlation
coefficient between EW and VW indices is 0.80 and 0.82, respectively. I interpret these values
as a first indication that indices constructed from the proprietary data can be considered
as a representation of the overall industry dynamics. Further, in column (5) I test the null
hypothesis that both indices generate the same average return and in column (6) I test the
null hypothesis that both return series are drawn from the same distribution.
As shown in Table 3.5, columns (5) and (6), I am not able to reject the null hypothesis
for either of the two tests. The t-statistics for the differences in mean returns are only 0.5
and 0.3 for the EW and VW index, respectively. Similarly, I am not able to reject the
null hypothesis that returns are drawn for the same distribution, as seen from the small
KS-statistics of 0.11 and 0.09 for the EW and VW index, respectively.
These results are crucial for this study as well as for papers examining the perfor-
mance of hedge funds in general. First, they validate the steps of data cleaning, described
in the previous section. They show that survivorship and backfill bias are the main forms
of biases and that their impact can be significantly alleviated by including all defunct funds
from the analysis and by deleting the entire return history prior to the first reporting date.
Moreover, not being able to reject the null hypotheses suggests that the findings are not
driven by artificially inflated return dynamics, but that they reflect accurately the level of
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profits generated by CTAs. This validation exercise provides further evidence that CTAs
generate significantly positive net excess returns. Furthermore, the low values of the KS-test
confirm the representative status of indices based on realized return data.
3.3.1 Characteristics Of CTA Returns
In this section, I analyse additional return characteristics that may further explain the grow-
ing popularity of CTAs among investors. I begin by assessing the skewness of returns at the
individual fund level. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of skewness for each fund’s returns,
where the red bar denotes funds whose returns have a skewness of zero.
Figure 3.1: Fund-level Skewness
Notes: This figure shows the skewness of net excess returns at the individual fund level. The
x-axis refers to the return skewness of each fund and the y-axis measures the number of funds in
each group relative to the entire sample. The red bar marks funds which returns have a skewness
of zero.
As indicated by Figure 3.1, approximately 64% of funds have returns with positive
skewness. In fact, for most funds the return skewness is 0.5. The maximum fund-level
skewness is 6.18, resulting in a stretched right tail of the distribution. The mean and
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median are 0.27 and 0.25, respectively, highlighting the positively skewed distribution of
returns at the fund level. The descriptive analysis suggests that investors, who prefer a
larger upside risk and or have preferences for skewed returns, may allocate some of their
capital to CTAs.
I confirm that CTAs serve as an alternative investment opportunity because they
generate positive returns during times when equity markets perform particularly poorly.
While this has been generally shown by previous studies (Kazemi and Li (2009); Bhardwaj
et al. (2014)), in my analysis I contribute to the literature by assessing how CTAs perform
in comparison to hedge funds and by pointing out performance differences across trading
strategies.9 Table 3.6 shows the monthly average excess return for the two CTA indices, the
S&P 500 as proxy for equity markets and the Hedge Funds Research Index (HFRI).
As shown in panel A, CTAs generate average monthly net excess returns of 1.7%
and 1.8% in bear markets when returns from equities are performing particularly poorly.
In the worst 5% months of the S&P 500, its average monthly return accounts for −10.1%
and hedge funds generate negative returns of −3.5%. The latter can be explained by the
investment focus of most hedge funds on long-equity driven strategies. Conversely, during
equity bull markets when the S&P 500 shows positive returns of 8.4%, CTA returns are
negative. The same countercyclical dynamics appear when I assess the 5% best or worse
months of the EW and VW indices in panels B and C, respectively.
In panel D, I depart from the existing literature and examine the tail correlation
of CTA and hedge fund returns. Since CTAs are often considered a sub-category of hedge
funds, I analyse the extent to which these two active investment classes show similar return
dynamics during extreme market events. Interestingly, panel D clearly highlights how the
timing of the return generating process of CTAs is fundamentally different during extreme
events. The countercyclical correlation that I observe with equity markets does not exist.
During the best and worst 5% months of the HFRI, returns of CTAs are essentially identical.
While the HFRI index swings between −4.1% and 4.2%, the VW–CTA index generates
1.8% in both periods. This analysis shows that in extreme events, the two asset classes
are largely uncorrelated with each other and indicates that the return generating process of
CTAs cannot be replicated by either equity markets or hedge funds.
9I use Hedge Fund Research’s value-weighted hedge fund index (HFRI) as a proxy for hedge
fund returns. The data are obtained via Datastream.
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Table 3.6: CTA Performance: Bull and Bear Markets
This table shows average monthly excess returns for the best and worst 5% months (13
months each) of the equally weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) CTA portfolio, S&P
500 value weighted index (excl. dividends) and HFRI Index (Hedge fund research index).
Panel A: S&P 500
Worst 5% S&P 500 months
CTA EW CTA VW S&P 500 HFRI
Monthly Average ER 1.7% 1.8% -10.1% -3.5%
Best 5% S&P 500 months
CTA EW CTA VW S&P 500 HFRI
Monthly Average ER -0.8% -0.7% 8.4% 2.1%
Panel B: EW CTA Index
Worst 5% EW CTA Index months
CTA EW CTA VW S&P 500 HFRI
Monthly Average ER -3.6% -3.5% 2.1% 0.4%
Best 5% EW CTA Index months
CTA EW CTA VW S&P 500 HFRI
Monthly Average ER 5.4% 5.0% -2.1% 0.0%
Panel C: VW CTA Index
Worst 5% VW CTA Index months
CTA EW CTA VW S&P 500 HFRI
Monthly Average ER -2.9% -3.7% 1.2% 0.2%
Best 5% VW CTA Index months
CTA EW CTA VW S&P 500 HFRI
Monthly Average ER 5.2% 5.2% -2.4% 0.1%
Panel D: HFRI Index
Worst 5% HFRI Index months
CTA EW CTA VW S&P 500 HFRI
Monthly Average ER 1.8% 1.8% -8.5% -4.1%
Best 5% HFRI Index months
CTA EW CTA VW S&P 500 HFRI
Monthly Average ER 1.9% 1.8% -4.7% 4.2%
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Table 3.7: CTA Performance: Bull and Bear Markets (By Trading Strategies)
This table shows average monthly excess returns for the best and worst 5% months (13
months each) of the equally weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) CTA portfolio, S&P
500 value weighted index (excl. dividends) and HFRI Index (Hedge fund research index)
Panel A: S&P 500










Monthly Average ER 3.1% 0.5% 2.7%% 0.3% -10.1% -3.5%










Monthly Average ER -2.0% 0.2% -0.7% 0.2% 8.4% 2.1%
Panel B: HFRI Index










Monthly Average ER 3.3% 0.7% 3.5% 0.2% -8.5% -4.1%










Monthly Average ER 2.4% 1.1% 3.4% 0.9% 4.7% 4.2%
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Overall, Table 3.6 suggests that CTAs’ countercyclical return movements are an
additional benefit to investors while allocating capital to CTAs. Clearly, these benefits are
not only reflected by smoothed returns across bear and bull markets, but also by lower
return volatility achieved through risk diversification.
As shown in panel B, these benefits cannot be obtained by investing in hedge funds,
since their returns differ from CTAs’ return structure.
In Table 3.7 I repeat the assessment of assets’ co-movements but I distinguish be-
tween the performances of individual trading strategies. In panel A, I document that trend-
following CTAs are more sensitive to equity market swings than non-trend-following funds.
For example, systematic trend followers fluctuate between 3.1% and -2.1% in the worst and
best 5% months of the S&P 500 returns, while non-trend followers generate 0.5% and 0.2%,
respectively. Similar dynamics can be observed for discretionary funds, for which returns
fluctuate between 2.7% and -0.7% for trend followers and only between 0.3% and 0.2% for
non-trend-following funds. Further, panel B reflects the disconnect between hedge fund
and CTA returns. The thoroughly positive returns of all four trading strategies in HFRI’s
good and bad times point toward the fundamentally different investment approach taken
by managers in each of the two active investment classes. In line with my earlier findings,
this analysis suggests that not only average returns but also higher moments and the timing
of return generation are crucial determinants for investors’ decisions to allocate capital to
CTAs.
3.4 Managerial Skill In The CTA Industry
The analysis of CTA performance has so far focused on the return generating process of net
of fee excess returns. However, to make further statements about the skills of managers, I
follow the literature and assess the gross returns of CTAs. Since most funds report net of
fee returns to BarclayHedge, I follow the approach of French (2008) to obtain gross returns
for each CTA in the database.
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Table 3.8: CTA and Benchmark Returns: A Comparison
Panel A provides summary statistics for EW and VW CTA portfolios before and after
fees. The t-statistics refer to the null hypothesis that funds generate on zero average re-
turns (H0 : µCTA = 0). Panel B shows summary statistics for Moskowitz et al. (2012)’s
time series momentum factors, available at https://www.aqr.com/library/data-sets/
timeseries-momentum-factors-monthly and Fung and Hsieh (2001)’s portfolio straddle
factors (PTFS), available at https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm.
The abbreviations BD, FX, COM, IR, STK, EQ refer to bonds, foreign exchange, com-
modities, interest rates, stocks, and equities, respectively. SP500 refers to the VW index
including dividends and AGG denotes Barclay’s Aggregate Bond Index.









Before fees 11.5% 8.2% 1.4 6.54
After fees 4.1% 7.2% 0.56 2.64
VW Index
Before fees 10.6% 8.5% 1.24 5.83
After fees 4.5% 7.6% 0.60 2.82







TSMOMCOM 0.121 0.153 0.79
TSMOMEQ 0.201 0.269 0.75
TSMOMBD 0.166 0.275 0.60
TSMOMFX 0.123 0.18 0.68
PTFSBD -19.2% 0.53 -0.36
PTFSFX -8.9% 0.674 -0.13
PTFSCOM -4.5% 0.495 -0.09
PTFSIR -11.9% 0.891 -0.13
PTFSSTK -58.4% 0.488 -1.20
SP500 0.01 0.148 0.67
AGG -0.11% 0.037 -0.03
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For most funds, the fees consist of an annual management and a performance fee,
which is charged only when the fund generates returns over a certain threshold. The man-
agement fee ranges from 0% to 20% with a mean of 1.8% and a standard deviation of 1%.
The performance fee ranges from 0% to 50% and has an average of 20% and a standard
deviation of 5%. Unfortunately, BarclayHedge does not have data on a fund’s high-water
mark or hurdle rate. Therefore, I take the most conservative approach and assume all funds
have a high-water mark and for all CTAs I choose the 3-Month Treasury Bill as a hurdle
rate.
Allowing for both features ensures that I do not overestimate gross returns artifi-
cially.10
As shown in Table 3.8, gross excess returns, defined as returns before fees but in
excess of the risk-free rate, are approximately three times larger than net excess returns for
the EW index, and roughly twice as large for the VW index. The impact of fees on the
difference between net and gross excess returns is comparable to Bhardwaj et al. (2014) who
construct gross returns using the same approach. In contrast to their paper, however, I find
that gross and net excess returns are significantly different greater than zero, as indicated
by the high t-statistics.
Next, equipped with EW and VW gross return indices, I assess whether funds can
produce abnormal returns in excess of different alternative trading strategies. I use Fung and
Hsieh (2001) portfolio straddle factors as a first benchmark strategy. The authors argue that
trend-following strategies can be replicated by using option portfolio straddles and, there-
fore, are expected to explain a large proportion of the variation in gross CTA returns.11.12
Second, I use time series momentum factors (TSMOM) by Moskowitz et al. (2012) as simple
normative benchmarks. Since CTAs generate returns by exploiting large consistent price
trends, momentum trading is an alternative benchmark that replicates comparable return
structure. Like the CTA gross indices, benchmark strategies do not include transaction
costs, which makes using gross returns more accurate than using net returns. As shown
10I use different specifications and find that the impact of high water mark on CTA gross returns
is small.
11The authors construct portfolio straddle factors for five different asset classes: bonds
(PTFSBD), foreign exchange (PTFSFX), commodities (PTFSCOM), interest rates (PTFSIR) and
stock markets (PTFSSTK).
12 Time series momentum strategies are constructed for commodities (TSMOMCOM), equities
(TSMOMEQ), bonds (TSMOMBD) and foreign exchange (TSMOMFX).
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in panel B of Table 8, CTA gross returns outperform all the nine individual strategies, the
S&P 500 and Barclay’s Aggregate Bond Index (AGG) in terms of Sharpe Ratio.
While CTA returns appear to generate better Sharpe Ratio, I also test if managers
can generate abnormal returns over and above these simple trading strategies. I postulate
that a significant gross alpha would indicate that CTAs generate returns that beat passive
trading strategies through their security selection skills and/or marketing timing ability.
The results for the EW and VW indices are shown for both models in Table 3.9. In addition
to the portfolio-straddle (PTFS) and time series momentum factors (TSMOM), I include
returns from the S&P 500 and the AGG index as passive benchmarks (Bhardwaj et al.
(2014)).
Tables 3.9 shows regression outcomes for different model specifications. As dis-
played, independent of the right-hand side variables, the intercept term is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the intercept is also economically significant, high-
lighting the existence of managerial skills among CTAs. For example, as shown in column
(4), when the VW index is the dependent variable and time series momentum factors are
used as benchmark strategies, CTAs can generate 0.44% abnormal returns per month (5.3%
annualized). Also, as shown in column (6), even adding PTFS and TSMOM factors in
the same model (column (5)), leaves a significant abnormal gross excess return of 0.53%
per month (6.4% annualized). Similar findings are seen in Table 3.10 with abnormal re-
turns ranging from 0.37% (4.4% annualized) for systematic trend followers 1.26% (15.12%
annualized) in Table 3.11 for discretionary trend followers.
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Table 3.9: CTA Manager Skill and Gross Alpha
This table shows the regression results for two models, with Fung and Hsieh (2001)’s portfolio
straddle factors (PTFS) and/or Moskowitz et al. (2012)’s time series momentum (TSMOM)
factors used as explanatory variables. The abbreviations BD, FX, COM, IR, STK, EQ refer
to bonds, foreign exchange, commodities, interest rates, stocks, and equities, respectively.
Both models include the SP500 and Barclay’s Aggregate Bond Index (AGG) as passive
investment benchmark. The dependent variable is the VW CTA portfolio. The sample
period is January 1994–December 2015. Coefficients are displayed in percentage terms.
Numbers in parentheses refer to OLS t-statistics, based on Newey-West standard errors.
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EW VW EW VW EW VW
alpha 1.08*** 1.00*** 0.57*** 0.44*** 0.70*** 0.53***
(8.32) (6.89) (4.31) (3.31) (5.82) (4.08)
TSMOMCOM 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.12***
(4.44) (3.96) (5.45) (4.49)
TSMOMEQ 0.04** 0.06*** 0.03** 0.05***
(2.40) (3.47) (2.08) (3.39)
TSMOMBD 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.09***
(5.38) (6.23) (4.54) (5.28)
TSMOMFX 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.04 0.06**
(3.04) (3.36) (1.58) (2.33)
PTFSBD 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(2.82) (2.65) (2.62) (2.61)
PTFSFX 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02***
(6.02) (4.19) 5.75 (3.43)
PTFSCOM 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02**
(4.29) (3.27) (3.65) (2.45)
PTFSIR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.89) (0.52) (0.01) (0.47)
PTFSSTK 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(1.45) (1.13) (1.04) (0.47)
SP500 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.05* 0.05
(0.90) (0.87) (-0.83) (-0.33) (1.68) (1.54)
AGG 0.19 0.28** 0.15 0.18 0.08 0.13
(1.62) (2.23) (1.25) (1.42) (0.73) (1.12)
R̄2 0.31 0.21 0.3 0.34 0.48 0.43
N 264 264 264 264 264 264
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Table 3.10: CTA Manager Skill and Gross Alpha: Systematic Traders
Table 10 shows the regression results for two models, with either Fung and Hsieh (2001)’s
portfolio straddle factors (PTFS) or Moskowitz et al. (2012)’s time series momentum
(TSMOM) factors used as explanatory variables. The abbreviations BD, FX, COM, IR,
STK, EQ refer to bonds, foreign exchange, commodities, interest rates, stocks, and equities,
respectively. Both models include the SP500 and Barclay’s Aggregate Bond Index (AGG)
as passive investment benchmark. The dependent variable is the VW CTA portfolio. The
sample period is January 1994 to December 2015. Coefficients are displayed in percentage
terms. Numbers in parentheses refer to OLS t-statistics, based on Newey-West standard
errors. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Systematic Trend Systematic Non-Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
alpha 1.31*** 0.37* 0.56*** 0.69*** 0.48*** 0.46***
(5.91) (1.88) (2.87) (5.86) (4.11) (3.85)
TSMOMCOM 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.05** 0.06**
(4.47) (4.99) (2.06) (2.34)
TSMOMEQ 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.02 0.01
(3.83) (3.83) (1.06) (0.93)
TSMOMBD 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.06***
(6.49) (5.45) (4.55) (4.07)
TSMOMFX 0.13*** 0.09** 0.04* 0.02
(3.44) (2.54) (1.78) (0.97)
PTFSBD 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01* 0.01
(2.79) (2.90) (1.75) (1.10)
PTFSFX 0.04*** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.02***
(3.35) (2.44) (4.21) (3.74)
PTFSCOM 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.00
(3.71) (2.94) (0.65) (0.01)
PTFSIR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(- 0.54) (0.51) (- 0.22) (0.43)
PTFSSTK 0.03* 0.02 - 0.01 - 0.01
(1.81) (1.26) ( - 0.96) (- 1.45)
S & P500 0.02 - 0.04 0.05 0.07** 0.06** 0.08***
(0.44) (- 0.90) (1.06) (2.45) (2.36) (3.09)
AGG 0.49** 0.32* 0.26 0.11 0.02 - 0.01
(2.50) (1.72) (1.47) (1.08) (0.17) (- 0.10)
R̄ 0.22 0.38 0.47 0.10 0.14 0.19
N 264 264 264 264 264 264
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Table 3.11: CTA Manager Skill and Gross Alpha: Discretionary Traders
Table 10 shows the regression results for two models, with either Fung and Hsieh (2001)’s
portfolio straddle factors (PTFS) or Moskowitz et al. (2012)’s time series momentum
(TSMOM) factors used as explanatory variables. The abbreviations BD, FX, COM, IR,
STK, EQ refer to bonds, foreign exchange, commodities, interest rates, stocks, and equities,
respectively. Both models include the SP500 and Barclay’s Aggregate Bond Index (AGG)
as passive investment benchmark. The dependent variable is the VW CTA portfolio. The
sample period is January 1994 to December 2015. Coefficients are displayed in percentage
terms. Numbers in parentheses refer to OLS t-statistics, based on Newey-West standard
errors. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Discretionary Trend Discretionary Non-Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
alpha 1.57*** 0.94*** 1.16*** 0.61*** 0.50*** 0.53***
(5.21) (2.92) (3.72) (4.76) (3.71) (3.91)
TSMOMCOM 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.03 0.04
(3.49) (4.05) (1.15) (1.34)
TSMOMEQ 0.01 0 0.03* 0.01
(- 0.34) (- 0.10) (1.64) (0.68)
TSMOMBD 0.11** 0.06 0.01 0.01
(2.51) (1.57) (0.43) (0.49)
TSMOMFX 0.1 0.02 0.02 - 0.00
(1.58) (0.30) (0.78) (- 0.09)
PTFSBD 0.04** 0.04** - 0.01* - 0.01
(2.37) (2.04) (- 1.76) (- 1.60)
PTFSFX 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(4.36) (4.21) (3.89) (3.64)
PTFSCOM 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.02* 0.02*
(3.78) (3.31) (1.91) (1.64)
PTFSIR 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.53) (0.30) (0.44)
PTFSSTK 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.38) (0.29) (0.50) (0.40)
S&P500 - 0.06 - 0.17** - 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03
(- 0.89) (- 2.41) (- 0.44) (0.95) (- 0.01) (0.99)
AGG 0.48* 0.57* 0.44 - 0.42*** - 0.37*** - 0.43***
(1.80) (1.90) (1.59) (- 3.73) (- 2.95) (- 3.51)
R̄ 0.24 0.14 0.29 0.11 0.04 0.10
N 264 264 264 264 264 264
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Furthermore, the regression analysis shows that the PTFS and TSMOM factors
explain a large proportion of the variance in CTAs’ returns. For example, if solely PTFS
factors are used as regressors, the adjusted R2 accounts for at least 0.21 and for the TSMOM
factors, adjusted R2 increases to even 0.30 and 0.34 for EW and VW, respectively. Moreover,
the combination of the two sets of factors results in an adjusted R2 of up to 0.48, explaining
nearly half of the variance of CTA returns. This significant increase, when combining the
two sets of factors, highlights that PTFS and TSMOM factors capture different dynamics
of CTAs’ return generating process. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show how the explanatory power
of these factors varies between CTA trading strategies. Generally, TSMOM factors explain
a larger degree of return variance than PTFS factors, pointing toward the similarities be-
tween time series momentum and CTAs’ trend-following strategies. For systematic and
discretionary trend followers the R2 is 0.38 and 0.24 when solely the TSMOM factors are
employed as regressors, while the R2 remains comparably low for non-trend followers (0.14
and 0.06). Combining both sets of factors in one regression again leads to high explanatory
power of up to 0.47, confirming the use of these factors as appropriate benchmark strategies.
3.4.1 Crisis Alpha
The diversity in trading strategies and managerial skill becomes even more apparent when
looking at CTA returns in times of equity market turmoil. While the positive gross excess
intercept term can be interpreted as an indicator of a manager’s skill in general, I want to
investigate further whether CTAs can make use of their skill during downturns in equity
markets. CTAs generate positive excess returns of up to 3% during the worst 5% months
of the S&P 500 (Table 3.12). Here I analyse whether these returns are subject to a trading
strategy that cannot be replicated by the PTFS or TSMOM factors. I test for the existence
of crisis alpha, by extending the previous regression by an additional intercept term and by
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estimating the following model:
RGt = α1 + α2I + π
j,B
t + εt (3.1)
where
π1,Bt = β1 + β2TSMOMCOMt
+ β3TSMOMEQt + β4TSMOMBDt + β5TSMOMFXt
π2,Bt = β1 + β2PTFSBDt
+ β3PTFSFXt + β4PTFSIRt + β5PTFSSTKt
where RGt refers to the gross excess return of an EW or VW index α1 is an intercept term
and πj,Bt is the risk premium of a benchmark return strategy. Again, I use Fung and Hsieh
(2001) (FH) portfolio straddle factors (j = 1) or Moskowitz et al. (2012)’s (2012) time series
momentum factors as a benchmark (j = 2). To measure the skill of CTAs during crisis
periods, I allow for α2, where I refers to a dummy variable term, set equal to 1 during
the 5% worse performing months of the S&P 500, such that it measures the skill of a CTA
manager during market downswings. The intercept α1 captures the average skill of managers
during the remaining periods. The results are shown in Table 3.12. For brevity, I focus on
the two intercept terms and their joint impact.
As seen in panel A, independent of the explanatory variables, the intercept term α1
is positive and statistically significant. For the dummy variable intercept term (α2) only EW
indices and the VW index with FH factors as regressors show significant coefficients at the
10% level or higher. Concerning the joint impact (α2), I find that both intercept terms are
significant at least at the 10% level for all six specifications. For the time series momentum
strategies, I find that the average monthly return in non-crisis times accounts for 0.49% and
0.37% for the EW and VW index, respectively. In crisis times this value triples to 1.70%
abnormal monthly gross excess returns for the EW index and even 1.42% for the VW index
(αtotal). Both values are not only economically but also statistically significant at the 5%
and 10% level. Overall, CTAs appear to be particularly profitable investment opportunities
during equity market downturns.
Panel B provides insights about what kind of trading strategy can generate abnormal
gross excess returns during crisis periods. All but systematic trend funds generate significant
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Table 3.12: Crisis Alpha
This table reports coefficient estimates of equation 3.1, focusing on the two intercept terms.
In panel A, as indicated, either the equally (EW) or value- (VW) weighted index is used
as dependent variable and either Fung and Hsieh (2001)’s portfolio straddle factors (FH),
Moskowitz et al. (2012)’s time series momentum (TSMOM) factors, or both combined (All)
are used as explanatory factors. In panel B, VW indices are used as dependent variable.
Numbers in parentheses refer to OLS t-statistics, based on Newey-West standard errors.
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Panel A: Crisis Alpha - All CTAs
FH-Factors TSMOM- Factors All Factors
EW VW EW VW EW VW
α1 0.90*** 0.78*** 0.49*** 0.37*** 0.61*** 0.46***
(6.30) (4.98) (3.52) (2.65) (4.73) (3.28)
α2 2.08*** 2.34*** 1.21* 1.06 1.24* 0.98
(3.07) (3.10) (1.71) (1.49) (1.94) (1.40)
αtotal = α1 + α2 2.98*** 3.12*** 1.70** 1.43* 1.85*** 1.44*
(3.96) (3.74) (2.23) (1.86) (2.65) (1.89)
R̄2 0.33 0.24 0.30 0.35 0.48 0.43










α1 0.24 0.47*** 0.86** 0.45***
(1.15) (3.81) (2.53) (3.20)
α2 2.04* 0.13 1.21 0.67
(1.93) (0.20) (0.70) (0.93)
αtotal = α1 + α2 2.28** 0.59 2.07 1.12
(1.99) (0.88) (1.11) (1.44)
R̄2 0.39 0.20 0.14 0.04
and positive monthly alphas during non-crisis periods (α1). However, during times of market
turmoil, only systematic trend followers can generate statistically significant alphas that
account for more than 2% in each month. The crisis alpha (αCrisis) is statistically significant
at the 5% level. These findings are in line with Kazemi and Li (2009) who argue that
systematic funds have a better market timing ability than discretionary traders, implying
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that systematic traders successfully adjust their portfolios just before equity turmoil and
subsequently generate higher returns from directional investments with or against long-
lasting price trends. Furthermore, the result can be linked to earlier studies (Kaminsky
(2011); Kaminsky and Mende (2011)) that refer to crisis alpha as profits that are generated
during crisis periods by exploiting large price trends. The analysis indicates that systematic
trend followers are most adept at benefiting from distressed markets.
3.5 Managerial Skill and Performance Persistence
Having established CTA managers’ skill through the analysis of gross returns, in this section
I assess their performance using an alternate measure: the amount of capital that funds are
able to extract from financial markets. To this end, I use an empirical procedure developed
by Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) to estimate the value added by a fund as the gross
excess return over a specific benchmark strategy, multiplied by its assets under management.
Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) argue that this measure is more precise than net or gross
abnormal returns obtained from standard regression models, as it takes into account the
number of assets managed by a fund. For example, since the size of CTAs ranges between
USD 10,000 and USD 5.3 billion,13 the added value of two funds with the same abnormal
return might vary greatly from each other because of the differences in the size of the funds’
AUM. This dimension is not captured by the gross alpha. Therefore, calculating the added
value of a CTA allows me to assess managerial skill from a new perspective that takes return
dynamics and fund size into account.
According to Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), the value added by a fund between




where qi,t−1 are fund i’s assets under management in period t− 1 measured in 2005
dollar terms,14 RGi,t is its gross return and R
B
i,t is a return from an alternative benchmark
investment that I calculate below. Once I have constructed the valued added for each
13Values refer to real AUM of the first reported entry to BarclayHedge.
14I transform nominal AUM to real AUM dividing it Pt/P0, where Pt is the US-CPI index in
period t and P0 US CPI index in year 2005.
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where N refers to the total number of funds, represented in BarclayHedge. Lastly, I follow
Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) and calculate a weighted measure of the average value added








Since more skilled managers stay alive for a longer period of time and, therefore,
add more value, I would expect the weighted measure S̄W to be larger than the simple
cross-sectional average S̄.
To construct the value added (Vit) for each fund, I use Moskowitz et al. (2012) time
series momentum factors as a benchmark trading strategy. More precisely, I estimate
RGt = β1 + β2TSMOMCOMt (3.6)
+ β3TSMOMEQt + β4TSMOMBDt + β5TSMOMFXt
where βi is the regression coefficient associated with one of the four time series
momentum factors. Then, I reconstruct RBt from the regression’s fitted values, so that the
time series of benchmark returns obtained has the same level of risk implied by the four-
TSMOM factor model. I choose these factors as a benchmark strategy for several reasons.
First, benchmark factors should be tradeable portfolios that serve as simple passive strategy.
This condition is clearly fulfilled by this benchmark since investors could simply reconstruct
the TSMOM factors by investing into short and long portfolios, depending on an asset’s
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prior returns. Second, previous research has emphasized CTAs’ extensive use of time series
momentum strategies (Baltas and Kosowski (2013); Elaut and Erdös (2016)). The high
R2 in the previous regression analysis of up 0.48 stresses the high explanatory powers of
this trading style. Third, Moskowitz et al. (2012) argue that their time-series momentum
factors are implementable strategies that generate the same payoff structure as Fung and
Hsieh (2001)’s options straddle factors. Since time series momentum factors are easier to
implement, I choose a passive strategy over the dynamic option straddle factors.
To alleviate concerns that results are driven by the growing size of the industry,
I follow Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) and plot the log number of funds reporting to
BarclayHedge as well as the log fund size of different percentiles over the entire sample
period. Figure 3.2 illustrates that the median fund size (base year 2005) remains comparably
stable over the entire period, while the number of reporting CTAs is growing, particularly
since 2001. The growth of the industry’s total AUM can therefore be attributed to an
increasing number of CTAs, rather than an increase in the size of CTAs. These industry
dynamics are comparable to those reported by Berk and van Binsbergen (2015).
As shown in Table 3.13, the average added value by a CTA is USD 0.49 million (base
year 2005) and the reporting life time-weighted average is USD 1.27 million. Both numbers
are significantly greater than zero at the 5% level using a one-sided t-test. Moreover, these
values are substantially higher than the USD 0.27 and USD 0.14 million added value of
mutual funds in the study by Berk and van Binsbergen (2015). In line with the authors, I
argue that the differences in the cross-sectional means highlight that more talented managers
have a longer lifespan. However, it is worth noting that, as demonstrated in the lower half
of Table Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), there is a substantial cross-sectional variation
in managerial skill. Value added by CTAs ranges from a loss of nearly USD 4 million
in the bottom 1% to profits of USD 6.82 million in the very top. Furthermore, roughly
two-fifths of the 926 funds do not add significant value. It is worth noting that Berk and
van Binsbergen (2015) find that up to 59% of mutual funds are not able to outperform
passive benchmark strategies. These results indicate that CTA managers are more skilled
than mutual fund managers - a reassuring figure given that CTA managers’ compensation
is orders of magnitude greater than that of mutual fund managers.15
15As highlighted by Stulz (2007), the compensation schemes of mutual funds and hedge funds
differ fundamentally from each other. Mutual fund managers’ compensation is more strictly regu-
lated, usually depends solely on the fund’s assets under management and investors pay no additional
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Figure 3.2: Development Of Real Assets Under Management in the CTA Industry
Notes: This figure shows the development of the growth of the assets under managements (AUM) in
the commodity trading advisor industry. The 1th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 99th percentile of the log
real AUM are displayed against the left axis (black lines, base year = 2005), while the log number
of funds (red line) refers to the axis on the right.
Next, I test for persistence in managerial skill. To this end, I employ a skills ratio













t=1(Vit − Ŝτi )2)/τ . In line with the authors, I take the
following approach. First, I split the sample into sorting and forecasting periods. In the
sorting sample, funds are sorted in quintiles according to their level of skill. The minimum
number of reported months for each fund i is 24 and I re-estimate the skills ratio for each
point in time τ based on an extending window approach, including all the fund information
from period 1 until τ . Second, for each τ I then estimate the value added for each fund in
performance fee. In contrast, the performance fee is a substantial component of a CTA manager’s
compensation and the results suggest that more skilful managers use a higher fee structure to signal
their skill.
73
Table 3.13: Manager Skill and Added Value
This table shows the value added by CTA managers over Moskowitz et al. (2012) time
series momentum factors. Values are expressed in million USD (base year = 2005). The
null hypothesis tested is whether the cross-sectional weighted average or the cross-sectional
mean is larger than zero (formally: H0 > 0) ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance, respectively.
Cross-sectional weighted average 1.27
Standard error of the weighted mean 0.02
p-value 0.04**
Cross-sectional mean 0.49









Percent with less than zero 0.41
Number of funds 926
the periods [Vi,τ+m, ..., Vi,τ+m+h], where h refers to the forecasting horizon and m to the
minimum number of reported months after period τ . For each point in time I estimate the
added value with information from the forecasting period only, not the sorting period. Since
I estimate the benchmark return for each point in time with four time series momentum
factors, I chose m = 40.16 Concerning the forecasting horizon, I use different lengths for
h, ranging between h = 3 and h = 36 months. The upper bound is chosen to account for
the fact that the average lifetime of funds is approximately 70 months so that funds in the
sorting period may not report any longer in the forecasting period. At the end, I obtain
16The minimum number of reporting months is chosen to be m=40 to allow for a sufficient number
of degrees of freedom in each of the rolling regressions. Results are qualitatively similar to other
specifications, such as e.g. m = 30 or m = 50.
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a time series of monthly average value added for each of the five portfolios. To evaluate
persistence, I examine how often the valued added by the bottom 20% (Portfolio 1) is
outperformed by the top 20% (Portfolio 5) and in how many months the latter outperforms
the former. Results are shown in Table 3.14 and Figure 3.3.
Table 3.14: Manager Skill and Performance Persistence
This table shows the average value added by CTAs (in USD million; base year = 2005)
sorted in the bottom and top portfolios for different forecasting horizons. The t-statistic
refers to the test whether the average value added test in the bottom and top portfolios
are the same. The table also shows the number of times the top quintile outperforms the
bottom quintile. Returns from Moskowitz et al. (2012)’s time series momentum factors are





Top 20 % Value Added T-statistic
Top 20% outperforms
bottom 20%
3 0.01 3 13.2 0.96
6 0.02 3.4 13.6 0.96
9 0.04 3.7 14 0.97
12 0.01 4 14.3 0.99
24 0.21 4.9 14.9 0.94
36 0.41 5.5 14.1 0.84
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Figure 3.3: Predictability of Fund Performance: Manager Skills Ratio
Notes: This figure shows the added value of CTAs sorted into portfolios over six different forecasting horizons (3, 6, 9, 12, 24, 36 months). The
y-axis measures added value in USD million (base year = 2005) and the x-axis refers to the five portfolios. Portfolio 1 refers to CTAs with the lowest
skill ratio and Portfolio 5 refers to CTAs with the highest skill ratio. The solid line refers to the average added value, while the dashed lines refers
to the 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 3.14 shows the value added by the funds in the top 20% and in the bottom 20%
of the sample. As displayed, the values added by the two groups of CTAs differ significantly
from each other. For example, the predicted added value of the bottom 20% is only USD 0.1
million, while the top 20% of CTAs’ added value accounts for USD 3 million. As indicated by
the large t-statistics, the added value between the two groups differs significantly across all
forecasting horizons. This indicates that managers with more managerial skill persistently
perform better than their less skilled peers. In addition, I find that in almost every month
the top 20% outperforms the bottom 20%. The most skilled CTAs outperform the least
skilled managers 96% of the time for the shortest forecasting horizon (h = 3).
Furthermore, in Figure 3.3 the solid line shows the average added value (y-axis)
for each portfolio (x-axis) for all six forecasting horizons. Independent of the forecasting
horizon, h, I find that more skilled funds (Portfolio 5) extract more value from capital
markets than less skilled managers (Portfolio 1). I interpret this finding as evidence that
better performance is not due to managers’ luck but rather to their managerial skills.
Finally, I assess if investors can infer a priori whether some managers are more
skilled than others. Since managerial skill is a scarce good and the cross-sectional variation
is large, rational investors would prefer to allocate their capital to CTAs that provide the
best performance. In line with Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), I assess whether investors
can learn about managers’ future performance based on their current compensation. If
compensation predicts future performance, managers could use it as a credible and observ-
able signal of their skill and attract more capital from investors. The existence of such
a signalling mechanism would indicate an efficient and competitive CTA market (Akerlof
(1970)). To control for the ex-ante predictability of future performance, I sort funds into
quintile portfolios based on their compensation, which is defined as accrued fees multiplied
by AUM. Using only the overall fee is problematic because the CTA fee structure is not very
diverse. In my sample, 53% of funds report the typical 2/20 fee structure of management
and performance fees. On the other hand, the amount of capital managed by a CTA varies
greatly in the cross-section and is crucial for managerial compensation.
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Figure 3.4: Predictability of Fund Performance: Manager Compensation
Notes: This figure shows the added value of CTAs sorted into portfolios over six different forecasting horizons (3, 6, 9, 12, 24, 36 months). The
y-axis measures added value in USD million (base year = 2005) and the x-axis refers to the five portfolios. Portfolio 1 refers to the CTA with the
lowest compensation and Portfolio 5 to the CTA with the highest compensation. The solid line refers to the average added value, while the dashed
lines refers to the 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 3.15: Compensation Scheme and Performance Persistence
This table shows the average value added by CTAs (in USD million; base year = 2005) sorted
in the bottom and top portfolios for different forecasting horizons. The t-statistic refers to
the test whether the average value added test in the bottom and top portfolios are the
same. The table also shows the number of times the top quintile outperforms the bottom
quintile. Returns from Moskowitz et al. (2012)’s time series momentum factors are used






Top 20 % Value Added T-statistic
Top 20% outperforms
bottom 20%
3 0.08 2.1 9.7 79%
6 0.07 2.2 9.5 83%
9 0.07 2.3 8.8 80%
12 0.09 2.5 9 82%
24 0.1 3.3 8.6 81%
36 0.1 4.5 8.2 72%
Table 3.15 provides support for the hypothesis that investors compete to allocate
money to successful CTA managers. As indicated by the high t-statistics, funds that demand
the highest compensation from investors outperform funds with the lowest compensation
scheme. The value added by the costliest top 20% exceeds the performance of the bottom
20% in at least 72% of all months. Figure 3.4 supports this claim. In all cases, CTAs in
Portfolio 5 add more value than funds in the lower ranked portfolios for up to nine months.
For h = 12 and h = 24, Portfolio 4 slightly outperforms the most expensive funds leading
to a slight kink in the solid line. In addition, 95% confidence bands increase with a larger
forecasting horizon (indicated by the scale of the y-axis), adding greater uncertainty about
a fund’s future performance. However, in the short run, high compensation ex ante predicts
future performance. Therefore, the results indicate that managers use their compensation
to signal their skills to investors, who use this information while determining their fund
allocations. Overall, I conclude that the value added provides additional evidence of man-




The CTA industry has grown rapidly over the past 20 years. However, extant empirical
evidence indicates that CTA managers have generated statistically insignificant net excess
returns and have passive benchmarks. If such is the case, why do professional, sophisti-
cated investors continue to invest in these underperforming funds? Is this a consequence of
investor irrationality? Or does the market thrive because it is too opaque to be aware of
its own failing? Clearly, the puzzling growth of CTAs raises fundamental questions about
academics’ understanding of the operational efficiency of the CTA industry and the alter-
native investments market at large. I employ a large and representative dataset of CTAs to
provide a new perspective on the performance of CTAs, the skill of their managers, and the
relation between CTA managers’ pay and performance.
The dataset is derived from the Barclay’s Hedge Fund Database and data provided
by Risk and Portfolio Management AB (RPM). The dataset has several advantages over
those used in extant studies. First, it provides the most compressive of coverage of the
CTA industry—70% of the total assets under CTA management, on average, between 1985
and 2015. Second, it is largely free of any graveyard bias as it has been downloaded by
RPM on a daily basis for a large proportion of the sample period. Third, it enables me to
classify CTAs into to four strategy groups: systematic and discretionary trend followers and
their non-trend-following counterpoints. Additionally, I use a smaller proprietary dataset of
realized CTA returns to validate my results obtained from the larger sample.
In contrast to earlier studies, I find that equally (EW) and value-weighted (VW)
portfolios of CTAs generate on average 4.1% and 4.5% excess returns for investors on an
annual basis. Notably, these returns are net of all fees. Despite high management and per-
formance fees, CTAs are a profitable investment opportunity for investors. The results also
show that CTA returns are positively skewed, countercyclical to equity markets and largely
uncorrelated with hedge fund returns. I also document that CTA managers outperform
normative benchmarks, such as time series momentum strategies, and produce up to 8.4%
abnormal gross excess return on an annual basis. Testing formally in a regression framework
for the existence of “crisis alpha”, I find that systematic trend-following funds produce on
average more than 27% annualized abnormal returns by exploiting large price trends during
crisis times. Next, measuring managerial skill by the amount of capital that CTAs extract
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from financial markets, I show that CTAs, on average, add value of USD 1.27 million per
month, with roughly 60% of the CTAs in the sample generating more value than passive
benchmark trading strategies. Finally, I find that the cross-sectional differences in managers’
skills are persistent up to three years, ruling out the possibility that the evidence relating
to managerial skill is driven by luck. Moreover, I show that managerial fees predict future
performance, indicating that investors are able to identify and reward skilled managers.
The results show the CTA market to be well-functioning, one in which rational
investors compete to invest with skilled managers, whose compensation is set in equilibrium
so that the expected net alpha is zero (Berk and Green (2004)).
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Chapter 4
FX Spot and Swap Liquidity
and the Effects of Window
Dressing
4.1 Introduction
This paper assesses liquidity conditions in the foreign exchange (FX) market using intra-
day data for the post-financial crisis period. Employing information on interdealer quoting
activity from the beginning of 2010 until mid-2017, I also account for FX swap dealers’
response to recent regulatory changes. With average daily trading volumes exceeding $5
trillion, the FX market is the world’s deepest financial market, yet FX liquidity conditions
are notoriously difficult to assess. For one, unlike say equity markets, FX trading is frag-
mented across many venues and is primarily executed over-the-counter (OTC). Furthermore,
trading volumes in FX derivatives are an important source of liquidity and price discovery in
FX markets. Specifically, daily trading volume in foreign exchange swap markets has been
increasing significantly in recent years and substantially exceeded spot market turnover in
2016 (BIS, 2016).1 Hence, it is crucial to account for FX derivatives, in addition to spot
trading, when assessing FX liquidity conditions.
1In April 2016, daily average turnover in the foreign exchange spot market was 1,652 billion US
dollar-equivalents, compared to 2,380 billion US dollar-equivalent for FX swaps (BIS, 2016).
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This paper contributes to the international finance literature in several ways. First,
it adds to the study on liquidity dynamics in currency markets which only recently witnessed
growing attention. Mancini-Griffoli and Ranaldo (2011) provide a systematic assessments
of FX spot liquidity, highlighting the substantial variation of liquidity across currency pairs.
Banti et al. (2012) combine data on returns and order flows across currencies to construct
a measure of systematic FX liquidity risk. Karnaukh et al. (2015) provide further evidence
for commonality in FX liquidity, using daily data covering a large cross-section of currency
pairs for more than twenty years. Hasbrouck and Levich (2017) examine liquidity dynamics
across a large number of currencies using one-month of settlement data, complemented with
high-frequency data on quotes. In contrast to these studies, I do not limit the analysis to
spot markets, but take into account liquidity conditions in the FX swap market as well.2
This extension allows me to explicitly account for the joint behaviour of FX market liquidity
and FX funding liquidity.
The theoretical framework for the interaction of these liquidity measures is grounded
in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Whereas market liquidity broadly refers to the costs
of trade execution and the ability to trade large volumes without generating an out-sized
price impact, funding liquidity refers to the ease with which such trades and the associated
market positions can be funded. Importantly, funding instruments are themselves traded,
and their pricing can affect market liquidity conditions, which can then feedback to funding
costs. While Banti and Phylaktis (2015) do assess this interaction of funding liquidity with
FX market liquidity, they look at funding liquidity conditions in repo markets, whereas
this analysis follows a novel approach by constructing all the funding liquidity measures
from activity in FX markets themselves. I measure FX funding liquidity by the forward
spread (e.g. forward discount computed from quotes of swap points) and, hence, I look at
funding liquidity in the proximate market, rather than relying on more removed measures
such as Libor-OIS or the TED spread. The FX forward point spread can be interpreted as
the funding costs of a foreign exchange swap that is used to borrow (lend) US dollar while
lending (borrowing) a local currency in the spot market.3
2BIS (2017) covered issues related to the liquidity of currency markets in the Americas, including
FX derivatives.
3To the extent that measures of FX funding liquidity, particularly when adjusted by benchmark
money market rates, are closely related to deviations from covered interest parity (CIP), this work
is somewhat related the CIP literature. However, as my aim is neither to measure CIP arbitrage
nor to explain CIP failure, I abstract from this literature. Links to a number of recent papers
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Second, I examine intra-day liquidity conditions, using Thomson Reuters Tick His-
tory (TRTH) data obtained from Reuters Datascope, while aforementioned analyses are
largely conducted at daily or lower frequencies. Huang and Masulis (1999) is another closely
related study to have used TRTH data to assess liquidity conditions, but they focused on
DM/USD, only on spot, and on one year of data between 1992 and 1993, whereas I cover a
much longer and recent time-period, and corroborated the findings in both JPY/USD and
EUR/USD.
Third, I estimate the effects of dealer competition on liquidity in spot and FX swaps
markets building upon an early stream of literature, which examines the relationship between
spot market liquidity, measured via bid-ask spreads and dealer competition (Huang and
Masulis (1999)). I also add to studies relating FX price discovery and dealer informational
advantages to dealer size (Rosenberg and Traub, 2009; Bjonnes et al., 2009; Phylaktis and
Chen, 2010; Menkhoff et al., 2016). I contribute to the literature by assessing the impact of
large and small dealers on liquidity conditions.
Fourth, in line with recent studies examining the market environment against the
background of post-crisis regulatory frameworks (e.g. Adrian, Fleming, Or, and Vogt, 2017),
I analyse current trends of liquidity dynamics and discuss the impact of the changing dealer
behaviour. In particular, I draw a line along a major difference in the regulatory treatment
of dealer balance sheets: I distinguish between globally systematically important banks (G-
SIBs) and smaller banks, as this captures the different constraints faced by large and smaller
dealers for providing liquidity in spot versus the swap markets. I document significant bal-
ance sheet window dressing by G-SIB dealers around regulatory reporting periods, which
translates into their scaling back on their market-making activity in FX swaps. The dy-
namics have strengthened as banks began managing their balance sheets in order to adhere
to the new leverage and liquidity regulations.4 Hence, I provide further insights into the
examining the persistent failure of CIP in the period following the global financial crisis can be
found here: https://www.bis.org/events/bissymposium0517/programme.htm.
4For example, the Basel standards required public disclosure of the Basel III leverage ratio by
international banks as of January 2015, although the leverage ratio will become a mandatory part
of the Basel III Pillar 1 requirements only in January 2018, after a period of monitoring and final
calibration. Similarly, liquidity coverage ratios (LCR) was phased in at 60% in January 2015,
and gradually rising to 100% over a period of four years. The former has implications for the
contribution of off-balance sheet derivatives, such as FX swaps, to the total exposure calculation
under the leverage ratio, while the latter affects how bank use FX swaps for their cross-currency
liquidity management.
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drivers of quarter-end anomalies in FX swap pricing documented by recent literature. Du
and Verdelhan (2018) find that quarter-end spikes in short-term FX swap basis are in line
with the maturity of the contracts relative to the reporting dates. Borio et al. (2016) show
that quarter-end widening of FX swap basis is closely related to the quarter-end divergence
in repo market spreads in respective currencies. Arai et al. (2016) take the fact that FX
swap spreads and GC repo spreads widen at quarter-ends while Tri-party repo spreads do
not widen as evidence of bank balance sheet management under the leverage ratio.5 I con-
tribute to this literature by showing that such quarter-end tightening in FX swap funding
conditions is explained by the pull-back by G-SIB dealers from FX swap markets. I also
document significant adverse spillovers to FX spot market arising from such dealer balance
sheet window-dressing in FX derivatives.
The main data source for this study is Reuters Datascope. I obtain data for
JPY/USD and EUR/USD spot market, 1-month swap points, and 1-month overnight index
swap (OIS) rates for the period February 2010 to May 2017. The database documents en-
tries at the milli-second frequency and comprises indicative quotes for the best bid and ask
price. Further, the database stores the name and location of the dealers that are active in
spot and swap markets and submit their quotes. The detailed track record allows me to con-
duct a comprehensive analysis of price and quantity dynamics of quote submissions in both,
spot and derivative, markets. The main empirical analysis is conducted at the intra-day fre-
quency leveraging price information with information on how many dealers were active, how
many quotes were submitted, how quote submissions varied within a specific time horizon,
and how all these metrics differed by dealer-type.
The main results are as follows. First, I find a robust relationship between FX
funding and FX market liquidity. A deterioration in FX funding liquidity, measured by the
widening of CIP deviations or simple FX swap spreads (forward discount) is associated with
a widening of bid-ask spreads in both currency swap and spot markets.
Second, this link between FX market and FX funding liquidity conditions strength-
ened significantly since about mid-2014. In particular, while some tightening in FX swap
market liquidity was always present around quarter-ends, these effects have become several
5This is because FX swap markets and GC repo markets rely on arbitrage-trading and market-
making by banks, whereas the Tri-party repo market gets US dollar supply also from real money
investors not subject to the leverage ratio.
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times larger since 2014, with significant spillover to spot market liquidity also emerging in
the latest period. The regime shift in the liquidity conditions in FX market appears related
to the re-occurring liquidity droughts at quarter-ends. During each month corresponding
to a quarter-end, controlling for higher variation in liquidity metrics, I find that FX fund-
ing and market liquidity exhibit stronger co-movement. Because the origins of quarter-end
anomalies can be traced to core bank funding markets, such as unsecured overnight mar-
kets and repo markets, this implies stronger transmission of exogenous FX funding liquidity
shocks to FX market liquidity. Statistical tests indeed point towards spillover of adverse FX
funding liquidity shocks to market liquidity.
Third, I find that liquidity conditions and dealer activity are closely related. Specif-
ically, the positive impact of dealer competition on FX market liquidity has decreased over
time. While large dealers still dominate as market-makers in spot and their quoting inten-
sity is associated with improved liquidity dynamics, they have also exhibited a tendency to
pull-back from making markets in FX swaps around balance sheet reporting periods. As
balance sheet window dressing by major dealers causes them to scale back their activity,
funding costs significantly increase, market liquidity declines and volatility increases. For
example, I find that funding costs at quarter-ends are approximately three times larger
between July 2014 and May 2017 than during the European debt crisis.
Fourth, and related, I find that market-making activity in FX swaps can signifi-
cantly diverge from that in spot. Whereas large dealers appear to dominate as principal
market-makers in spot throughout most of the sample period, small dealers largely dis-
place large dealers as market-makers in swaps in times when spreads are wide. Specifically,
when liquidity conditions tighten due to the pull-back by G-SIBs from FX swap markets
at quarter-ends, small dealers increase their quoting activity. In certain year-end periods, I
also find evidence that smaller dealers are consistently quoting inside spreads, hence are the
ones making-markets on average. Yet, small dealers stepping in during these times does not
appear to lead to an improvement in liquidity conditions. I identify two reasons for this.
One is that small dealers are low volume players, thus require wider bid-ask spreads and
forward spreads for their market-making activity to be profitable. The second reason is that
quoting activity by small dealers does not contribute to the same extent to price discovery
as that by large dealer. Specifically, greater quoting intensity by small dealers does not
suppress the dispersion of forward rate quotes in the same way that quoting intensity by
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large dealers does, indicating greater volatility of quotes around the “true” forward rate,
constructed from the sum of spot rate and swap points, in an any given hour.
Finally, consistent with the price spillovers from forward points in FX derivative
markets to bid-ask spreads in both swap and forward rates (eg. FX funding to market
liquidity spillovers), starting July 2014 for JPY/USD (January 2015 for EUR/USD) I also
find that heightened activity by smaller dealers in FX swap markets has a stronger effect on
market liquidity (bid-ask spreads) in the spot market compared to smaller dealers in spot.
This is noteworthy, especially because more than half of small dealers in FX swaps do not
even participate in the spot market directly. In certain times, wider spreads quoted by small
dealers in the swap market negatively impact spot market liquidity, and offset some of the
positive effects on spot market liquidity from competition by large dealers.
Hence, the analysis suggests that funding liquidity has become a more important
economic factor to understand bid-ask spreads in FX spot. I also show that dealer structure
of FX markets has been changing over the span of the sample period, and that smaller banks
appear to act more frequently as market makers in FX swaps as G-SIB dealers pull back.
This adds nuance to the widely held view that FX liquidity provision is highly concentrated
among a handful of largest dealers (King et al., 2011), while smaller dealers operate an
agency model simply passing client flows into the wholesale FX market (Moore et al., 2016).
While such concentration of liquidity provisions among the largest dealers appears to largely
hold for spot markets, in the markets for FX swaps smaller dealers tend to turn to making
markets and providing liquidity at times when spreads are wide enough to meet their hurdle
rates. Since smaller dealers charge higher mark ups, their increased quoting activity does
not necessarily lead to a narrowing of funding and market liquidity spreads, instead allowing
the deterioration in FX liquidity conditions to persist until large dealers re-enter as market-
makers as the quarter-end turn passes. Overall, this means that window dressing by large
FX dealers in FX swaps has been disruptive not only to swap market liquidity but also to
liquidity in spot.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the measures of
liquidity and dealer activity. Section 3 contains broad overview of liquidity measures at
daily frequency. Section 4 contains the core intra-day analysis of FX liquidity dynamics.
Section 5 concludes.
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4.2 Data and Variable Definitions
I obtain data for JPY/USD and EUR/USD spot exchange rate and 1-month swap points
from Reuters Datascope for the sample period 1st February 2010 to 31st May 2017. The
dataset contains information on dealers’ best bid and ask quote submissions, timed at the
milli-second frequency. In addition, it documents the name and location of the dealer bank
that submitted the quote. I also obtain information on 1-month overnight indexed swap
rates for both countries. Table 4.1 shows the sample of tick history data for a two second
window for spot JPY/USD.6
Table 4.1: Example: Two-second window for JPY/USD spot rate
RIC Date Time Dealer Bid Ask
’JPY=’ ’5-May-17’ ’14:47:29.348944’ ’BKofNYMellon NYC’ 112.620003 112.6399994
’JPY=’ ’5-May-17’ ’14:47:29.381124’ ’BARCLAYS LON’ 112.610001 112.6399994
’JPY=’ ’5-May-17’ ’14:47:29.640943’ ’SOC GENERALE PAR’ 112.599998 112.6399994
’JPY=’ ’5-May-17’ ’14:47:30.065053’ ’KASPI BANK ALA’ 112.620003 112.6399994
’JPY=’ ’5-May-17’ ’14:47:31.277082’ ’SEB STO’ 112.599998 112.6500015
’JPY=’ ’5-May-17’ ’14:47:32.260157’ ’RBS LON’ 112.599998 112.6399994
’JPY=’ ’5-May-17’ ’14:47:32.301189’ ’RABOBANKGFM LON’ 112.589996 112.6399994
Note: Data refers to a two-second window on 5th May 2017. The information is obtained
from Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database and accessed via Reuters Datascope.
Since quotes are submitted to and documented by Reuters in irregular time intervals,
I transform the raw data from the milli-second frequency to 1-min time series, using the
last submitted ask and bid quote in each minute. I consider all submitted quotes, irrelevant
if a certain dealer submitted more than one quote during each minute. Huang and Masulis
(1999) refer to this methodology as quote-weighted price data. I keep a detailed record of
6While containing important information on quoting activity by FX dealer banks, the dataset
is also subject to a number of limitations. First, it is primarily based on quote submissions on
the Thomson Reuters Matching platform, which, together with EBS, only represent about 13% of
global spot FX trading volume and 12% of global FX swaps trading volume, according to BIS (2016).
Second, the data only has information on quotes and not traded prices or volumes, which precludes
us from computing a number of popular measures of market liquidity based on the volume-return
relationship. Third, the dataset does not contain information on the depth of the order-book, and
the observed quotes are top-of-book quotes. Lastly, while Reuters is the main trading platform for
commonwealth and emerging market currency pairs, for EUR/USD and JPY/USD it is EBS. As
these are the two most frequently traded exchange rates, however, I believe it is pivotal to shed
light on the link between liquidity dynamics and dealer activity in spot and swap market of these
two currency pairs. Breedon and Vitale (2010) show that dynamics between EBS and Reuters are
highly correlated and both markets are closely linked with each other.
88
the number of submitted quotes and I identify the number of unique dealers that are active
in each 1-minute time-interval. In very few cases, in which no quote submission took place,
I use the last available information to fill the gap. Next, while activity on FX markets
is not restricted to specific trading hours, I clean the data in the spirit of earlier studies
(e.g. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega, 2003) and exclude certain trading hours
and holidays. On weekends and in the occasion of a holiday, I delete data entries between
21:00:00 (GMT) of the previous day until 21:00:00 (GMT) of the holiday itself. For example,
I drop information on weekends from Friday 21:00:00 until Sunday 21:00:00. We drop data
on fixed holidays such as Christmas (24th - 26th December), New Year’s (31st December -
2nd January) and July fourth (4th July).7 In addition, I exclude flexible holidays, such as
Good Friday, Easter Monday, Memorial Day, Labour Day, and Thanksgiving and the day
after.
I obtain equally spaced time-series bid and ask prices for spot rate, 1-month swap
points, and overnight index swap (OIS) rates, number of quote submissions, and number
and names of active dealers. Lastly, I convert the series to the hourly frequency to reduce
the impact of market microstructure noise. For the entire sample period, I obtain 44,088
observations.
4.2.1 Price Measures Of Market Liquidity
After these steps of data cleaning, I construct the following variables. Spot dealers quote
spot bid and spot ask prices, FX swap dealers quote bid and ask swap points. Following
Banti and Phylaktis (2015), I measure market liquidity at the hourly frequency in the foreign






F askh − F bidh
Fmidh
(4.2)
where the mid-price is calculated as the arithmetic average between ask and bid price
in each respective market segment. The bid and ask forward exchange rates are implied by
the swap points quoted by dealers in FX swaps. We define the 1-month forward rate implied
7In 2015, the official holiday is 3rd July, since July 4th falls on a Saturday.
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by swap points: F = S + SP ∗ 10−2 for USD/JPY and F = S + SP ∗ 10−4 for USD/EUR,
where S denotes the spot rate and SP are 1-month swap points.
4.2.2 Price Measures Of Funding Liquidity
Swap point quotes from FX swap dealers contain another important piece of information.
For example, if the reported swap points are negative, this indicates that USD is trading
at a forward discount. Hence, the pricing of FX swaps reflects the costs of obtaining say
USD today at the spot rate S in exchange for say JPY, and reversing this transaction in
one month at the pre-agreed forward exchange rate F . This, effectively, represents the cost
of term funding of one currency against another.
Hence, this main measure of FX funding liquidity is based on the forward spread,





where Fmid and Smid refer to the mid-price 1-month forward and spot rates, re-
spectively.
As an alternative measure of funding liquidity, I adjust the forward spread (forward
discount) by the level of benchmark interest rates, OIS rates, in the two currencies of the
same maturity. This is because, over a longer horizon, the level of the forward-spot differ-
ential should change to reflect the relative interest rate differentials in the two currencies,
as stipulated by the covered interest parity (CIP). Hence, an alternative measure of FX
funding liquidity is based on annualising the implied 1-month interest in the raw forward
discount, then adjusting it by the OIS rates in the two currencies. Effectively this comes
down to computing deviations from CIP:8
CIPdevh = (1 +
rmidh
100










8That said, adjustment of the forward discount by the OIS rates should not be considered as
a measure of CIP arbitrage profits (see, for example, Rime, Schrimpf, and Syrstad, 2017), but is
simply used to account for the relative cost of funding liquidity via FX swaps in the two currencies
taking into account the level of benchmark interest rates.
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where rmidh and r
mid∗
h refer to the mid-price OIS rates of both currencies.
By now, it should be fairly obvious that the pricing of FX swaps is reflective of both
market and funding liquidity.9 First, the quotes for swap ask (bid) points are the quotes for
the differential between ask (bid) spot and ask (bid) forward rate, thus implying a price for
both. Second, the forward discount implicit in the swap points provides a measure of term
funding of one currency against another.
4.2.3 Quantity Measures Of FX Liquidity
While these price-based measures are used to explore the relationship of liquidity dynamics,
I use the following additional quantity-based measures that account for FX dealer structure
and quoting activity. First, following Huang and Masulis (1999), I measure dealer competi-
tion by tracking the total number of quote submissions. I do this not only for spot, but also
for forward points, with the number of quotes per hour denoted by QSh and Q
F
h , respectively.
In addition, I construct a measure of dealer competition at the extensive margin by counting
the total number of active unique dealer banks within each hour. I denote this measure as
NSh and N
F
h for spot and forward points, respectively. I treat all dealers from one bank,
independently of their branch’s location, as one market participant. It is worth noting the
difference between these two measures. While former one accounts for the quoting activity
of banks, the later only takes into account the actual number of banks active in the market.
Lastly, I combine these two variables and measure quoting intensity as the ratio of submit-






). I interpret this measure as indicator of dealer
competition at the intensive margin. An overview of the measures is provided in Table 4.2.
4.2.4 Large Versus Small Dealers
Since I know what dealer is active in the market, I distinguish between small and large dealers
as an additional dimension of the analysis. An earlier study that looked at the size dimension
is Phylaktis and Chen (2010). These authors relied on the ranking of the Annual Euromoney
FX Survey (EMS) to make a dealer classification by size. An alternative approach is to
distinguish between large and small dealers in view of recent policy implementations and
rely on the classification of global systematically important banks (G-SIBs) by the Financial
9See Baba et al. (2008) for an exposition of cash flows in an FX swaps.
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Table 4.2: Benchmark hourly and daily measures


















FX funding liquidity mean
CIPdevh = (1 +
rmidh










h dealer competition, intensive margin sum
NPh = #Dealers
P
h dealer competition, extensive margin sum
QPh /N
P














n−1 variance; rP = ln(Ph)− ln(Ph−1); P ≡ S, F -
Stability Board, (BIS, 2011, 2013a). Table 4.3 shows the comparison between the thirty G-
SIB bank dealers and the top FX dealers according to the 2016 Euromoney survey. While
almost all 30 G-SIBs are ranked as top FX dealers in the Euromoney Survey (Table 4.3, left
column). 10 27 additional banks would be considered as large dealers by the Euromoney
FX Survey but are not included in the list of G-SIBs.
Figure 4.1 shows daily time-series of the percentage share of all top-of-book quotes







classified according to the G-SIB designation versus dealers that are only part of the Eu-
romoney Survey. During the entire sample period, large dealers categorised according to the
G-SIB classification were responsible for 37.2% of daily spot quote submissions, on average,
whereas using the broader Euromoney Survey for classification would raise that share to
49.8%. Figure 4.1 points towards an increased concentration of spot liquidity provision by
tier-1 and tier-2 dealers. The share of spot quotes in JPY/USD submitted by large dealers
approximately doubles between 2011 and 2014. Yet, as both figures show, the trends of both
10The only exception is Mizuho FG, which is classified as G-SIB but not listed in the Euromoney
Survey. Note that non-bank dealers such as Citadel Securities, XTX Markets, Tower Research
Capital, or Virtu Financial do not appear in the database by name. This is because their access
to Reuters Matching trading platform is prime-brokered by major FX dealer banks. Therefore, the
quotes of such non-bank market-makers on Reuters Matching appear under their prime-broker’s
name and not their own. Dealers that are not appear in the database are marked in grey in Table
4.3.
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Table 4.3: G-SIB classification vs Euromoney FX Survey rankings
This table reports the comparison between large dealer categorisation based on G-SIB clas-
sification with that based on Euromoney FX Survey rankings in 2016.
G-SIB Classification Euromoney FX Survey (EMS)
Agricultural Bank of China Alfa Bank
Bank of America Merrill Lynch ANZ Banking Group
Bank of China Bank of Montreal
Bank of New York Mellon BBVA
Barclays CIBC
BNP Paribas Citadel Securities
China Construction Bank Commerzbank
Citigroup Commonwealth Bank of Australia
Credit Suisse Danske Bank
Deutsche Bank Den norske Bank
Goldman Sachs Jump Trading
Groupe BPCE Lloyds Banking Group
Groupe Credit Agricole Lucid Markets
HSBC National Australia Bank
ICBC Natixis
ING Bank Nomura
JP Morgan Chase Rabobank
Mitsubishi UFJ FG RBC Capital Markets
(Mizuho FG) Saxo Bank
Morgan Stanley Scotiabank
Nordea SEB
Royal Bank of Scotland TD Securities
Santander Tower Research Capital
Societe Generale Virtu Financial
Standard Chartered Westpac Banking
State Street XTX Markets




Notes: Banks that are classified as large dealers according to G-SIB classification are also
considered as large dealers according to the Euromoney FX Survey (EMS). Banks marked in
grey are not available in our database and banks that are only part of the G-SIB classifaction
but not listed in EMS are marked with parenthesis.
classifications are very different from each other. First, quoting activity by tier-1 dealers
becomes increasingly volatile in the second half of the sample. Second, in periods when
tier-1 dealers (G-SIBs) pull back and decrease their market making activity (e.g. December
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Figure 4.1: Large and small dealer characteristics in JPY/USD
(a) Daily percentage quotes from large dealers in spot: G-SIB vs Euromoney classification
(b) Daily percentage quotes from large dealers in swap markets: G-SIB vs Euromoney
classification
See Table 4.1 for the corresponding list of dealers. G-SIB (tier-1) dealers refer to banks
that are classified as globally systematically important banks. EMS are banks that are
listed as large dealers by the FX Euromoney Survey but that are not part of the G-SIB
classification.
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Figure 4.2: Large and small dealer characteristics in EUR/USD
(a) Daily percentage quotes from large dealers in spot: G-SIB vs Euromoney classification
(b) Daily percentage quotes from large dealers in swap markets: G-SIB vs Euromoney
classification
See Table 4.1 for the corresponding list of dealers. G-SIB (tier-1) dealers refer to banks
that are classified as globally systematically important banks. EMS are banks that are
listed as large dealers by the FX Euromoney Survey but that are not part of the G-SIB
classification.
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2016), tier-2 dealers increase the number of quote submissions.
Moving to FX swap markets, the substitution effect between tier-1 and tier-2 quotes
is even stronger than in spot, as indicated by the counter cyclical quoting activity of tier-
1 versus tier-2 dealer activity (Figure 4.1b). The decreasing quoting activity in FX swap
points at general FX dealer aversion to making-markets in FX derivatives around regulatory
reporting periods, because, unlike cash, derivatives exposures are costly in terms of capital
and collateral requirements under Basel III, and national leverage and liquidity regulations.
Tier-1 dealers are also subject to the annual G-SIB surcharge and are choosing to actively
manage down their balance sheets to avoid crossing into the next G-SIB bucket.11 The
incentives to window-dress balance sheet would be strongest for banks whose end-of-year
G-SIB score puts them closest to the next G-SIB bucket for the following year. Figure 4.3
illustrates this using end-2016 G-SIB scores for the banks that fall into this category in the
JPY/USD sample, and what this implies about their proximity to the higher G-SIB bucket,
and hence a higher capital surcharge beginning 2017. Similar dynamics for EUR/USD are
shown in Figure 4.2.
During the entire sample period, large dealers categorised according to the G-SIB
classification where responsible for 52.2% of daily quote submissions, on average. Whereas,
using the broader Euromoney Survey for classification would raise that share to 73.5%. This
implies that the majority of dealers classified as small in the swap market are still the type
to make it into the Euromoney Survey, unlike most of the small dealers in the spot market.
Hence, it may be more accurate to think of small dealers in FX swaps as tier-2 dealers,
while many more small dealers in spot are better thought of as tier-3 dealers, because they
would not feature in the Euromoney Survey.
11See, for example, J.P. Morgan “Making sense of Libor’s mysterious rise”, North American Fixed
Income Strategy, 14 December, 2017.
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Figure 4.3: G-SIB surcharge and bucket cut-off points (2016/2017)
The figures show G-SIB banks included in the sample for JPY/USD as they are positioned
according to their G-SIB score at end-2016 and their proximity to the next G-SIB bucket
as of beginning 2017.
Indeed, the comparison of Figures 4.4a and 4.4b shows that most small (tier-3)
dealers are only active in the spot market in both sub-sample periods, while tier-2 banks
increase their activity in FX swaps markets since about mid-2014. In contrast, tier-1 dealer
behaviour changes from quoting in both markets to greater liquidity provision in spot mar-
kets only. I interpret the Venn diagrams as further evidence that quoting activity between
tier-1 and tier-2 banks differ significantly from each other in spot and swap markets, with
tier-1 dealer shifting away from quoting FX swaps to only quoting spot as bank adopted to
the new regulatory reporting templates as of January 2015. As Figure 4.4c shows, the tier-1
dealer shifting away from quoting both FX forward points and spot (e.g. FX swaps) to only
quoting spot are particularly pronounced around the quarter-end and year-end regulatory
reporting periods.
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Figure 4.4: Activity of small and large dealers by market segment in JPY/USD
(a) Average share of dealers active in spot and derivative markets: Feb 2010 - Jun 2014
(b) Average share of dealers active in spot and derivative markets: Jul 2014 - May 2017
(c) Percentage of large dealer activity in spot and derivative markets
Figure 4.4a and 4.4b show the average share of dealers active in different market segments for the
period February 2010 - June 2014 and July 2014 to May 2017, respectively. The red line refers to
dealers that are only active in the swap market, the blue line refers to dealers active only in spot
markets, and the intersection refers to dealers that are active in both markets. Figure 4.4c shows
the 25-day moving average of large dealers (tier-1) that are only active in spot markets, only in
swap markets, and in both markets. 98
Figure 4.5: Activity of small and large dealers by market segment in EUR/USD
(a) Average share of dealers active in spot and derivative markets: Feb 2010 - Jun 2014
(b) Average share of dealers active in spot and derivative markets: Jul 2014 - May 2017
(c) Percentage of large dealer activity in spot and derivative markets
Figure 4.4a and 4.4b show the average share of dealers active in different market segments for the
period February 2010 - June 2014 and July 2014 to May 2017, respectively. The red line refers to
dealers that are only active in the swap market, the blue line refers to dealers active only in spot
markets, and the intersection refers to dealers that are active in both markets. Figure 4.4c shows
the 25-day moving average of large dealers (tier-1) that are only active in spot markets, only in
swap markets, and in both markets. 99
4.3 Liquidity Measures In The Long-Run
This section looks at daily trends in liquidity and dealer competition measures over the
sample period February 2010 to May 2017. Figures 4.6a and 4.6b show the dynamics of the
price-based liquidity measures for JPY/USD and EUR/USD, respectively. Market liquidity
in the spot and swap markets move very closely (correlation of 0.97 for JPY/USD and 0.98
for EUR/USD) over most of the sample period. For both currency pairs, bid-ask spreads
increase during the European debt crisis at the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012. They
remain comparably low afterwards and start to increase gradually for both currencies from
mid-2014 until the end of the sample. Since a higher bid-ask spread is associated with more
illiquid market conditions, both Figures seem to suggest that market liquidity has declined
towards the end of the sample.
For funding liquidity, I observe a similar pattern. As indicated by the black plot,
there is an increase in (absolute) forward discount in the middle of 2011 and relatively
stable funding costs in the period after the European debt crisis. From the third quarter in
2014 onward, funding liquidity drops on a re-occurring basis. These liquidity droughts are
particularly prevalent during quarter-end periods, indicated by the grey areas. Clearly, the
level of funding liquidity since about mid-2014 follows a different pattern compared to the
2010 to 2014 period.
Table 4.4 shows summary statistics for price-based FX liquidity measures across the
months falling on quarter-ends (QE), versus those on month before (BQE) and after (AQE).
The sample is split according to the apparent regime change in FX liquidity conditions with
the emergence of the quarter-end turn in forward points in September 2014 for JPY/USD
and March 2015 for EUR/USD; hence I pick the second sub-sample cut-off two month
prior to the QE month for each currency pair. For each liquidity measure, Panel A shows
the average level as well as p-values of a one-sided t-test that the liquidity measures are
significantly worse than in the rest of the months in each sub-sample. Panel B shows the
volatility of each liquidity measure as well as the p-values of the variance ratio test that
volatilities are significantly different compared to the rest of the months in each sub-sample.
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The outside y-axis shows OIS-based 1-month CIP deviations, in basis points; the middle
y-axis shows 1-month forward discount, in basis points as a percentage of spot price; the
inner y-axis shows bid-ask spreads, in basis points as a percentage of mid-price.
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics: Liquidity dynamics (price-based) at quarter end
This table reports the average and standard deviation of spot market and swap market liquidity, measured by the bid-ask spread of spot rate (SpreadS) and
forward rate (SpreadF ), and funding liquidity, measured by forward discount (Fdiscount) and CIP deviations (CIPdev) for JPY/USD and EUR/USD
for two different sub-sample periods. QE refers to months at quarter-ends (March, June, September, December), BQE are months before quarter-end
(February, May, August, November), and AQE refer to the first month after quarter-end (January, April, July, Octobers). In Panel A, numbers in
parentheses refer to the p-value of a one-sided t-test that market and funding liquidity in the respective months is larger than in the rest of the months
in each sub-sample. In Panel B, numbers in parentheses denote the p-value of a variance ratio test.
JPY/USD EUR/USD
02/2010 - 06/2014 07/2014 - 05/2017 02/2010 - 12/2015 01/2015 - 05/2017
QE BQE AQE QE BQE AQE QE BQE AQE QE BQE AQE
Panel A: Average and t-test
Fdiscount -2.91*** -2.39*** -2.40*** -9.94*** -6.24*** -6.29*** -0.37*** 0.12 0.31 -10.38*** -8.38 -8.47
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.83) (1.00) 0.00 (1.00) (0.99)
CIPdev -29.83*** -23.66 -23.50 -91.86*** -45.24 -48.63*** -25.36*** -21.01 -20.97 -65.96*** -40.72 -45.47
(0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.99)
SpreadS 3.41 3.47 3.41 2.79* 2.80** 2.65 1.97 1.99 1.95 2.74 2.75 2.70
(0.70) 0.12 (0.76) (0.05) (0.02) (1.00) (0.45) (0.11) (0.91) (0.38) (0.27) (0.81)
SpreadF 3.72 3.73 3.67 3.21*** 3.15 3.03 2.18 2.17 2.12 3.02 2.94 2.95
(0.35) (0.28) (0.83) (0.00) (0.27) (1.00) (0.12) (0.21) (0.98) (0.15) (0.73) (0.67)
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics: Liquidity dynamics (price-based) at quarter end
This table reports the average and standard deviation of spot market and swap market liquidity, measured by the bid-ask spread of spot rate (SpreadS) and
forward rate (SpreadF ), and funding liquidity, measured by forward discount (Fdiscount) and CIP deviations (CIPdev) for JPY/USD and EUR/USD
for two different sub-sample periods. QE refers to months at quarter-ends (March, June, September, December), BQE are months before quarter-end
(February, May, August, November), and AQE refer to the first month after quarter-end (January, April, July, Octobers). In Panel A, numbers in
parentheses refer to the p-value of a one-sided t-test that market and funding liquidity in the respective months is larger than in the rest of the months
in each sub-sample. In Panel B, numbers in parentheses denote the p-value of a variance ratio test.
JPY/USD EUR/USD
02/2010 - 06/2014 07/2014 - 05/2017 02/2010 - 12/2015 01/2015 - 05/2017
QE BQE AQE QE BQE AQE QE BQE AQE QE BQE AQE
Panel B: Standard deviation and ratio test
Fdiscount 1.76 *** 1.29 0.88 5.23 *** 3.89 3.89 2.89 2.73 3.21 5.37 *** 4.13 4.25
(0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.76) (0.99) (1.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.99)
CIPdev 21.41 *** 15.43 10.21 44.70 *** 29.75 28.22 0.39 14.09 0.37 0.69 23.33 0.76
(0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.11) (1.00) (0.80) (0.68) (1.00) (0.01)
SpreadS 0.78 0.83 * 0.79 0.58 *** 0.55 0.46 0.47 * 0.37 0.44 0.84 * 0.66 0.85
(0.87) (0.06) (0.67) (0.00) (0.21) (1.00) (0.09) (0.65) (0.83) (0.07) (0.66) (0.03)
SpreadF 0.90 0.95 0.92 0.77 *** 0.69 0.64 21.86 *** 0.45 12.70 39.21 *** 0.69 25.25
(0.81) (0.13) (0.59) (0.00) (0.75) (1.00) (0.00) (0.67) (1.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00)
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Quarter-end anomalies of the type picked-up in this paper are a recent phenomenon
that has emerged since about September 2014 for JPY/USD (March 2015 for EUR/USD).
Their origins are exogenous to the FX market as such, attributed to the window dressing
by global banks, as some banks shrink their balance sheets so as to manage their regulatory
costs associated with the new post-crisis capital and liquidity requirements. Such balance
sheet window-dressing appears to have first-and-foremost affected short-term money markets
and on balance sheet funding instruments, such as repurchase agreements (CGFS, 2017 and
Aldasoro, Ehlers, and Eren, 2018). However, strong effects have also been documented for
off-balance sheet instruments, such as FX swaps (see Arai, Makabe, Okawara, and Nagano,
2016 and Du and Verdelhan, 2018).
Takeaways from the results reported in Table 4.4 are as follows. First, FX funding
liquidity, as measured by either swap points, Fdiscount, or swap points adjusted by the
level of benchmark interest rates, CIPdev, deteriorates significantly at quarter-end months
over the entire period (both wider spreads and higher spread volatility), but the magnitudes
of the fall in liquidity at quarter-ends are several times larger in the most recent period.
Second, market liquidity in JPY/USD has begun exhibiting significant deteriorations at
quarter-ends in the most recent period, as indicated by wider level and volatility of bid-ask
spreads in spot and swaps. Market liquidity in EUR/USD appears less affected, although
the volatility of bid-ask spreads particularly in the swap market, but also to a lesser extent
in spot, has risen.
Further, Figures 4.7a and 4.7b show the dynamics of quantity-based measures of
market activity. They show FX dealer quoting intensity in spot (blue) and swap market
(red) as well as the moving average for both markets. Spot market trading intensity is up to
five to ten times higher than in the swap market. In addition, in both markets, I observe an
increase in market activity towards the end of the sample. The moving averages indicate a
rise in quote submissions compared to the number of banks. The spiking of dealer quoting
intensity is particularly pronounced for FX forwards for both currency pairs.
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Figure 4.7: Measures of dealer competition in spot and swap markets
(a) JPY/USD
(b) EUR/USD
The figure shows daily dealer quoting intensity, defined as the total number of quotes divided by







measures based on the top of the order book.
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Figure 4.8: Small dealer quoting intensity in the swap markets
(a) JPY/USD
(b) EUR/USD
The figure shows daily dealer quoting intensity of small dealers in forwards, defined as the total
number of quotes divided by the total number of active dealers in a given day t, QF,SDt /N
F,SD
t ; all
measures based on the top of the order book.
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The steep increase in quoting intensity in FX swaps is driven by increased activity
of smaller dealers. Figures 4.8a and 4.8b plot the quoting intensity of smaller dealers in
the swap market against CIP deviations that take account of transaction costs (measured
by bid-ask spreads). As the figures show, whenever bid-ask spreads and forwards spreads
widen, as measured by the transaction cost-adjusted CIP deviations, small dealers tend to
increase their quoting intensity. This was temporarily the case during the euro area sovereign
debt crisis, but became more persistent since about mid-2014 as price-based measures of FX
liquidity conditions deteriorated first in JPY/USD and then in EUR/USD. One possibility
is that smaller institutions not constrained by G-SIB surcharge or that have greater balance
sheet availability are trying to take advantage of the dislocations in FX swap markets. For
example, smaller banks could borrow dollar cash in the Fed funds market and then lend it
out in FX swaps.
From Figures 4.6 through 4.8 I draw the following conclusions. First, liquidity
dynamics, market participation, and trading activity vary to a great extent over the sample
period. For example, while market liquidity in spot and swap markets appears to be greatly
impacted by the European debt crisis during the first years of the sample, bid-ask spreads
and funding costs decrease significantly between 2013 to mid-2014. From mid-2014 until the
end of the sample liquidity dynamics are tightening again, despite an overall calm market
environment compared to the crisis years. Second, liquidity droughts appear to emerge on a
re-occurring basis and are stronger towards the end of a quarter. Third, as is also empirically
established later, the rise in total quoting activity by FX dealers is not necessarily associated
with an improvement in liquidity conditions.
4.4 Intraday FX liquidity Dynamics
In this section, I move to the analysis at the hourly frequency, using measures constructed
from tick-level data and described in Table 4.1. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show the variation in
FX market and funding liquidity in spot and swap markets during the trading hours for
the two sub-sample periods for JPY/USD and EUR/USD, respectively. Market liquidity
(measured by bid-ask spreads) tends to be lower during the beginning and end of the trading
day, resembling a reversed J-shaped form of liquidity (blue bars).
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Figure 4.9: Intraday liquidity dynamics: JPY/USD
(a) Feb 2010 - Jun 2014
(b) Jul 2014 - May 2017
Figures (4.9a) and (4.9b) display average intraday levels of market liquidity in spot and
swap markets, measured by spot rate bid-ask spread (S, top left), forward rate bid-ask
spread (F , top right), funding liquidity (Fdiscount, bottom left) and CIP deviations
(CIPdev, bottom right). Blue bars refer to non quarter-end months wand red lines refer
quarter-end months; GMT time-stamps.
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Figure 4.10: Intraday liquidity dynamics: EUR/USD
(a) Feb 2010 - Jun 2014
(b) Jul 2014 - May 2017
Figures (4.10a) and (4.10b) display average intraday levels of market liquidity in spot
and swap markets, measured by spot rate bid-ask spread (S, top left), forward rate bid-
ask spread (F , top right), funding liquidity (Fdiscount, bottom left) and CIP deviations
(CIPdev, bottom right). Blue bars refer to non quarter-end months wand red lines refer
quarter-end months; GMT time-stamps.
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Measures of FX funding liquidity, both Fdiscount and CIPdev, in turn exhibit an
inverted J-shape, also indicating worse liquidity conditions when London and New York
based traders are largely absent.
Red lines indicate averages for each trading hour during quarter-end months. As
shown in Figure 4.9a, market liquidity changed little during quarter-ends in the February
2010 to June 2014 period, but FX funding liquidity conditions were usually worse. Dur-
ing the second sub-sample period, from July 2014 to May 2017, shown in Figure 4.9b, FX
funding liquidity measures are considerably worse in levels (blue bars), and their deteriora-
tion at quarter-ends is much larger in relative terms, with spreads in both Fdiscount and
CIPdev about two times wider (red lines). Furthermore, unlike the earlier period, bid-ask
spreads exhibit widening at quarter ends for both spot at swap markets, indicating possible
spillovers from FX funding to FX market liquidity at quarter-ends during the most recent
period. Figures 4.10a and 4.10b show qualitatively similar results for EUR/USD.
Statistical tests confirm that intraday co-movement between FX market and funding
liquidity has strengthened since the appearance of quarter-end anomalies in funding markets
in mid-2014 for JPY/USD and early 2015 for EUR/USD. Table 4.5 shows that pairwise
correlations as well as percentage of variation explained by a common factor has increased
across all combinations of bid-ask spreads in spot and swaps with FX funding liquidity
measures, for both currency pairs.
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Table 4.5: Intraday conditional co-movement of liquidity measures
This table reports the average co-movement between spot market and swap market liquidity,
measured by the bid-ask spread of spot rate (SpreadS) and forward rate (SpreadF ), and
funding liquidity, measured by forward discount (Fdiscount) and CIP deviations (CIPdev)
for JPY/USD and EUR/USD. Funding liquidity is measured either by forward points or
by CIP deviations. ρ refers to the average correlation coefficients across trading hours and
PCA refers to the proportion of variation explained by the first principal component.
JPY/USD
02/2010 00:00- 06/2014 23:00 07/2014 00:00 - 05/2017 23:00
SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadF
ρFdiscount -0.44 -0.50 -0.51 -0.63
ρCIPdev -0.41 -0.46 -0.47 -0.57
PCAFdiscount 72.22 74.80 75.62 81.66
PCACIPdev 70.52 73.16 73.73 78.26
EUR/USD
02/2010 00:00 - 12/2014 23:00 01/2015 00:00 - 05/2017 23:00
SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadF
ρFdiscount 0.24 0.27 -0.28 -0.40
ρCIPdev -0.34 -0.46 -0.32 -0.43
PCAFdiscount 62.00 63.54 64.16 69.81
PCACIPdev 67.15 72.85 65.89 71.74
Notes: Hourly sample; GMT time-stamps.
4.4.1 Short- and Long-run Liquidity Dynamics
The descriptive statistics point towards time-varying liquidity dynamics across sub-sample
periods. They also indicate that the co-movement between FX market and FX funding
liquidity conditions intensified in the last sub-sample period. While funding liquidity has
tended to deteriorate at quarter-ends even in the pre-2014 period, these funding liquidity
droughts have intensified since mid-2014. Furthermore, it is only in the latest sub-sample
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period that FX funding liquidity droughts appear to spillover to market liquidity conditions.
To formally examine the relationship between liquidity conditions in spot and swap
markets, and the interaction between their market liquidity and funding liquidity compo-
nents, I estimate a conditional error correction model (ECM), derived from an autoregressive
distributed lag model specification for the two sub-sample periods. Following Pesaran et al.
(2001) the specification allows to assess the long- and short-run specification between a set
of variables independent of the order of integration of the variables in the system. As the dy-
namics of variables vary across the sample period, displaying mean-reversion in some months
but high persistence in others, inferences about non-stationarity from standard unit root
tests are highly dependent on the chosen time-period. Modelling the relationship between
dealer activity and liquidity in an ARDL model, however, allows me to take an agnostic
view about the order of integration, and to model long- and short-run dynamics without














h + uh (4.5)
where zSh = (Spread
P
h , |Fdiscount|h, QPLD,h/NPLD,h, QPSD,h/NPSD,h, V olPh ) = (SpreadPh ,xPh )′
is a vector of endogenous variables. LD, SD denote large and small dealers, for both spot
and forward points, P = S, F . The vector contains bid-ask spread as a measure of market
liquidity, forward points as a measure of funding liquidity, quoting intensity of large and
smaller dealers, and realized volatility as control variables. α denotes an intercept and the
term
∑23
i=1 δiHi refers to hourly dummy variables and their associated coefficients. Long-
run dynamics are captured by the lagged terms of the dependent and independent variables
while short run dynamics are driven by the contemporaneous and lagged differenced terms. I
test for the existence of a long-run relationship applying Pesaran et al. (2001) bound testing
procedure. First, I test if all long-run coefficients are significantly different from zero using
a F-test (H0 : θi = 0). Second, I test if the coefficient of the cointegrating relationship is
smaller and significantly different from zero. I estimate the identical specification for every
sub-sample period and only vary the number of lags p. Then I examine the significance of
the long-run coefficients. If both null hypotheses are rejected, I conclude that there exists a
long-run relationship between variables in vector zS and zF .
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Table 4.6: Intraday conditional co-movement of liquidity measures
This table is based on estimation results of the long-run equation of a conditional error
correction model (ECM) derived from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model
specification. Specifically, for the two sub-sample periods and for spot and swap market
liquidity, measured by spot rate SpreadS and forward rate SpreadF bid ask spreads, P =














where a vector zSh = (Spread
P
h , |Fdiscount|t, QPj,h/NPj,h, V olPh ) = (SpreadPh ,xPh )′ and j =
LD,SD, denote quoting activity of large and small dealers, respectively. The coefficients
are scaled by the standard deviation of the explanatory variables in each sub-sample.
JPY/USD
02/2010 00:00 - 06/2014 23:00 07/2014 00:00 - 05/2017 23:00
Variable SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS






SD 0.350*** 0.202*** 0.180*** 0.311***
V olF 0.183*** 0.427***
QSLD/N
S




V olS 0.143*** 0.154*** 0.382*** 0.271***
EUR/USD
02/2010 00:00 - 12/2014 23:00 01/2015 00:00 - 05/2017 23:00
Variable SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS






SD 0.000 -0.026*** 0.080* 0.043*
V olF 0.407*** 0.295***
QSLD/N
S




V olS 0.303*** 0.356*** 0.158*** 0.156***
Hourly sample; GMT time-stamps. ARDL lags chosen based on the Schwarz (Bayes) crite-
rion (SC). P-values assigned based on HAC robust standard errors: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 4.7: Long-run liquidity dynamics in JPY/USD
This table reports coefficients from the long-run equation of a conditional error correction
model (ECM) derived from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model specification.
Specifically, for the two sub-sample periods and for spot and swap market liquidity, measured














where a vector zSh = (Spread
P
h , |Fdiscount|t, QPj,h/NPj,h, V olPh ) = (SpreadPh ,xPh )′ and j =
LD,SD, denote the quoting intensity of large and small dealers, respectively. F-statistics
based on the results of the bound testing procedure for long-run relationship, robust to
variables being in between I(0) and I(1). Constant and coefficients on short-run effects are
omitted for brevity.
Sample: 2/01/2010 00:00-6/30/2014 23:00 7/01/2014 00:00-5/31/2017 23:00
Variable: SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS
|Fdiscount| 0.273*** 0.153*** 0.138*** 0.089*** 0.064*** 0.022***







SD 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.012***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




LD -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.007***





V olS 1.353*** 1.457*** 2.053 1.457***
(0.41) (0.42) (0.31) (0.42)
θ -0.07*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.12***
F − Stat 90.20 129.961 133.250 124.24 110.62 133.25
Hour dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.273 0.280 0.281 0.261 0.274 0.281
Obs 26484 26484 26484 17592 17592 17592
Hourly sample; GMT time-stamps. ARDL lags chosen based on the Schwarz (Bayes) cri-
terion (SC). HAC robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
F-statistic based on the Pesaran et al (2001) bounds test: 1% critical values 3.29 for I(0)
and 4.37 for I(1).
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Table 4.8: Long-run liquidity dynamics in EUR/USD
This table reports coefficients from the long-run equation of a conditional error correction
model (ECM) derived from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model specification.
Specifically, for the two sub-sample periods and for spot and swap market liquidity, measured














where a vector zSh = (Spread
P
h , |Fdiscount|t, QPj,h/NPj,h, V olPh ) = (SpreadPh ,xPh )′ and j =
LD,SD, denote dealer quoting activity of large and small dealers, respectively. F-statistics
based on the results of the bound testing procedure for long-run relationship, robust to
variables being in between I(0) and I(1). Constant and coefficients on short-run effects
omitted for brevity.
Sample: 2/01/2010 00:00-6/30/2014 23:00 7/01/2014 00:00-5/31/2017 23:00
Variable: SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS
|Fdiscount| 0.035*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.057*** 0.011 0.006***







SD 0.000 -0.001*** 0.003** 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




LD -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*





V olS 6.573*** 7.721*** 2.030*** 2.006***
(0.55) (0.65) (0.35) (0.34)
θ -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.130*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.11***
F − Stat 91.76 106.04 113.64 51.77 59.92 60.79
Hour dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.277 0.275 0.275 0.347 0.355 0.349
Obs 29457 29457 29457 14619 14619 14619
Hourly sample; GMT time-stamps. ARDL lags chosen based on the Schwarz (Bayes) cri-
terion (SC). HAC robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
F-statistic based on the Pesaran et al (2001) bounds test: 1% critical values 3.29 for I(0)
and 4.37 for I(1).
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Table 4.6 shows the coefficients estimates of the long-run equations, expressed in
terms of economic magnitudes by scaling by the standard deviations of the regressors. Ta-
ble 4.7 and Table 4.8 show the complete test results for the long-run relationship among
the variables for JPY/USD and EUR/USD, respectively. The reported F-statistics of the
Pesaran et al. (2001) bounds test exceed I(1) critical values for all equation, indicating the
presence of a statistically significant long-run relationship among the selected measures of
liquidity and volatility.
Focusing on Table 4.6, the ECM-ARDL model estimation results point at several
takeaways. First, there is a strong and robust relationship between FX market liquidity, as
proxied by bid-ask spreads in both swap (SpreadF ) and spot (SpreadS), with FX funding
liquidity, as proxied by the absolute forward discount (Fdiscount). For example, a one
standard deviation widening in Fdiscount is associated with 41.6bp (26.5bp) wider bid-ask
in JPY/USD (EUR/USD) swap, and a 64.9bp (8.4bp) wider bid-ask spread in JPY/USD
(EUR/USD) spot. The link between funding and market liquidity strengthens in the second
sub-sample period, particularly for JPY/USD where economic magnitude of the coefficient
on Fdiscount increases more than three-fold in the swap bid-ask spread equation. For
EUR/USD I also observe a substantial strengthening of the liquidity relationship from 6.9bp
to 26.5bp in the swap market, while the relationship in spot increases only slightly and
remains comparably low.
Second, the positive net effect of dealer competition on market liquidity in FX swaps
has all but disappeared. A one standard deviation increase in the quoting intensity by large
dealers in the swap market, QFLD/N
F
LD used to be associated with a 28.7bp (14.7bp) narrowing
of bid-ask spreads on JPY/USD forward rate spread (EUR/USD forward rate spread) in
the 2010 to mid-2014 (December 2015 for EUR/USD), but the effect becomes small and not
statistically significant in the mid-2014 to 2017 period. In contrast, the negative association
between quoting intensity of smaller dealers, QFSD/N
F
SD, and market liquidity in FX swaps
has persisted for both currency pairs, and even strengthened significantly in the case of
EUR/USD. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in QFSD/N
F
SD is associated with 0.31bp
(0.04bp) wider bid-ask spread in FX swap market for JPY/USD (EUR/USD).
Third, in contrast to the swap market, dealer competition in the spot market has con-
tinued to contribute to significant narrowing of bid-ask spreads also in the post-2014 period.




is associated with 20.5bp (35.9bp) narrower bid-ask spreads in JPY/USD (EUR/USD) spot.
For neither of the two currency pairs do small dealers in spot contribute to a tighter bid-ask
spread in the spot market in the second half of the sample. Both coefficients are small in
magnitude (0.039 and 0.062 for JPY/USD and EUR/USD) and not significantly different
from zero.
Fourth, rises in small dealer (primarily tier-2 bank) activity in swaps appears to
have negative spillovers on spot market liquidity. Specifically, even though small dealer
competition in spot markets does not seem to have a statistically significant effect on market
liquidity in JPY/USD and EUR/USD, higher quoting intensity by small dealers in swaps
is associated with wider bid-ask spreads in the spot (Table 4.7, last column). Similarly,
when small dealer quoting intensity in EUR/USD spot is replaced with small dealer quoting
intensity in swaps in the SpreadS equation, the coefficient is two times larger in magnitude
and takes on a positive sign (Table 4.8, last column). This is noteworthy especially because
approximately half of small dealers in FX swaps do not even participate in spot market
directly (see, Figure 4.5, above).
These results are obtained controlling for time-of-day effects with hourly dummies,
as well as for intraday volatility in both spot and swap markets. The results are also robust
to measuring FX funding liquidity using CIP deviations instead of the un-adjusted forward
discount (see Tables A5 and A6).
4.4.2 Adverse Liquidity Effects Of Small Dealer Competition
What are the possible economic reasons behind the negative relationship between FX mar-
ket liquidity and small dealer competition? The first reason is that small dealers charge
higher spreads. This can be gleaned from Table 4.9, which shows simple average of the
median hourly bid-ask spreads and forward discounts computed from forward quotes by
large and small dealers. For both JPY/USD and EUR/USD, the bid-ask spreads of for-
ward rates (expressed as a percentage of mid-forward rate, in basis points) are significantly
higher for small dealers compared to large dealers. Similarly, the forward discount (forward
spread, expressed as a percentage of mid-spot rate) is also somewhat wider for small dealers
compared to large dealers. This is consistent with smaller dealers facing higher hurdle rates
to enter as market-makers in the swap market, presumably due to being smaller volume
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players. Hence, their competition does not lead to the narrowing of the spreads to the levels
that can be supported by large dealers.
Table 4.9: Forward rate bid-ask spreads and forward discounts quoted by large vs
small dealers
JPY/USD EUR/USD
Dealer category: SpreadF Fdiscount SpreadF Fdiscount
Large dealers 3.322bp -4.471bp 2.218bp -2.990bp
Small dealers 3.648bp -4.579bp 2.247bp -2.993bp
Notes: Average median hourly quotes. Large dealer are banks classified as G-SIBs and
appearing in the Euromoney FX Survey rankings. 2/01/2010 00:00 to 5/31/2017 23:00
sample period.
The second reason for the negative relationship between FX market liquidity and
small dealer competition in the swap market relates to the relative informational disad-
vantage of small dealers compared to large dealers. Bjonnes et al. (2009) find that order
flow of large dealer banks is more informative than that of small banks, in terms of return
predictability. Menkhoff et al. (2016) find evidence that informative order-flow of sophis-
ticated investors affects foreign exchange rate via the intermediation of large dealers. My
logic is consistent with this literature. Large dealers intermediate the lion share of customer
flows inside their internal liquidity pools. As a result, their activity on anonymous primary
interdealer venues, such as Reuters Matching, is largely driven by the hedging of any resid-
ual inventory imbalances reflective of aggregate informed trading of their client base. This
would suggest that, on average, large dealers possess more precise information about the
“true” market forward exchange rate at any point in time (again, because they observe the
FX hedging activity of their diverse client base) compared to small dealers.
In order to test this, I follow recent studies which assess the distribution of quote
submissions. For example, Corsetti et al. (2017) use information on both quotes and trades
to construct a quote dispersion measure that accounts for market participants’ reaction to
new information based on the speed of trade execution. As I do not possess information on
trades but only on quote submissions, the measure of dispersion follows Jankowitsch et al.












where qFi accounts for the number of forward quote submissions within a minute, Q
F
h
denotes the total number of submissions within the hour, Fi denotes the forward mid-price
in minute i and F̄h is the average forward price of each hour. In times of higher volatility
and low liquidity, I expect the dispersion of quotes to be comparably larger and DispFh to
increase.
I then, once again, formulate a conditional ECM, but for the system that includes
DispFh , quoting intensity by large and small dealers, and hourly volatility of the forward













h + uh (4.7)















shows the results. Consistent with the hypothesis outlined above, large dealer quoting inten-
sity is associated with a reduction in the dispersion of forward quotes in both JPY/USD and
EUR/USD. In contrast, smaller dealer quoting intensity is not associated with a reduction
in the forward quote dispersion in JPY/USD, while their marginal effect on dispersion is
less than that of large dealers in the EUR/USD swap market.
To summarise, the results reported in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 indicate that two effects
are at play in generating the negative relationship between liquidity in the FX swap market
and competition by small dealers. The first one relates to their wider required intermediation
spreads, both bid-ask spreads and the forward spread (forward discount). The second one
relates to their informational disadvantage and hence greater uncertainty about the actual
market mid-rate for pricing FX swaps, which leads to greater dispersion and volatility of
the forward quotes.
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Table 4.10: Forward quote dispersion of small and large dealers
This table reports coefficients from the long-run equation of a conditional error correction
model (ECM) derived from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model specification.
In the top part of the table coefficients are scaled by the sample standard deviation, while
raw regression estimates are displayed in the bottom part. Specifically, for the second sub-




























′ and j = LD,SD, denotes
quoting intensity of large and small dealers, respectively. F-statistics based on the results of
the bound testing procedure for long-run relationship, robust to variables being in between




LD -0.15 *** -0.10 ***
QFSD/N
F
SD 0.12 * -0.09 ***
V olF 3.45 *** 3.24***
QFLD/N
F






V olF 18.548*** 41.625***
(4.28) (2.79)
θ -0.31*** -0.61***
F − Stat 111.93 624.79
Hourly dummies yes yes
Adj. R2 0.60 0.68
Obs 17050 14247
Hourly sample: 1/06/2014 00:00 to 5/31/2017 23:00; GMT time-stamps. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4.4.3 Three-tier Dealer Classification
To further understand the varying impact of quoting activity from different dealer segments,
in a next step I apply an even more granular dealer classification to confirm the intuition
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of the earlier findings. I explicitly distinguish between dealers that are classified as G-SIB
banks (tier-1), dealers that are listed in the Euromoney Survey but that are not classified
as a G-SIB banks (tier-2), and other small dealers (tier-3). While I have separated tier-1
banks from the remaining dealer universe in the previous estimations, in this analysis I
allow for an explicit split between small dealers (tier-2 and tier-3) and thereby differentiate
between banks that vary in size but which are all not affected by recent regulatory changes.
I re-examine the estimation of the ARDL-ECM model of Equation 4.5 and then discuss the
impact of dealers’ quoting intensity on the forward spread dispersion.
To begin with, Table 4.11 displays the economic impact of a change in dealer quoting
intensity for each of the three dealer classifications (tier-1: T1, tier-2: T2, tier-3: T3).
Coefficients are scaled by the sample standard deviation, while raw regression coefficients and
cointegration parameters for both currency pairs are shown in Tables 4.12 and 4.13. Focusing
on the second sub-sample, Table 4.11 shows how the positive impact of quoting intensity of
the three different groups on market liquidity conditions declines almost monotonically in
magnitude or statistical significance from tier-1 to tier-3 banks.
For example, for JPY/USD an increase in tier-1 quoting intensity leads to a decline
in market liquidity in the swap market by 10.2bp, tier-2 dealers lower the spread, though
the effect is not significant, and a one standard deviation increase of tier-3 dealer quoting
intensity significantly worsens market liquidity conditions by 66.2bp. Further, I find that
activity of tier-3 dealers (40.5bp) deteriorates liquidity conditions in the spot market by a
factor more than six times as large as the quoting intensity of tier-2 dealers (6.1bp).
For EUR/USD, I document similar market characteristics though the impact of
quoting intensity of tier-2 and tier-3 dealers on market liquidity dynamics is lower than for
JPY/USD. Between January 2015 and May 2017, liquidity conditions in the swap market
do not significantly improve neither because of an increase in tier-1 nor in tier-2 dealers
quoting intensity, while tier-3 dealers’ quoting widens the spread (2.2bp). I also note that
tier-3 swap dealer activity affects liquidity conditions in the spot market, however, the
magnitude of spread changes due to swap dealers is much lower (1.5bp) than the impact of
spot dealer quoting intensity. Again, I show in the appendix (Table A7 and A8) that the
results are qualitatively similar if funding costs are measured by CIP deviations instead of
by the forward spread.
121
Table 4.11: Intraday conditional co-movement of liquidity measures
This table is based on estimation results of the long-run equation of a conditional error correction
model (ECM) derived from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model specification. Specif-
ically, for the two sub-sample periods and for spot and swap market liquidity, measured by spot














where a vector zSh = (Spread
P
h , |Fdiscount|t, QPj,h/NPj,h, V olPh ) = (SpreadPh ,xPh )′ and j =
T1, T2, T3, denotes Tier-1, Tier-2, and Tier-3 dealer quoting intensity, respectively. The coeffi-
cients are scaled by the standard deviation of the explanatory variables in each sub-sample.
JPY/USD
02/2010 00:00 - 06/2014 23:00 07/2014 00:00 - 05/2017 23:00
Variable SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS






T2 0.372*** 0.181*** -0.032 0.061**
QFT3/N
F
T3 0.419*** 0.171*** 0.662*** 0.405***
V olF 0.156*** 0.393***
QST1/N
S







V olS 0.139*** 0.144*** 0.353*** 0.370***
EUR/USD
02/2010 00:00 - 12/2014 23:00 01/2015 00:00 - 05/2017 23:00
Variable SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS






T2 0.088*** -0.014 -0.145 -0.208
QFT3/N
F
T3 -0.064* -0.029** 0.022** 0.015*
V olF 0.405*** 0.294***
QST1/N
S







V olS 0.266*** 0.357*** 0.111*** 0.155
Hourly sample; GMT time-stamps. ARDL lags chosen based on the Schwarz (Bayes) crite-
rion (SC). P-values assigned based on HAC robust standard errors: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 4.12: Long-run liquidity dynamics in JPY/USD (By Bank Tiers)
This table reports coefficients from the long-run equation of a conditional error correction
model (ECM) derived from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model specification.
Specifically, for the two sub-sample periods and for spot and swap market liquidity, measured














where a vector zSh = (Spread
P
h , |Fdiscount|t, QPj,h/NPj,h, V olPh ) = (SpreadPh ,xPh )′ and j =
T1, T2, T3, denotes Tier-1, Tier-2, and Tier-3 dealer quoting intensity, respectively. F-
statistics based on the results of the bound testing procedure for long-run relationship,
robust to variables being in between I(0) and I(1). Constant and coefficients on short-run
effects are omitted for brevity.
Sample: 2/01/2010 00:00-6/30/2014 23:00 7/01/2014 00:00-5/31/2017 23:00
Variable: SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS
|Fdiscount| 0.268*** 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.057*** 0.069*** 0.041***







T2 0.017*** 0.008*** -0.001 0.002**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
QFT3/N
F
T3 0.037*** 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.015***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




T1 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.002***









V olS 1.316 1.367 1.893 1.987
(0.40) (0.40) (0.26) (0.26)
θ -0.08*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.12***
F − Stat 83.57 113.65 113.58 125.71 109.87 93.74
Hour dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.27
Obs 26484 26484 26484 17592 17592 17592
Hourly sample; GMT time-stamps. ARDL lags chosen based on the Schwarz (Bayes) criterion (SC).
HAC robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. F-statistic based on
the Pesaran et al (2001) bounds test: 1% critical values 3.29 for I(0) and 4.37 for I(1).
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Table 4.13: Long-run liquidity dynamics in EUR/USD (By Bank Tiers)
This table reports coefficients from the long-run equation of a conditional error correction
model (ECM) derived from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model specification.
Specifically, for the two sub-sample periods and for spot and swap market liquidity, measured














where a vector zSh = (Spread
P
h , |Fdiscount|t, QPj,h/NPj,h, V olPh ) = (SpreadPh ,xPh )′ and j =
T1, T2, T3, denotes Tier-1, Tier-2, and Tier-3 dealer quoting intensity, respectively. F-
statistics based on the results of the bound testing procedure for long-run relationship,
robust to variables being in between I(0) and I(1). Constant and coefficients on short-run
effects omitted for brevity.
Sample: 2/01/2010 00:00-6/30/2014 23:00 7/01/2014 00:00-5/31/2017 23:00
Variable: SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS
|Fdiscount| 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.059*** 0.031*** 0.021***







T2 0.001*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
QFT3/N
F
T3 -0.002* -0.001** 0.001** 0.001*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




T1 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004***









V olS 5.777*** 7.739*** 1.430*** 1.985***
(0.52) (0.65) (0.28) (0.33)
θ -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.14*** -0.11***
F − Stat 80.67 105.28 96.76 44.42 70.37 52.46
Hour dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.38 0.35
Obs 26484 26484 26484 17592 17592 17592
Hourly sample; GMT time-stamps. ARDL lags chosen based on the Schwarz (Bayes) criterion (SC).
HAC robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. F-statistic based on
the Pesaran et al (2001) bounds test: 1% critical values 3.29 for I(0) and 4.37 for I(1).
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Lastly, I document in Table 4.14 a gradually declining impact of dealer quoting
intensity on the prevalent dispersion of quote submissions in the swap market. In the top
panel, coefficients are scaled by the variables’ standard deviation, while the bottom part of
the table displays the raw long-run coefficients of Equation 4.7. I note that an increasing
quoting intensity by tier-1 banks leads to a significant decline in the dispersion of forward
quotes of 14.4bp for JPY/USD and 10.4bp for EUR/USD. Quoting intensity by tier-2 banks
does not lower the quote dispersion for JPY/USD, while for EUR/USD it becomes smaller
but to a lesser degree compared to the effect of tier-1 quoting activity (7.7bp). Notably,
coefficients of tier-3 quoting intensity are positive for both currency pairs, providing further
evidence that banks with a smaller customer base and those that are likely exposed to
lower volumes of customer order flow contribute to a wider dispersion of forward quote
submissions. This effect is particularly large for JPY/USD (33.3bp) while smaller and not
significant for EUR/USD (1.4bp).
4.4.4 Contagion Versus Interdependence
In this subsection, I test for the presence of contagion from funding markets to market
liquidity at quarter-end balance sheet reporting periods, when large dealers pull back and
small dealers increase their quoting intensity in FX swaps.
I follow Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and calculate an adjusted correlation coefficient
using hourly data. I then test for regime shifts between quarter-end and non-quarter end
months.12 Adjusting the correlation coefficient for heteroskedastic levels of volatility allows
me to make further statements about contagions and spillovers, rather than simple co-
movement. To this end, I estimate the following bivariate vector autoregressive model:







where P = F, S (4.9)
where ∆yh refers to the first differenced and de-seasonalized measures of funding and mar-
ket liquidity. First, I de-seasonalise the FX liquidity metrics by regressing their changes
on hourly dummies. Second, I estimate Equation (4.8) using a 200-hour rolling window
12Using a vector autoregression framework, Moinas et al. (2017) exploit regime shifts of volatility
levels to examine liquidity dynamics in the European treasury bond markets.
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Table 4.14: Forward quote dispersion (By Bank Tiers)
This table reports coefficients from the long-run equation of a conditional error correction
model (ECM) derived from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model specification.
In the top part of the table coefficients are scaled by the sample standard deviation, while
raw regression estimates are displayed in the bottom part. Specifically, for the second sub-




























′ and j = T1, T2, T3, denotes
Tier-1, Tier-2, and Tier-3 dealer quoting intensity, respectively. F-statistics based on the
results of the bound testing procedure for long-run relationship, robust to variables being
























V olF 18.314*** 41.578***
(4.20) (2.78)
θ -0.32*** -0.61***
F − Stat 97.08 518.69
Hour dummies yes yes
Adj. R2 0.60 0.68
Obs 17050 14247
Hourly sample: 1/06/2014 00:00 to 5/31/2017 23:00; GMT time-stamps. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
and store the variance-covariance matrix for every single estimation.13 Third, based on the
obtained variance-covariance matrices from the hourly VAR regressions, I follow the ap-
13Every rolling estimation initially allows for 8 lags but I increase the lag length in a step-wise
fashion until residuals are free of serial correlation.
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where ρ∗ refers to the standard correlation coefficient between funding and market liquidity,
and σQEFdiscount and σ
NQE
Fdiscount refer to the average variance of FX funding liquidity in quarter-
end months (QE) and the two preceding non quarter-end months (NQE), respectively.
Since the intra-day data allows us to construct the measure of co-movement for every rolling
window estimation, I am able to obtain a time series of unconditional correlation coefficients
for each QE and NQE period.
Having obtained the time-series of the adjusted correlation coefficients between fund-
ing and market liquidity measures in quarter-end months and the preceding two months, I
then employ a one-sided t-test to examine for the following hypothesis:
H0: ρNQE < ρQE | ρQE < 0 HA: ρNQE > ρQE | ρQE < 0
where ρNQE and ρQE refer to the average of the adjusted correlation coefficients in the
non-quarter-end and quarter-end months. Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that the
shocks to Fdiscount in a quarter-end month lead to spillover to bid-ask spreads, even after
adjusting for the higher level of volatility of funding conditions during these periods.14
Table 4.15 shows the results for JPY/USD. The average adjusted correlation coeffi-
cient is negative in a number of quarter-end as well as non-quarter-end months in both spot
(upper panel) and forward (lower panel). Based on the t-test conducted on the adjusted
correlation coefficients, I am able to reject the null of no spillovers in 3 out of 11 quarter-end
months considered for spot, and 4 out of 11 quarter-end months for forwards.
14Qualitatively the same conclusions are drawn when shocks to CIP deviations at quarter-end
months are considered. Results are summarized in Table A9 and A10 for JPY/USD and EUR/USD,
respectively.
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Table 4.15: Contagion from FX funding to market liquidity in JPY/USD
The table shows tests for contagion from FX funding liquidity to FX market liquidity in
spot and swap markets. We follow Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and conduct a t-test of
whether the correlations between ∆Fdiscount and ∆SpreadP is significantly more negative
at quarter-ends, where P = S, F . The correlation coefficients are estimated using a 200-
hour rolling window bi-variate VAR, and adjusted for heteroskedastic levels of volatility,
thus allowing to make statements about contagions rather than a simple co-movement.
To spot market: ∆Fdiscount→ ∆SpreadS
Q-end month Prior 2 months Contagion
QEs: ρQE σQE ρNQE σNQE t-stat Reject H0
09/14 0.004 0.009 -0.004 0.006 -14.13
12/14 0.015 0.020 -0.019 0.015 -25.18
03/15 0.075 0.022 0.018 0.046 -27.35
06/15 -0.023 0.051 0.009 0.064 8.94 Yes
09/15 0.008 0.008 -0.011 0.020 -22.89
12/15 0.020 0.057 0.013 0.066 -1.61
03/16 0.067 0.042 -0.009 0.100 -17.41
06/16 -0.078 0.062 -0.012 0.021 18.66 Yes
09/16 -0.007 0.053 -0.093 0.094 -19.36
12/16 -0.044 0.046 0.014 0.058 17.36 Yes
03/17 0.024 0.081 -0.053 0.072 -15.36
Avg. contagion -0.048 0.053 14.987 3/11 QEs
To forward market: ∆Fdiscount→ ∆SpreadF
Q-end month Prior 2 months Contagion
QEs: ρQE σQE ρNQE σNQE t-stat Reject H0
09/14 0.002 0.008 -0.005 0.007 -13.44
12/14 0.012 0.019 -0.021 0.015 -25.1
03/15 0.078 0.023 0.023 0.047 -25.66
06/15 -0.028 0.052 0.011 0.061 10.71 Yes
09/15 0.016 0.014 -0.013 0.02 -26.63
12/15 -0.011 0.025 0.03 0.067 14.61 Yes
03/16 0.053 0.057 -0.023 0.106 -15.23
06/16 -0.078 0.061 -0.008 0.022 20.17 Yes
09/16 -0.008 0.076 -0.071 0.084 -12
12/16 -0.06 0.05 -0.009 0.071 13.37 Yes
03/17 0.021 0.077 -0.059 0.066 -16.95
Avg. contagion -0.044 0.047 14.715 4/11 QEs





, where P = F, S and all endogenous variables de-seasonalised
of hourly effects.
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Table 4.16: Contagion from FX funding to market liquidity in EUR/USD
The table shows tests for contagion from FX funding liquidity to FX market liquidity in
spot and swap markets. We follow Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and conduct a t-test of
whether the correlations between ∆Fdiscount and ∆SpreadP is significantly more negative
at quarter-ends, where P = S, F . The correlation coefficients are estimated using a 200-
hour rolling window bi-variate VAR, and adjusted for heteroskedastic levels of volatility,
thus allowing to make statements about contagions rather than a simple co-movement.
To spot market: ∆Fdiscount→ ∆SpreadS
Q-end month Prior 2 months Contagion
QEs: ρQE σQE ρNQE σNQE t-stat Reject H0
03/15 0.029 0.052 -0.055 0.09 -19.33
06/15 0.086 0.089 0.082 0.126 -0.65
09/15 0.041 0.027 -0.012 0.048 -22.99
12/15 -0.027 0.036 -0.006 0.069 6.44 Yes
03/16 0.123 0.062 0.053 0.049 -17.68
06/16 0.011 0.007 -0.002 0.025 -13.6
09/16 0.039 0.03 -0.082 0.064 -42.74
12/16 -0.106 0.081 0.039 0.047 29.35 Yes
03/17 -0.031 0.096 -0.113 0.161 -10.77
Avg. contagion -0.067 0.059 17.90 2/9 QEs
To forward market: ∆Fdiscount→ ∆SpreadF
Q-end month Prior 2 months Contagion
QEs: ρQE σQE ρNQE σNQE t-stat Reject H0
03/15 0.031 0.049 -0.075 0.1 -23.54
06/15 0.077 0.096 0.005 0.102 -11.08
09/15 0.04 0.028 -0.04 0.058 -31.32
12/15 -0.026 0.034 -0.025 0.066 0.32 Yes
03/16 0.152 0.067 0.052 0.046 -23.83
06/16 -0.01 0.029 -0.003 0.027 3.58 Yes
09/16 0.053 0.031 -0.078 0.058 -48.82
12/16 -0.105 0.08 0.025 0.047 26.43 Yes
03/17 -0.017 0.098 -0.113 0.171 -12.04
Avg. contagion -0.047 0.048 10.11 3/9 QEs





, where P = F, S and all endogenous variables de-seasonalised
of hourly effects.
Hence, the evidence in favour of contagion from FX funding to FX market liquidity
in JPY/USD is strongest for December 2015, June 2016, and December 2016.
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Table 4.16 shows the analogous test results for EUR/USD. Similar to JPY/USD,
the number of months in which the null is rejected in favour of contagious spillovers is higher
for forward bid-ask spreads than for spot bid-ask spreads. At the same time, the overall
number of months, in which the results point towards contagion from FX funding liquidity
to FX market liquidity, is slightly less that for JPY/USD. Still, both December 2015 and
December 2016 turn out to be the quarter-end periods with the most robust evidence in
favour of contagions, rather than simple co-movement. It is noteworthy that these months
also fall on year-ends, when additional G-SIB surcharges apply to large dealer banks’ balance
sheets.
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that a deterioration in funding liquidity at
quarter-ends can spillover to market liquidity in spot and forward market. Taken together
with the previous results on dealer activity, these findings suggest that the pull-back by G-
SIBs from dealing in FX swaps at quarter- and year-ends can have a particularly contagious
implications for spot market liquidity, as they are displaced by more expensive and less
informed dealers.
4.4.5 Small Dealer Market-making: Case Study Of December 2016
In this sub-section I provide evidence that small dealers displaced large dealers as market-
makers in FX swaps for both currency pairs and also in spot markets for EUR/USD in
December 2016. However, because these smaller volume players require higher hurdle rates,
in terms of both bid-ask spreads on the forward points that they quote as well as wider
forward discount, the increased competition by smaller dealers allows the low FX liquidity
environment to persist. In contrast, large banks continued to dominate as market-makers
in spot for JPY/USD and differences are very small for EUR/USD, indicating that it is
likely their balance sheet constraints on the exposures to FX derivatives that explains their
pull-back from quoting inside spreads in the swap market.
The left-hand panels of Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show the median hourly JPY/USD
quotes of small dealers and large dealers during December 2016, for spot and forward points,
respectively. The top graph displays ask and the bottom graph the associated bid quotes.
The right-hand panels show the hypothetical location of small dealer quotes relative to large
dealer quotes in the case that small dealers are actively making markets by quoting inside
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spreads. If the actual quotes correspond to the inside spread scenario, then this indicates
that small dealers, not large dealers, would have been making markets on average during
this month. The comparison of actual data (left) to the scenarios (right) in Figure 4.11
indicates that in December 2016, despite the pull-back by large dealers (G-SIBs) form the
market in the aggregate, large dealers continued to make markets in spot. However, the
comparison of actual data (left) to the scenarios (right) in Figure 4.12 of the forward quotes
indicates that small dealers entered as market-makers in the swap market.
The results for EUR/USD, shown in Figure 4.13 and 4.14, are qualitatively similar
for the swap market and small players appear to act as market-makers. In the spot market,
differences in the submitted quotes of small and large dealers are low in magnitude and
spreads in spot and swap markets by the different dealer segments are very similar. Yet, in
contrast to JPY/EUR it appears that during most times of the day small dealers also act
as market makers in this market segment.
A hypothesis that I so far reject is that smaller banks enter the market to source
liquidity in one of the currencies. If this was the case, the test of inside versus outside spread
by dealer category would have shown smaller dealers providing skewed quotes relative to
large dealers. Data indicate that this is not the case.
Such entry of small dealers in forwards rather than spot as market-makers is consis-
tent with large dealers pulling back from trading in derivatives (e.g. forwards and FX swaps)
but continuing to make markets in spot. Hence, the results indicate that small dealers can
play an important role in market-making in FX swaps when funding conditions are tight
and spreads are wide enough for smaller-volume players to profitably engage as market-
makers. This adds nuance to the recently documented changes in FX market structure,
whereby liquidity provision is bifurcated between the few large dealers making markets as
principals and smaller dealers that operate an agency model simply passing client flows into
the wholesale FX market. In this context, special periods, like quarter-ends, can be used
for identification of funding liquidity effect on dealer competition and FX market activity.
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(a) Actual spot ASK
(b) Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers
Short USD spot
(c) Actual Spot BID
(d) Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers
Long USD spot
Figure 4.11: Median quote in JPY/USD spot (December 2016)
Spot quotes of small dealers compared to spot quotes of large dealers. Left-hand side figures
indicate that small dealers did not act as market-makers in spot in December 2016. Top-left:
Actual spot ask; Top-right: Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers Short USD spot scenario (ASK: SELL
USD @ 116.160). Bottom-left: Actual spot bid; Bottom-right: Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers Long
USD spot scenario (BID: BUY USD @ 116.124). GMT time-stamps.
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(a) Actual forward points ASK
(b) Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers
Short USD forward
(c) Actual forward points BID
(d) Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers
Long USD forward
Figure 4.12: Median quote in JPY/USD forward points (December 2016)
Forward quotes of small dealers compared to forward quotes of large dealers. Indicates that small
dealers acted as market-makers in swap markets in December 2016. Top-left: Actual forward points
ask; Top-right: Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers Short USD forward scenario (ASK: SELL USD @
116.160 - 0.221). Bottom-left: Actual forward points bid; Bottom-right: Hypothetical: Smaller
Dealers Long USD forward scenario (BID: BUY USD @ 116.124 - 0.226). GMT time-stamps.
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(a) Actual Spot ASK
(b) Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers
Short USD spot
(c) Actual Spot BID
(d) Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers
Long USD spot
Figure 4.13: Median quote in EUR/USD spot (December 2016)
Spot quotes of small dealers compared to spot quotes of large dealers. Indicates that small and
large dealers act as market-makers in spot in December 2016. Top-left: Actual spot ask; Top-right:
Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers Short USD spot scenario (ASK: SELL USD @ 0.9491). Bottom-left:
Actual spot bid; Bottom-right: Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers Long USD spot scenario (BID: BUY
USD @ 0.9489). GMT time-stamps.
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(a) Actual Forward Points ASK
(b) Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers
Short USD spot
(c) Actual Forward Points BID
(d) Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers
Long USD spot
Figure 4.14: Median quote in EUR/USD forward points (December 2016)
Forward quotes of small dealers compared to forward quotes of large dealers. Indicates that small
dealers acted as market-makers in swap markets in December 2016. Top-left: Actual forward points
ask; Top-right: Hypothetical: Smaller Dealers Short USD forward scenario (ASK: SELL USD @
0.9491 - 0.00188). Bottom-left: Actual forward points bid; Bottom-right: Hypothetical: Smaller
Dealers Long USD forward scenario (BID: BUY USD @ 0.9489 - 0.00192). GMT time-stamps.
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4.5 Conclusion
Trading volumes in FX swaps are larger than spot, making these instruments crucial for
price discovery in currency markets, yet there is hardly any literature on FX market liquidity
taking the pricing of FX derivatives into account. In this paper, I measure the joint evolution
of FX spot and forward market liquidity conditions. I draw on the pricing of both types of
instruments to study the relationship between FX market liquidity and FX funding liquidity.
The assessment of liquidity conditions also takes into account information on the number of
dealers active at a given point in time, their quoting intensity, as well as dealer characteristics
such as size. In particular, I account for the window dressing behaviour by large dealers
in FX swap markets. The empirical strategy thus makes particular use of month-end and
quarter-end dynamics in the FX swap market for the identification of exogenous FX funding
liquidity shocks, and their impact on FX market liquidity.
The results based on intraday data for JPY/USD and EUR/USD show that FX
spot and swap market liquidity is intimately linked. Furthermore, I find evidence for the
presence of liquidity spirals in FX markets, a la Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). The
co-movement between market and funding liquidity has increased in recent years, and the
instances of extreme liquidity droughts have also risen. Statistical tests also point towards
contagion of adverse FX funding liquidity shocks to market liquidity in both FX swap and
spot markets in the most extreme periods, particularly at year-ends.
Competitive dynamics of FX dealers play an important role in these liquidity dy-
namics. Specifically, the positive impact of dealer competition on FX market liquidity has
decreased over time. The structural break in the relationship between FX swap and spot
market liquidity conditions, and with dealer activity, appears related to the window dressing
behaviour by large FX swap dealers. While large dealers still dominate market-making in
spot markets at all times, and their quoting intensity is associated with improved liquidity
dynamics, they have exhibited a tendency to pull-back from market-making in FX deriva-
tives, namely FX swaps, around balance sheet reporting periods. Yet, as large dealers are
displaced by smaller, and as such more expensive and less informed, dealers in the forward
markets, spot market liquidity appears to also suffer because liquidity conditions in spot
and swap markets are tightly linked.
Hence, funding liquidity is now arguably a more important economic factor to un-
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derstand bid-ask spreads in FX spot. As such, window dressing by large dealers in FX
swaps has been disruptive not only to swap market liquidity but also to liquidity in spot.
This does not mean that tighter regulation is harmful to liquidity conditions. Quite the
opposite, liquidity in times of stress would have been enhanced with better capitalization
and other regulatory reforms. However, the evidence does point at G-SIB dealer banks man-
aging down their activity in FX swaps around regulatory reporting periods, which suggests
that banks do not yet hold adequate capital to support the size of their desired FX swap
business. Consistent with evidence in Gambacorta and Shin (2016) that higher bank capital
is associated with greater amount of lending, the evidence can be interpreted to suggest
that higher bank capitalisation would also translate into improved FX market liquidity.
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A Additional Tables & Robustness Checks
Table A1: Intraday correlation coefficient of liquidity measures by trading hour
This table reports the average correlation coefficient by trading hour between spot market
and funding liquidity (ρFdSpS ) and swap market and funding liquidity (ρ
Fd
SpF ) in two sub-sample
periods for the JPY/USD and EUR/USD exchange rates.
JPY/USD EUR/USD
















0.00 -0.37 -0.43 -0.50 -0.59 -0.41 -0.50 -0.30 -0.42
1.00 -0.41 -0.47 -0.49 -0.58 -0.41 -0.50 -0.31 -0.44
2.00 -0.42 -0.47 -0.50 -0.59 -0.38 -0.48 -0.32 -0.45
3.00 -0.41 -0.46 -0.46 -0.57 -0.42 -0.51 -0.27 -0.41
4.00 -0.41 -0.46 -0.50 -0.59 -0.40 -0.49 -0.27 -0.42
5.00 -0.36 -0.41 -0.48 -0.57 -0.40 -0.51 -0.25 -0.41
6.00 -0.39 -0.44 -0.49 -0.58 -0.38 -0.50 -0.30 -0.46
7.00 -0.43 -0.47 -0.39 -0.53 -0.33 -0.46 -0.23 -0.40
8.00 -0.41 -0.45 -0.32 -0.48 -0.30 -0.42 -0.26 -0.41
9.00 -0.46 -0.49 -0.36 -0.50 -0.28 -0.41 -0.23 -0.38
10.00 -0.45 -0.48 -0.48 -0.56 -0.29 -0.41 -0.38 -0.49
11.00 -0.42 -0.45 -0.49 -0.56 -0.36 -0.46 -0.42 -0.52
12.00 -0.41 -0.46 -0.51 -0.58 -0.35 -0.47 -0.40 -0.51
13.00 -0.40 -0.46 -0.47 -0.55 -0.33 -0.46 -0.35 -0.46
14.00 -0.40 -0.47 -0.48 -0.54 -0.27 -0.40 -0.35 -0.46
15.00 -0.36 -0.43 -0.50 -0.56 -0.27 -0.41 -0.41 -0.50
16.00 -0.41 -0.47 -0.53 -0.59 -0.37 -0.49 -0.49 -0.56
17.00 -0.41 -0.48 -0.53 -0.59 -0.38 -0.50 -0.51 -0.57
18.00 -0.43 -0.49 -0.52 -0.58 -0.33 -0.47 -0.33 -0.41
19.00 -0.43 -0.49 -0.50 -0.56 -0.32 -0.46 -0.34 -0.41
20.00 -0.40 -0.46 -0.48 -0.56 -0.33 -0.45 -0.27 -0.36
21.00 -0.38 -0.44 -0.44 -0.55 -0.28 -0.39 -0.27 -0.35
22.00 -0.46 -0.51 -0.48 -0.58 -0.29 -0.39 -0.21 -0.32
23.00 -0.42 -0.46 -0.49 -0.59 -0.33 -0.43 -0.17 -0.30
Avg. -0.44 -0.50 -0.51 -0.63 0.24 0.27 -0.28 -0.40
Hourly sample: 2/01/2010 00:00 to 5/31/2017 23:00; GMT time-stamps.
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Table A2: Intraday correlation coefficient of liquidity measure, by trading hour
incl. CIP deviations
This table reports the average correlation coefficient by trading hour between spot market
and funding liquidity (ρCIPdevSpreadS ) and swap market and funding liquidity (ρ
CIPdev
SpreadF ) in two
sub-sample periods for the JPY/USD and EUR/USD exchange rates.
JPY/USD EUR/USD
















0 -0.37 -0.43 -0.50 -0.59 -0.41 -0.50 -0.30 -0.42
1 -0.41 -0.47 -0.49 -0.58 -0.41 -0.50 -0.31 -0.44
2 -0.42 -0.47 -0.50 -0.59 -0.38 -0.48 -0.32 -0.45
3 -0.41 -0.46 -0.46 -0.57 -0.42 -0.51 -0.27 -0.41
4 -0.41 -0.46 -0.50 -0.59 -0.40 -0.49 -0.27 -0.42
5 -0.36 -0.41 -0.48 -0.57 -0.40 -0.51 -0.25 -0.41
6 -0.39 -0.44 -0.49 -0.58 -0.38 -0.50 -0.30 -0.46
7 -0.43 -0.47 -0.39 -0.53 -0.33 -0.46 -0.23 -0.40
8 -0.41 -0.45 -0.32 -0.48 -0.30 -0.42 -0.26 -0.41
9 -0.46 -0.49 -0.36 -0.50 -0.28 -0.41 -0.23 -0.38
10 -0.45 -0.48 -0.48 -0.56 -0.29 -0.41 -0.38 -0.49
11 -0.42 -0.45 -0.49 -0.56 -0.36 -0.46 -0.42 -0.52
12 -0.41 -0.46 -0.51 -0.58 -0.35 -0.47 -0.40 -0.51
13 -0.40 -0.46 -0.47 -0.55 -0.33 -0.46 -0.35 -0.46
14 -0.40 -0.47 -0.48 -0.54 -0.27 -0.40 -0.35 -0.46
15 -0.36 -0.43 -0.50 -0.56 -0.27 -0.41 -0.41 -0.50
16 -0.41 -0.47 -0.53 -0.59 -0.37 -0.49 -0.49 -0.56
17 -0.41 -0.48 -0.53 -0.59 -0.38 -0.50 -0.51 -0.57
18 -0.43 -0.49 -0.52 -0.58 -0.33 -0.47 -0.33 -0.41
19 -0.43 -0.49 -0.50 -0.56 -0.32 -0.46 -0.34 -0.41
20 -0.40 -0.46 -0.48 -0.56 -0.33 -0.45 -0.27 -0.36
21 -0.38 -0.44 -0.44 -0.55 -0.28 -0.39 -0.27 -0.35
22 -0.46 -0.51 -0.48 -0.58 -0.29 -0.39 -0.21 -0.32
23 -0.42 -0.46 -0.49 -0.59 -0.33 -0.43 -0.17 -0.30
Avg. -0.41 -0.46 -0.47 -0.57 -0.34 -0.46 -0.32 -0.43
Hourly sample: 2/01/2010 00:00 to 5/31/2017 23:00; GMT time-stamps.
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Table A3: First principal component of liquidity measures by trading hour
This table reports the variation explained by the first principal component by trading hour
between spot market and funding liquidity (FdSpS ) and swap market and funding liquidity
(FdSpF ) in two sub-sample periods for the JPY/USD and EUR/USD exchange rates.
JPY/USD EUR/USD
















0 70.42 73.29 75.11 82.15 65.00 65.17 63.99 69.95
1 72.09 75.13 74.21 81.44 64.02 64.68 64.56 70.27
2 72.16 74.77 73.82 81.42 65.14 65.32 63.75 69.79
3 71.83 74.60 72.44 81.03 64.45 64.77 60.75 67.43
4 71.52 74.46 74.18 82.17 64.94 65.23 59.94 67.09
5 69.06 72.01 73.28 81.18 60.86 61.89 59.10 66.90
6 71.13 73.60 75.53 82.18 56.05 58.37 62.92 70.56
7 73.21 75.13 69.33 77.64 55.46 58.52 57.63 66.21
8 72.27 74.25 64.96 74.64 56.75 59.84 59.24 66.56
9 74.61 76.18 67.01 75.53 57.45 60.71 57.08 64.95
10 74.56 75.65 76.70 81.58 58.83 62.12 67.07 72.74
11 73.00 74.46 77.20 81.66 59.28 62.14 70.30 75.28
12 72.28 74.62 78.52 82.74 58.76 61.24 68.94 73.95
13 71.62 74.68 77.00 81.31 59.63 61.52 65.59 70.87
14 72.04 75.14 77.45 81.72 62.73 63.95 65.80 70.95
15 70.17 73.42 79.20 82.77 66.31 67.30 68.31 73.00
16 72.93 75.66 81.27 84.14 63.00 64.59 75.87 78.97
17 72.60 75.70 81.72 84.44 63.51 65.01 78.65 80.66
18 73.33 76.09 81.32 84.16 60.07 62.63 66.58 70.32
19 73.25 76.06 79.95 83.66 61.32 63.45 67.34 70.85
20 71.95 74.95 78.17 82.86 67.23 68.08 61.57 65.74
21 70.28 73.31 75.80 83.07 66.28 66.59 65.06 69.32
22 74.50 77.04 76.14 83.79 65.06 65.83 56.92 63.29
23 72.53 74.95 74.46 82.64 65.82 66.02 52.83 59.81
Avg. 72.22 74.80 75.62 81.66 62.00 63.54 64.16 69.81
Hourly sample: 2/01/2010 00:00 to 5/31/2017 23:00; GMT time-stamps.
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Table A4: First principal component of liquidity measures, by trading hour incl.
CIP deviations
This table reports the variation explained by the first principal component by trading hour
between spot market and funding liquidity (CIPdevSpreadS ) and swap market and funding liquidity
(CIPdevSpreadF ) in two sub-sample periods for the JPY/USD and EUR/USD exchange rates.
JPY/USD EUR/USD

















0 68.65 71.45 75.15 79.68 70.67 74.95 64.77 71.21
1 70.67 73.61 74.42 79.07 70.40 74.95 65.56 71.80
2 70.97 73.44 75.01 79.70 69.09 74.19 66.07 72.40
3 70.39 73.04 73.14 78.51 70.77 75.33 63.34 70.41
4 70.30 73.09 74.93 79.73 69.94 74.54 63.60 71.17
5 67.85 70.63 73.79 78.67 70.23 75.67 62.37 70.30
6 69.41 71.89 74.33 79.20 68.92 75.10 65.18 73.05
7 71.64 73.57 69.63 76.47 66.52 72.81 61.32 69.93
8 70.74 72.61 66.04 74.00 64.99 71.16 63.22 70.30
9 72.82 74.34 67.94 74.84 63.88 70.50 61.33 68.92
10 72.66 73.79 74.06 78.14 64.64 70.44 68.79 74.60
11 71.06 72.62 74.41 78.11 68.01 72.97 70.84 76.19
12 70.26 72.82 75.40 78.96 67.38 73.35 70.04 75.63
13 69.83 73.13 73.72 77.34 66.48 72.89 67.58 73.19
14 70.10 73.46 73.75 77.21 63.45 70.19 67.74 73.11
15 68.16 71.70 74.92 78.20 63.73 70.54 70.30 75.16
16 70.70 73.74 76.68 79.57 68.65 74.53 74.45 78.23
17 70.44 73.83 76.68 79.48 69.23 74.94 75.66 78.40
18 71.48 74.46 76.23 79.05 66.74 73.73 66.58 70.66
19 71.56 74.59 74.79 78.25 66.18 73.02 66.88 70.58
20 69.92 73.16 74.12 78.17 66.65 72.52 63.68 67.85
21 69.04 72.09 71.85 77.50 64.15 69.42 63.32 67.42
22 72.92 75.61 74.06 78.82 64.41 69.36 60.33 66.03
23 70.86 73.15 74.53 79.57 66.58 71.37 58.28 65.15
Avg. 70.52 73.16 73.73 78.26 67.15 72.85 65.89 71.74
Hourly sample: 2/01/2010 00:00 to 5/31/2017 23:00; GMT time-stamps.
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Table A5: Long-run dynamics in JPY/USD incl. CIP Deviation
This table reports coefficients from the long-run equation of a conditional error correction
model (ECM) derived from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model specification.
Specifically, for the two sub-sample periods and for spot and swap market liquidity, measured














where a vector zSh = (Spread
P




′ and LD, SD denotes large and small dealers. F-statistics based on the
results of the bound testing procedure for long-run relationship, robust to variables being
in between I(0) and I(1). Constant and coefficients on short-run effects omitted for brevity.
2/01/2010 00:00 6/30/2014 23:00 7/01/2014 00:00 5/31/2017 23:00
Variable: SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS
|CIPDev| 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.001***







SD 0.022*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.009***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




LD -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.001***





V olS 1.384*** 1.485*** 2.098*** 2.177***
(0.42) (0.43) (0.33) (0.23)
θ -0.07*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.10***
F − Stat 88.01 129.99 132.67 120.10 107.98 92.29
Hour dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.273 0.280 0.280 0.260 0.273 0.270
Obs 26484 26484 26484 17592 17592 17592
Hourly sample; GMT time-stamps. ARDL lags chosen based on the Schwarz (Bayes) cri-
terion (SC). HAC robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
F-statistic based on the Pesaran et al (2001) bounds test: 1% critical values 3.29 for I(0)
and 4.37 for I(1).
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Table A6: Long-run dynamics in EUR/USD incl. CIP Deviation
This table reports coefficients from the long-run equation of a conditional error correction
model (ECM) derived from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model specification.
Specifically, for the two sub-sample periods and for spot and swap market liquidity, measured














where a vector zSh = (Spread
P




′ and LD, SD denotes large and small dealers. F-statistics based on the
results of the bound testing procedure for long-run relationship, robust to variables being
in between I(0) and I(1). Constant and coefficients on short-run effects omitted for brevity.
Sub-sample period: 2/01/2010 00:00-12/31/2014 23:00 01/01/2015 00:00-5/31/2017 23:00
Variable: SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS
|CIPDev| 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.001***







SD -0.001 -0.002*** 0.003** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




LD -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.004





V olS 6.104*** 6.022*** 1.932*** 1.908***
(0.55) (0.54) (0.34) (0.33)
θ -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.11***
F − Stat 108.04 108.11 110.60 52.28 61.15 61.94
Hour dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.279 0.276 0.276 0.348 0.355 0.349
Obs 29457 29457 29457 14619 14619 14619
Hourly sample; GMT time-stamps. ARDL lags chosen based on the Schwarz (Bayes) cri-
terion (SC). HAC robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
F-statistic based on the Pesaran et al (2001) bounds test: 1% critical values 3.29 for I(0)
and 4.37 for I(1).
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Table A7: Long-run dynamics in JPY/USD incl. CIP Deviation by Bank Tiers
This table reports coefficients from the long-run equation of a conditional error correction
model (ECM) derived from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model specification.
Specifically, for the two sub-sample periods and for spot and swap market liquidity, measured














where a vector zSh = (Spread
P




′ and T1, T2, T3 denote the quoting intensity of Tier-1, Tier-2, and Tier-3
dealers, respectively. F-statistics based on the results of the bound testing procedure for
long-run relationship, robust to variables being in between I(0) and I(1). Constant and
coefficients on short-run effects omitted for brevity.
2/01/2010 00:00 6/30/2014 23:00 7/01/2014 00:00 5/31/2017 23:00
Variable: SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS
|CIPDev| 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004***







T2 0.017*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
QFT3/N
F
T3 0.043*** 0.018*** 0.030*** 0.018***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




T1 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.002***









V olS 1.341*** 1.369*** 1.945*** 1.998***
(0.41) (0.40) (0.29) (0.27)
θ -0.08*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.12***
F − Stat 83.53 114.17 114.61 126.34 105.31 94.65
Hour dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.28 0.282 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28
Obs 26484 26484 26484 17592 17592 17592
Hourly sample; GMT time-stamps. ARDL lags chosen based on the Schwarz (Bayes) cri-
terion (SC). HAC robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
F-statistic based on the Pesaran et al (2001) bounds test: 1% critical values 3.29 for I(0)
and 4.37 for I(1).
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Table A8: Long-run dynamics in EUR/USD incl. CIP Deviation
This table reports coefficients from the long-run equation of a conditional error correction
model (ECM) derived from an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model specification.
Specifically, for the two sub-sample periods and for spot and swap market liquidity, measured














where a vector zSh = (Spread
P




′ and T1, T2, T3 denote the quoting intensity of Tier-1, Tier-2, and Tier-3
dealers, respectively. F-statistics based on the results of the bound testing procedure for
long-run relationship, robust to variables being in between I(0) and I(1). Constant and
coefficients on short-run effects omitted for brevity.
Sub-sample period: 2/01/2010 00:00-12/31/2014 23:00 01/01/2015 00:00-5/31/2017 23:00
Variable: SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS SpreadF SpreadS SpreadS
|CIPDev| 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.004***







T2 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
QFT3/N
F
T3 -0.001*** 0.000 0.001* 0.001*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




T1 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.004***









V olS 5.643*** 5.992*** 1.386*** 1.887***
(0.53) (0.54) (0.28) (0.32)
θ -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.14*** -0.11***
F − Stat 93.32 100.49 95.28 44.65 69.87 53.36
Hour dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.279 0.278 0.276 0.348 0.377 0.350
Obs 26484 26484 26484 17592 17592 17592
Hourly sample; GMT time-stamps. ARDL lags chosen based on the Schwarz (Bayes) cri-
terion (SC). HAC robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
F-statistic based on the Pesaran et al (2001) bounds test: 1% critical values 3.29 for I(0)
and 4.37 for I(1).
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Table A9: Contagion from FX funding to market liquidity in JPY/USD, incl. CIP
Deviations
The table shows tests for contagion from FX funding liquidity to FX market liquidity in
spot and swaps. We follow Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and conduct a t-test of whether the
correlations between ∆CIPDev and ∆SpreadP is significantly more negative at quarter-
ends, where P = S, F . The correlation coefficients are estimated using a 200-hour rolling
window bi-variate VAR, and adjusted for heteroskedastic levels of volatility, thus allowing
to make statements about contagions rather than a simple co-movement.
To spot market: ∆CIPDev → ∆SpreadS
Q-end month Prior 2 months Contagion
QEs: ρQE σQE ρNQE σNQE t-stat Reject H0
09/14 0.007 0.012 -0.006 0.011 -17
12/14 0.019 0.021 -0.02 0.024 -24.53
03/15 0.035 0.045 0.024 0.059 -3.16
06/15 -0.01 0.054 0 0.058 2.63 Yes
09/15 0.005 0.008 -0.009 0.02 -17.2
12/15 0.029 0.042 0.027 0.054 -0.55
03/16 0.027 0.05 -0.008 0.097 -7.8
06/16 -0.075 0.087 -0.008 0.021 13.74 Yes
09/16 0.005 0.052 -0.081 0.081 -20.75
12/16 -0.077 0.047 0.004 0.049 24.97 Yes
03/17 -0.015 0.08 -0.051 0.068 -7.3
Avg. contagion -0.054 0.063 13.78 3/11 QEs
To forward market: ∆CIPDev → ∆SpreadF
Q-end month Prior 2 months Contagion
QEs: ρQE σQE ρNQE σNQE t-stat Reject H0
09/14 0.005 0.011 -0.007 0.011 -16.37
12/14 0.015 0.02 -0.023 0.022 -25.04
03/15 0.037 0.044 0.03 0.06 -2.04
06/15 -0.015 0.056 0.002 0.055 4.39 Yes
09/15 0.014 0.014 -0.011 0.02 -23.29
12/15 0.004 0.02 0.044 0.052 17.92
03/16 0.029 0.064 -0.012 0.093 -8.24
06/16 -0.059 0.099 -0.01 0.03 8.71 Yes
09/16 0.035 0.081 -0.029 0.086 -11.64
12/16 -0.088 0.045 -0.013 0.059 22.45 Yes
03/17 -0.021 0.075 -0.054 0.065 -7.18
Avg. contagion -0.054 0.067 11.85 3/11 QEs





, where P = F, S and all endogenous variables de-seasonalised
of hourly effects.
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Table A10: Contagion from FX funding to market liquidity in EUR/USD, incl.
CIP Deviations
The table shows tests for contagion from FX funding liquidity to FX market liquidity in
spot and swaps. We follow Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and conduct a t-test of whether the
correlations between ∆CIPDev and ∆SpreadP is significantly more negative at quarter-
ends, where P = S, F . The correlation coefficients are estimated using a 200-hour rolling
window bi-variate VAR, and adjusted for heteroskedastic levels of volatility, thus allowing
to make statements about contagions rather than a simple co-movement.
To spot market: ∆CIPDev → ∆SpreadS
Q-end month Prior 2 months Contagion
QEs: ρQE σQE ρNQE σNQE t-stat Reject H0
03/15 0.015 0.034 -0.064 0.108 -18.150
06/15 0.112 0.051 0.043 0.123 -12.910
09/15 0.021 0.043 -0.003 0.053 -7.860
12/15 -0.033 0.044 -0.005 0.067 7.810 Yes
03/16 0.126 0.053 0.054 0.046 -21.090
06/16 0.011 0.007 -0.002 0.023 -14.040
09/16 0.044 0.037 -0.080 0.065 -40.060
12/16 -0.123 0.072 0.040 0.058 35.020
03/17 -0.039 0.041 -0.074 0.150 -6.120 Yes
Avg. contagion -0.078 0.058 21.42 2/9 QEs
To forward market: ∆CIPDev → ∆SpreadF
Q-end month Prior 2 months Contagion
QEs: ρQE σQE ρNQE σNQE t-stat Reject H0
03/15 0.019 0.034 -0.073 0.11 -20.89
06/15 0.101 0.049 0.009 0.114 -18.58
09/15 0.021 0.042 -0.027 0.062 -15.2
12/15 -0.04 0.04 -0.021 0.064 5.46 Yes
03/16 0.153 0.058 0.053 0.043 -27.12
06/16 -0.01 0.029 -0.003 0.025 3.64 Yes
09/16 0.057 0.036 -0.07 0.063 -42.09
12/16 -0.11 0.071 0.029 0.057 30.59 Yes
03/17 -0.043 0.039 -0.074 0.159 -5.14
Avg. contagion -0.053 0.047 13.23 3/9 QEs
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Gregoriou, Greg N., Georges Hübner, and Maher Kooli, 2010, Performance and persistence
of commodity trading advisors: Further evidence, Journal of Futures Markets 30, 725–
752.
Griffin, John M., and Jin Xu, 2009, How smart are the smart guys? a unique view from
hedge fund stock holdings, The Review of Financial Studies 22, 2531–2570.
Gruber, Martin J., 1996, Another puzzle: The growth in actively managed mutual funds,
The Journal of Finance 51, 783–810.
Hasbrouck, Joel, and Richard M. Levich, 2017, Fx market metrics: New findings based on
cls bank settlement data, Working Paper 23206, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Huang, Roger D., and Ronald W. Masulis, 1999, Fx spreads and dealer competition across
the 24-hour trading day, The Review of Financial Studies 12, 61–93.
Ibbotson, Roger G., and Peng Chen, 2006, The a,b,cs of hedge funds: Alphas, betas, and
costs, Technical report.
152
IMF, 2014, Annual report on exchange rate arrangements and exchange restrictions 2014 1
– 109.
Jankowitsch, Rainer, Amrut Nashikkar, and Marti G. Subrahmanyam, 2011, Price disper-
sion in otc markets: A new measure of liquidity, Journal of Banking and Finance 35, 343
– 357.
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